

Encouraging Negotiation in South Africa

How, Who and When

Timo Kivimäki

A study based on a project commissioned by the
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Copenhagen, March 7, 2001,

Timo Kivimäki

Introduction

The end of the Cold War and the rise of ethnic and nationalist conflicts have reprioritized the agenda of international relations and diplomacy. One of the prominent new issues is how different approaches of conflict management by international actors might contribute to the transformation of settings, which are known to produce violent disputes, to the settlement of disputes before they become conflicts² and to the containment of violent escalation of conflicts if they cannot be avoided.³ Among the general problems of conflict management, this study addresses the problem of how to encourage dialogue between the disputants and how to push the conflict towards negotiation on its resolution. The theoretical models of conflict management offer some explanations for these problems but involve major paradoxes and contradictions as well. One paradox is related to the timing of conflict management efforts to enter into negotiations, another to the question of which party should be influenced in this activity. A third paradox in conflict management is related to the fact that in rational bargaining, influence used to persuade one party to compromise is reacted to by the rational opponent by increasing one's own claims: after all, if claims for terms of negotiation are adjusted with the agents' relative bargaining strength, any externally caused increase in bargaining strength calls for a readjustment in demands.

On the one hand, it is known that a negotiation effort needs to be ripe for a solution: there needs to be enough political will before anything constructive can be done.⁴ However, it is equally common knowledge that conflicts are easier to settle and negotiate before they escalate and spawn increased hostility, a rise of hatred, war propaganda, etc.⁵ The question here is not so much about when the first moves towards a settlement are made as it is about when the situation is pushed to the point where things cannot continue as usual so that decisions on escalation into a full-scale war or negotiation and resolution need to be made. In South Africa, moral condemnation or the arms embargo did not force the government to make these crucial decisions; it was full-scale economic sanctions together with the African Nationalist Congress' (ANC) campaign to render the country ungovernable, which finally, forced action. Either the government had to start using extreme military means to solve the "problem of terrorism" or it needed to negotiate with, and compromise with its opponent.

On the other hand, it is integral to the realist mainstream position that outside intervention in conflict should avoid disturbing the balance of forces: support for the underdog can only lengthen a conflict by giving hope to the ultimate loser.⁶ Yet, any morality in diplomacy would suggest

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supporting the weaker, oppressed party in the conflict. Even though the international conflict management action hardly ever chooses sides in an absolute manner and pressures only one of the parties, it can be said that sometimes pressure is more focused on one side than on the other. While the international community very early sought to increase its power over the ANC, strongly pressuring it later on to abandon violent strategies and accept the Peace Accords in 1991, it seems fair to say that the main pressure was towards the government.

Thirdly, in order to produce compromises, agents involved in a dispute need to be moved towards each other. At the same time, however, moving one side should be done in a way in which the other is not provoked to demand more. Here the crucial question is how the international community managed to pressure the government without encouraging the ANC to take a firmer stand towards compromises.

The present study examines these three paradoxes of avoiding provocation, choosing sides and timing one's intervention in the context of the South African conflict between the ANC (African National Congress) alliance and the government. The interpretation of the conflict – i.e., whether it is a racial, class conflict, communal dispute or a conflict between the racists and the non-racialists or between the legal order and subversion – is one of the disputes in the conflict between the ANC and the government. Therefore, it is difficult to refer to and define the focus of this study without taking sides in the dispute about the dispute (meta-bargaining). When I use the expressions "the conflict" or "the conflict between the ANC and the government," I refer only to the conflict over apartheid. Conflicts between the ANC and the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), for example, are ruled out here.

Defining the ANC and the government as unitary actors is, of course, an over-simplification. The ANC consisted of many different factions: its elite, according to Hennie Kotzie⁷, differed greatly in its socialization and thought from the grassroots forces; the political positions of the exiled ANC elite and the South African ANC elite, according to Nelson Mandela's biography⁸, were very different, the ANC militants and "the diplomats" used very different strategies; and the macroeconomists of the ANC⁹ and the revolutionists had very different views about the commitment to economic nationalism and socialism.

At the same time, the government forces consisted of very different forces: extremely committed elements in the police force, legalistically and rigidly oriented people at the Ministry of Law and Order (Minister Adrian Vlok, for instance); and liberal forces and early opponents of apartheid like President Frederick De Klerk and Professor Willie Esterhuise (who represented the government unofficial negotiating panel at meetings with the ANC beginning 1986).¹⁰

The actor ANC and the actor apartheid government can, however, be identified by focusing on the official declaratory policies of the sides, which effectively restricted the freedom of individuals within the sides and unified the appearance of the moves by individual agents within the ANC and the

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government towards each other. Even if the ANC's Macro Economic Group, MERG, could use its influence to liberalize the ANC's economic posture in the internal discussions of the movement, it could not make compromises as it pleased towards the government on behalf of the ANC. Here, the official declaratory position of the ANC restricted its freedom. Similarly, even though many individuals within the apartheid government did not consider ANC members terrorists, the public official rhetoric of the ANC prevented the members of the cabinet from negotiating (at least officially or in public) with the ANC.¹¹

The study of international diplomacy is restricted here to the analysis of measures of the western democracies. This is not to say that the block of non-democratic socialist countries would not have been meaningful. Yet, the power strategies of the former communist countries were very different and their special characteristics were not interesting from the point of view of a study, which is interested in finding lessons and prescriptions for future diplomatic interventions by the democratic powers. Many of the peculiarities of the power diplomacy of the Soviet bloc were indeed historically interesting and in many respects have relevance in today's diplomacy of totalitarian nations. Yet, due to the research interests of the present study, the lessons from Western (not only the allies of the US, but all democratic nations) diplomacy are found more relevant and are thus focused on here.

The studied measures vary from the moral, normative, cultural, political and economic pressures and sanctions of foreign governments to the influence of external non-governmental economic and non-economic international agents and to the "diplomacy of the market." It is recognized that there is no coherent "international actor" in the South African conflict, but rather several individual - even conflicting - strategies by several actors as well as the conflicting pressures within each individual international actor. Yet, in many general approaches, the international community managed to create some consensus and coordination, which makes it easier to study the overall influence of the "international community."

Historically, the focus of studied measures is the 1970s and 1980s, because it was these measures that contributed to the beginning of negotiations at the end of the 1980s. The Western conflict management did not end in the 1990s, but since most of this conflict management took place in a context of existing negotiation, the problems were slightly different from in the case of encouraging negotiation. Most of the measures by the Western community of nations encouraged the continuation of negotiation and promoted compromises within negotiations rather than establishing preconditions for negotiations.

External influence was studied on both sides by investigating with interviews and with content analyses of documents the external motives at each step of compromise in politics, economics, and negotiation strategy - for example, questions such as the use of violence in support of claims. In order to provide a framework for the interpretations and an understanding of

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the outcome, an idealization of the purposeful logic of the bargaining is introduced.¹²

The management of conflict in South Africa can easily be categorized as a successful undertaking. Even if violence was certainly not prevented - indeed 22 000 people died during the last ten years of conflict (1984-1994, SAIRR 1996) and the politics of apartheid contained a lot of structural and open violence for decades - escalation into a full scale bloodbath was prevented. Furthermore, even though we believe that the foreign interference in the dispute was not always beneficial or that it did not eclipse domestic efforts, there are some grounds for believing that the theory of conflict management can gain something from the South African experience.

The intention here is to produce, with the help of this case study, some theory elements for a better understanding of conflict management and conflict resolution. South Africa is taken as a starting point or a pilot case for the production of hypotheses, on the basis of the theory elements created, for a more systematic analysis of timing and focusing in conflict. In particular, a clarification of the condition of a "desperate bargainer" and its implications on the timing and focusing of peace efforts is aimed at with the theoretical interpretation of the South African case.

Bargaining for Terms of Social Peace and Stability in South Africa

One of the problems in the application of formal bargaining models is the assumption that it is easy for purposeful agents to reach a Pareto-optimal outcome: a solution to which there are no alternatives, which would be better for both disputants. In reality, as Fisher and Ury¹³ have shown, reaching the Pareto-optimal frontier - the frontier where bargaining becomes purely a matter of distribution - requires a lot of effort towards mutual gains. Reaching agreements and mutual gains is not, however, the only problem in conflict resolution. The traditional concern of formal bargaining theories on the question of distribution and terms of agreement is still relevant in any negotiation process. Otherwise, peace¹⁴ would be very easy to achieve, even unilaterally: laying down one's arms and retracting all demands would almost certainly work in any conflict. However, as we take into consideration the question of terms, things get complicated. Thus in every conflict resolution process, working for mutual gain is one problem and the distribution element is another. It is easy to see how determination - sensitivity to (as opposed to indifference to) the terms of peace - is an

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important factor influencing the prospect of peace as well as the terms of a potential settlement.

Determination not to yield on one's terms increases the chances of getting advantageous peace terms, if peace is eventually achieved, yet reduces the chances that a settlement will actually be reached. As long as the white government, backed by its white constituency, was sure of the legitimacy of apartheid, it was determined to continue. Thus it was very difficult to persuade the government to compromise, and the prospect of a negotiated solution was, therefore, very remote.

At the same time, the ANC was determined to keep extensive nationalization on the economic agenda as a condition for a settlement, and it was unlikely to yield on this demand. With this determination, however, the prospects of a settlement between the socialist black/non-racial nationalists and the cold-war-minded capitalist apartheid regime were also slim. Fortunately, the collapse of the communist economies had a tremendous effect in softening the rhetoric of the ANC on economic issues.¹⁵ Yet there seemed to be no indication of a declining determination on any matters other than economic policies: the collapse of communism certainly did not reduce the ANC's persistence in ending the apartheid. Desperate determination to fight apartheid seemed to be a factor that could not be changed all through the process of conflict resolution.

It is also comprehensible that the less dependent a bargaining party is on achieving peace, the less likely it is to concede to a peace agreement on just any terms. Yet the very dependence on non-violence is the essence of the ripeness for the solution of a conflict: if the bargainers are not sufficiently dependent on an early cessation of violence, the conflict bargaining is not ripe for peace.

Thus inasmuch as the conflict did not sufficiently hurt the white government, there was not enough ripeness on the official side to make any genuine efforts towards an acceptable solution for the apartheid conflict. It seems that a feeling of dependence grew among white people during the further radicalization of the non-racial masses that at the end of the 1980s already constituted a serious threat to the well-being of the white community.¹⁶ At the same time the leadership started to perceive that only a solution that would accommodate the wishes of the majority, not South African international public relations, could convince the international audience that the time for sanctions was over.¹⁷ For the ANC, dependence on the negotiations, "the collapse of the faith in a hegemonic strategy," came later, at the end of the 1980s, when the main supplier of ANC weaponry, the Soviet Union, had reached a state of 'imperial overreach' and ceased her support.¹⁸ After that, even the most radical ANC fighters had to confess that militarily the anti-apartheid movement did not stand a chance. Yet the desperate determination to end apartheid made the ANC side prefer a losing battle to surrender.

It has been established elsewhere¹⁹ that in bargaining between purposeful (rational) agents all factors affecting the bargaining power -

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ability to influence the terms of an agreement - can be reduced to the above-mentioned concepts of dependence (on a peaceful solution) and determination (with regard to the terms of a solution). Thus all promotion of one's bargaining power seems to conflict with the mutual interest of bargainers in ending hostilities and settling disputes peacefully. Yet bargaining models assume that rational negotiators are able to solve their differences no matter how small their dependence (as long as conflict is not beneficial) or how great their determination. This is rationalized by the assumption of mutual understanding of the strategic nature and symmetry of the bargaining situation: even though the government was rather determined on the question of rights of self-determination of different races/cultures, it was willing to compromise on the principle when it seemed that the opponents' even stronger commitment to non-raciality threatened the whole peace process. Rational agents concede if their relative bargaining power forces them to do so. This logic was clearly demonstrated in the South African Afrikaner discussion of realism vs. idealism in the racial dilemma, within the Afrikaner Broederbond, an organization, which promoted Afrikaner values. In these discussions, the question was not whether the Afrikaner principle of self-determination was just, but how much of this principle could be afforded in the context of existing social realities.²⁰

In the South African conflict, the assumption of mutual understanding of the strategic nature and symmetry of the bargaining situation was limited, as in so many other conflicts, by two factors: differences in perception and interpretation of the conflict and commitments before interaction. These factors became obstacles to rational compromise.²¹

Firstly, the agents had different perceptions of the negotiation setting, resulting in differing views of the determination and dependence of each other. This difference in perceptions is not merely a question of one party having the wrong facts but, instead, of parties creating their social realities in an incompatible fashion.²² The perceptions and myths behind extreme determination or weak feeling of dependence were not necessarily misperceptions or expressions of some false consciousness, but rather they were simply differences in orienting oneself to normative and social realities. Related to this, rational compromises were difficult given the different interpretations of the dispute in the conflicting camps, and some of the violence can, indeed, be explained as an effort to influence the others' perception by demonstrating one's determination and lack of dependence on a peaceful solution.

When the ANC expressed its determination to end apartheid, it did so within an interpretation of the South African conflict as a liberation struggle. However, since the government did not accept and fought against the ANC construction of the conflict, it could not assess the ANC's bargaining position within the ANC's interpretation. The government position on the ANC leverage was based on a conception of the conflict as one between a legitimate state and an externally funded and led group of terrorists.²³ Later in the 1980s, ANC leverage was assessed in the context of a struggle between one white and several black communities, of which the

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black communities depended entirely on white-owned businesses for their income. Similarly, when the ANC assessed the government's bargaining leverage, it saw the government as the last exponent of colonialist oppression, desperately fighting against the objective processes of emancipation,²⁴ while the white government based its determination on a Christian mission to protect God's order and the global cause of the free world against Communist totalitarianism.²⁵ Thus, quite obviously, neither side saw its relative bargaining position as requiring any adjustments or major compromises.²⁶

The second problem with rational concessions in South Africa was in the measures both sides used to commit themselves to strengthen their determination. Bargainers tended to seek leverage through determination by creating dogmatic populist posture ("true believer") cultures and by making promises of determination to their constituencies.²⁷ Also, violent actions in prolonged, hostile bargaining can create emotional commitments to determination and independence: if the adversary has killed one's brother, he becomes an enemy, and yielding to an enemy is worse than yielding to an adversary.

The perception of the ANC as a group of terrorists (a strategy of demonizing the opponent) or the promises of Mandela at the outset of serious negotiations concerning the non-negotiable stand on extensive nationalizations²⁸ made the stands of both sides more rigid and rendered it difficult for both adversaries to make rational compromises despite the fact that their relative bargaining positions would have warranted such compromises.

South African Lessons for Conflict Management: Avoiding Provocation

On the basis of our examination of the dilemmas of the bargaining on the terms of social peace in South Africa, we already have an inkling of where to look for the problems to tackle by conflict management in order to facilitate negotiation. First of all, any efforts to facilitate the dispute resolution have to keep in mind both the effort towards mutual gains and the problem of the terms of peace: the peace process is about progress and compromises - steps towards mutual gains and steps that contradict the original partial demands of conflicting parties. Therefore, external influence on a conflict is about brainstorming how to produce mutual gains and attacking the strongholds of partial interests and bargaining power: the agents' independence with regard to a solution and their determination in relation to the terms (attacking independence, attacking determination).

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In the context of rational bargaining, external influence to reduce one party's dependence does not necessarily bring the process closer to a solution. If the opponent of the weakened bargainer understands the strategic nature of bargaining, he realizes that the weakening of the other party means the strengthening of his own position, and this reduces his incentive to compromise. It has been said that the weakening of the white government through sanctions contributed to an increase in strength and determination in the ANC and, thus, in addition to delegitimizing apartheid contributed to the increase in violence in South Africa between 1984 and 1994. According to the South African Conservative Party, the willingness of the National Party Government to reform apartheid (late 1970s, 1980s) increased the ANC's perception of its own bargaining power and encouraged the radical opposition to promote the objectives of radical revolution.²⁹

Yet, there are many incidents in the conflict management in South Africa where one party could be affected without affecting the other. One of the most important of these was related to the way how Western diplomacy contributed to the weakening of the rationalization of apartheid based on cold war ideology. Since the South African government leaned to the West, its anti-apartheid opponents were associated with the anti-Western, communist camp, and thereby the government believed that fighting the anti-apartheid forces was a Western obligation.³⁰ This interpretation had been the key component of pro-apartheid argumentation, which again was the backbone of the legitimization of the political determination to marginalize the ANC.³¹ The Defence White Papers of 1973 and 1977 made this clear: white sovereignty was closely associated with Western order. With this mindset "the State completely misread what was happening in the townships ...relying on the distorted information being fed by the right-wing security policemen...seduced by the militance of township rhetorics, the State took township protest for revolution...".³² According to many leading analysts of South Africa, the cold war explanation of apartheid gained some of its credibility because of the war in Angola and Mozambique, in which South Africa was actually fighting against the communist powers, who also supported the anti-apartheid forces of South Africa.³³

What had made the cold war legitimization of apartheid so powerful was the fact that through the logic of cold war, all criticism of the Western-oriented South African Government was treated as an onslaught of communist forces: "permissiveness, and related ideologies.. exaggerated individual freedom, one-man-one-vote ... boycotts, isolation, demonstrations ... all in the same bag of threats to western order".³⁴ This way of marginalizing the opponent of apartheid was closely associated with the government's inability to make rational compromises, since it made it difficult for liberal South Africans, neutral countries, or even the United Nations (who would then be marginalized as agents of the communist bloc) to brake it.³⁵ Thus the intervention of the West itself was needed for the transformation of the government's perception of the link between the cold war and apartheid.³⁶

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The normative pressure (not to mention the Arms Embargo of South Africa [UNSC] in 1977) by the West against the apartheid government eventually eroded the credibility of the National Party's interpretation of the conflict with the ANC-led opposition. If the West condemned the apartheid, how could the white government see itself fighting side by side with the "free world" against the enemies of democracy? In addition, the criticism and strong measures of "free world governments" and the condemnation of global capitalist markets suggested to the government that perhaps apartheid was neither a way to contain Communism nor to advance capitalism. The position (meta-bargaining position) was further weakened by the fact that because it needed markets the government also had to approach the Eastern European nations. According to Magnus Malan, the top official at the South African Defence Forces, also the reduction of the communist threat after the victories in Angola also paved the way for negotiations.³⁷ The death knell for the anti-communist rationale of anti-ANC policies was naturally struck in the collapse of Communism at the end of the 1980s.

In addition to the strategic influence through international public opinion, the diplomatic measures ranged from voluntary (1963) and mandatory (1977) arms embargos and oil embargos (OPEC in 1973, UNGA in 1963, 1975, 1976, 1978 and 1979) the trade and financial sanctions after 1985. These measures affected the credibility of the idea of association between capitalism and apartheid. Since the latter half of 1960, the apartheid restrictions against black education had seriously hampered South Africa's competitive position, as further modernization of the South African economy and production would have required a larger better-educated labor force.³⁸ Thus, to an important degree, apartheid had already in the 1970s started to conflict with the interests of capitalist development. International intervention and the popular disgust among western customers towards apartheid reduced the demand not only for South African products but also for products produced by companies, which had economic ties with South Africa. As a result of economic efforts by the diplomatic community and Western consumers, the international capital movements also started to play a role in weakening the perceived link between capitalism and apartheid.

Immediately after the British Commonwealth, the EC and the US had declared their restrictions on trade, 400 companies withdrew their assets. During August 1985, US banks alone withdrew \$400 million from the South African economy, and between 1984 and 1989 the South African economy lost a total of \$40 billion of foreign investments,³⁹ inflation exceeded 15% and growth stopped at 1% per annum⁴⁰. This, in addition to other problems caused by apartheid, undermined the credibility of the South African economy and the value of the rand. Within a year from August 1984, the value of the rand dropped by half; in 1990 its value was approximately one third of what it had been in 1980. By 1985 South African capitalist business interests had visibly turned against apartheid, beginning negotiations with the ANC. When both the public Western pressure and the pressure of the capitalist markets supported an end to apartheid, sustaining the

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rationalization that apartheid was part of the Western capitalist battle against communism was very difficult.⁴¹

According to Rupert Taylor, Willie Esterhuysen⁴² and many others, the fall of the cold war rationale was one of the most important requirements for the government decision to negotiate. Only in the 1980s and especially during the latter half of it did discussion about apartheid in the white-serving South African media start to analyze the South African political options on the basis of pragmatic utility calculations rather than in terms of dogmatic and ideological principles. Not until then did opinion polls register the fears of prominent Afrikaners of things getting worse (54%)⁴³, the prospect of apartheid being a threat to the well-being of South Africans (81.1%)⁴⁴ and the assessments of factors that would be better in black majority rule, such as foreign investment (better 54.8%, worse 34.4%)⁴⁵, trade with the West (61% better, 25.1% worse), African trade (71.6% saying better, 9.1% worse), economic growth (24% better, 67.7% worse), free enterprise (33.4% better, 48.3% worse), world acceptance (87.5% better), and corruption and efficiency (the majority saying they would be worse).

While the cold war interpretation had been the backbone of the government's determination against the ANC, the weakening of this source of government determination did not alter the ANC's perception of its own relative bargaining strength. After all, the ANC never accepted the government's construction of the conflict, so the collapse of that construction did not reduce the ANC's motives for compromise. This is the reason why non-provocative action could be taken.

Sanctions might have been associated with some of the problems in the ANC's ability to make rational compromises and especially the problems of the violence within the anti-apartheid camp. According to Blalock,⁴⁶ the creation of pre-committing war mythologies is related to the mobilization priorities and to the problem that the temptation to free-ride in the conflict effort increases as the costs of conflict increase. If the sanctions were costly for the individual supporters of the ANC, there was a need among the ANC elite to motivate its supporters to accept these costs by increasing the role of rigid dogmas and norms boosting the fighting spirit. This was very clear in the division of the anti-apartheid camp between the sanctions-supporting ANC and the Inkatha movement, which resisted sanctions. To sustain the sanction-supporting climate, normative pressures needed to be created against those who did not support the sanctions. Such people were treated as traitors, and thus yielding in the question of sanctions towards the position of the government risked the normative sanctions of the true believers of the anti-apartheid battle. Furthermore, to play down the perception of the costs of sanctions for the ANC supporters, the ANC elite needed to understate and underestimate the contribution of global markets to the welfare of South Africans.⁴⁷ This, again, increased the commitment by the ANC to economic nationalism.

Another myth the white government had insisted on was an interpretation that the white community was defending itself against "paganism" and against "godless ideologies".⁴⁸ If the issue was not about

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secular utilities, but “higher” principles were at stake, there was no justification for any white Christians in South Africa, for yielding and compromising towards the opponent. Compared to the holy mission, economic hardship could only have weight to change opinions of cowards and traitors.

However, the moralistic criticism of fellow Christian nations, the sides taken by Christian NGOs and especially the attention given in the form of a Nobel Prize to the ANC’s Bishop Desmond Tutu weakened the credibility of the view that Vorster and Botha were on a Christian mission. According to some analysts, the collapse of this meta-game position was crucial. For example, John Kane-Berman (Director of the South African Institute of Race Relations) claims that the change of heart in the Afrikaner community was caused by the South African Dutch Reformed Church condemnation of apartheid in the latter half of the 1980s.⁴⁹ The conscious efforts of some anti-apartheid Afrikaners to explode this myth of apartheid also had an important role at least within the intellectual community and the political elite. In particular, arguments based on the Holy Bible in their dissociation of apartheid and Christian values, and in fact condemning apartheid as sin, were very important contributions in the weakening of this source of rational compromise to negotiate.⁵⁰

On the side of the ANC, the most problematic interpretation of the battle was the idea that the anti-apartheid campaign was a battle comparable to the anti-colonialist liberation battles.⁵¹ Even Mandela used this association, for example when during his visit to the USA in 1990 he compared the ANC with George Washington, Lincoln and others responsible for the end of the British colonialism in America.⁵² On the one hand, this liberation mythology glorified military solutions. On the other, it was not compatible with the idea of the non-racialist cause and the idea of making it safe for the supporters of apartheid to back off their cause. It seems that most of the work against militarist liberation mentality in the ANC was done by the members of the South African anti-apartheid coalition and by changes in the international setting. Those people of the ANC who saw the role of military battle as crucial, and those who felt that negotiations should only start after a military victory by the ANC were discouraged by the first signs of the fall of communism in 1987 when the economic support from the communist bloc to the military battle started to erode and the Soviet Union started to push the ANC towards accommodation. Getting rid of militarism in the ANC anti-apartheid campaign was also probably pushed by those Western leaders⁵³ who, after Mandela’s release in February 1990, did not see strong reasons for the continuation of sanctions. It is probable that there is a connection between Mandela’s visit to the UK and the USA in June 1990 and the initiative in July 1990 by Joe Slovo,⁵⁴ leader of the South African Communist Party, to stop armed resistance in order to give peace a chance.

In addition to fighting harmful myths -- the international community, or more specifically, a senior British Foreign Office official, Sir Rennick -- contributed to the facilitation of unofficial interaction and meetings between

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people on both fronts of the conflict. A formula was sought to make it politically possible for important people trusted by the government, administration, academic community and the movement of Afrikaner nationalism (especially the Afrikaner Broederbond) to meet secretly with the exiled ANC representatives in London (later more officially in France and Switzerland). At the same time, a similar process was initiated within the country, with the jailed ANC leadership. Even if this kind of meeting could always be explained by the government as a strategy of the official anti-terrorist intelligence -- one of the participants of these meetings was Neil Barnard and later also Mike Louw, senior intelligence officers from the National Intelligence Services⁵⁵ -- it had an important function in bringing closer the views between the camps. According to one of the Afrikaner participants in the London process, the two-day negotiations each week had an important role in exposing the stereotypes of the opponent held by both sides. The fact that the Friday meetings, unlike the Saturday meetings, were social rather than businesslike contributed to this revelation when both sides uncovered the *people*, with ordinary human interests, behind the ANC/government labels. Thabo Mbeki put it very nicely, saying that these were the occasions when both sides realized that their opponents did not have horns on their heads.⁵⁶

It seems that attacks on the determination and independence of negotiators ought to avoid provoking the opponent to increase his demands and refuse concessions. In addition to producing mutual gains, external influence should try to give each bargaining party reasons for concession, which do not affect the other side. This is possible if the diplomatic influence concentrates on *reducing the obstacles to rational compromises*, which can be done by dispelling differences in the perceptions of the relative bargaining positions and differences in interpretations of the conflict. Bringing the opponents together unofficially and weakening myths that make one side more determined but which are not shared by the other side can reduce one side's determination not to negotiate, without making the other more determined, thus bringing conflicting parties closer to each other. Furthermore, the international action can have success especially in areas, which, for some reason, are inaccessible to the parties in conflict (such as advocating the weakening of the cold war legitimization of apartheid).

Pressure Against the Strong or Against the Weak

Anything conflict management can do to solve disputes on an impartial basis is naturally desirable. However, the international community has increasingly found itself compelled to pressure one side while exerting less influence on the other, as occurred in the case of South Africa as well as in

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the Bosnian war, the Serbo-Croatian conflict, the Gulf War, North Korea and Haiti.

For a long time, the realist "morale" of international relations has suggested that moralist interventions on the side of the underdog are in fact immoral whenever involvement is not intended to have a permanent impact on the balance of power between the disputants.⁵⁷ The impact of such a moralist intervention, according to realists, prolongs the violent dispute between the stronger party and the underdog: when the underdog is deluded by external forces into believing that it is not dependent on a non-violent solution, violence will go on. An asymmetrical conflict can only stop when the stronger party has achieved its objectives militarily or when the weaker side has finally become convinced of its opponent's superiority and acceded to his demands. For the realists, violence is an active use of coercive power resources, and an asymmetrical conflict is a straightforward matter of a violent power game where, to use our concepts of bargaining, the motive for the underdog to concede is its dependence on a solution (in order not to get hurt). The realist logic has received some empirical evidence in the study of civil wars and communal conflicts: an undeniable dominance of the top dog has been found to reduce the probability of hostilities.⁵⁸

The realist approach to the South African conflict was chosen by the US intelligence community (not the USA itself), which, by providing intelligence to the apartheid government (as a *quid pro quo* for South African services), helped to stabilize the white order. Having a superior opponent, the destabilizing anti-apartheid forces were then supposed to act rationally and avoid the onset of violence.

The realist approach to conflict management has been criticized from the conceptual point of view. At the beginning of the 1970s, Johan Galtung⁵⁹ deconstructed the order/status quo bias of the realist concept of violence by articulating a new, structural usage of the concept of violence. In Galtung's analytical apparatus, violence exists not only where the underdog believes that it could challenge the exploitative terms of peace by initiating armed interaction but also in the stable exploitative terms of "peace." Lost years of human life are the chief criterion in Galtung's operationalization of violence: if apartheid puts part of the population in an inferior position compared to a non-racial, non-exclusive condition, and the life expectancy declines as a result, years of human life are lost quite as if there were an open conflict with people people being killed.

Secondly, the realist prescription of helping the strong can be criticized from the critical position on normative grounds. The association of conflict resolution with the aim of stability and the status quo implies a normative commitment to conservatism. Alternatively the function of conflict resolution could be seen as emancipation and change for the better, not just consolidation of the existing order.⁶⁰

The effort to bring about positive changes and reduce violence, which has become part of the status quo and order, was clearly demonstrated in the anti-apartheid diplomacy of the international community in the 1970s and

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1980s⁶¹. By shifting the balance of forces and bargaining power in favor of the underdog, the international community intended to reduce the violence in the terms of social peace in South Africa.

The realist rationale for helping the stronger party to maintain stability can also be criticized in terms of an interest in reducing the probability and intensity of active hostilities (in contrast to structural violence). According to the socio-psychological approach of international negotiations put forward by Hadjipavlou-Trigeorgis and Trigeorgis,⁶² hostility is not necessarily prolonged/caused because of delusions by the weaker party concerning its relative strength, but, instead, because the weaker side cannot live with the terms of peace imposed upon it by the stronger bargainer. The socio-psychological approach stresses the need to take socio-psychological realities into consideration when terms of peace are drafted. Otherwise a peace agreement cannot last.⁶³

To integrate this into our conceptual system, the problem of the realist conflict management is that it concentrates only on increasing the sense of dependence of the weaker side and does not sufficiently take into account that the needed compromises on the weaker side can be pending because of the desperate determination caused by its not being able to live with the terms which compromises would lead to. Finland did not want to fight the Winter War against the Soviet Union because it thought it could win it, but because it could not live with the anticipated terms of peace (the Estonian fate). Thus, in this case, pressure (highlighting the costs of conflict) on Finland would not have helped to avoid the war. Similarly, the realist conflict resolution effort by Henry Kissinger at the beginning of the 1970s in Vietnam did not succeed even though the bombings probably proved to the Communists in Vietnam that they should be dependent on peace. Yet, desperation led them to hold on to their determination and not to yield. Realist overemphasis on the manipulation of dependence might, in cases of desperate underdogs, lead to a need to "destroy the village in order to stabilize it."

According to many assessments by scholars of the South African transformation,⁶⁴ the black community of South Africa could be regarded as a desperate underdog; this interpretation receives some support from the opinion polls of 1986 and 1987⁶⁵ and from the experiences of some desperate uprisings in 1963 and 1976 as well as increasingly frequent ones after 1984. It seems that in the absence of compromise on the apartheid terms of stability, South Africa would have lapsed into civil war no matter how strong the repressive machinery of the white establishment was and no matter how little hope there was for the ANC coalition to win militarily. According to Cyril Ramaphosa, who later became the ANC's chief negotiator, and Nelson Mandela, South Africa was already moving in this direction in 1987.⁶⁶ According to polls of primarily urban, male, professional blacks in 1987, attitudes towards violence had become more radical despite the fact that very few people believed violence would bring about a solution to the conflict.⁶⁷

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Desperation among black South Africans was partly based on absolute objective factors of survival. Compared to neighboring nations, South Africans were better off, by standard economic measures. However, the subordinate position of black South Africans and their direct exposure to coercion and repression by the coercive apparatus of the state made their situation unbearable. Furthermore, the perception of the conditions of black people was based on availability heuristics - judgment of situations made on the basis of easily available evidence and easy comparisons rather than on objective observation of living conditions.⁶⁸ If the blacks, as a group, saw themselves as the most repressed of all in South Africa, it was natural for them to think that they had nothing to lose, even if the living conditions were not extreme when measured objectively. This also conforms to Gurr's logic of relative deprivation, according to which the sense of being repressed is not based on absolute matters but either on subjective comparisons with past wealth or with the wealth enjoyed by other people in the society.⁶⁹

The moral basis for desperation among black South Africans was also important. After the defeat of absolute racism during World War II and during the colonial wars,⁷⁰ and after the progress made in the United States related to racial equality, the South African black community felt that apartheid was an anomaly and simply morally too wrong to be tolerated. Thus it seems that the only way to deal with the South African problem was not to manipulate the dependence of the weaker party, but to take its determination as a socio-psychological reality and concentrate on influencing the stronger. By compromises on the stronger side (change in the terms of social peace), it is possible to reduce the desperate determination to continue the struggle of the weaker side and thereby reduce the socio-psychological obstacles to peace.

The diplomacy of the UN General Assembly in apartheid matters started to follow this logic of reasoning very early. UNGA Resolution 181 (S/5386) of August 7, 1963, bearing upon problems of race conflict in South Africa (UN's definition), stressed the connection between the unfair terms of peace in South Africa and the risk of conflict. This conflict could not be contained by suppressing the aspirations of the weaker party for fundamental political rights; instead, compromises were needed on the side of the stronger.

After some domestic as well as foreign efforts to persuade South Africa to abandon apartheid, the white government started to see the need for compromise if it was to address the question of the desperate determination of the ANC coalition that was threatening stability and peace. The logic of socio-psychological realities also came to the South African thinking through the intellectual community from the reform orientation of the Western counter-insurgency thinking. According to studies made by an important think tank, the Africa Institute of South Africa⁷¹ the long-term prospects for stability and containment of Soviet influence in Southern Africa depended on the success of this reform process which would reduce the probability of revolutionary activism in the desperate black community.

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"In the long run, the South African regime could conceivably come to an accommodation with its black population, which would remove a key to Soviet influence in the area."⁷² "A myriad of reform proposals are being considered and some have been implemented; but the fear engendered by the Soweto riots and the dramatic changes along South African borders since the collapse of Portuguese colonialism render this prospect more difficult, although certainly not impossible. To some extent these events serve to encourage reform, an impetus, which did not exist prior to 1974. Meanwhile, the USSR reaps considerable propaganda benefits by portraying itself as the champion of the oppressed in Southern Africa".⁷³

Towards the end of the 1980s, it seemed that the need to address the problem of desperate determination of the broad ANC alliance had become the main reason for Afrikaners to end apartheid. According to a poll by Lawrence Schlemmer in 1987, 81% of Afrikaners felt that the primary threat in the continuation of white rule was that it would provoke extensive violence. The question was no longer that the white rule had to have more coercive resources to contain the "terrorist challenge", but that only negotiation and compromises could bring about stability.

In addition to further convincing the South African government that the desperate determination of the ANC group was a threat to peace (a matter that was relatively visible even without the Western influence), the international community tried to address the problem of the unwillingness of the South African government to try to compromise with the ANC alliance (lack of dependence on a solution among the government). This was done by the international diplomatic community of western nations, which subscribed to the ANC formula for peace, democracy and non-raciality,⁷⁴ and by making these principles conditional on the continuation of a variety of normal forms of interaction between these nations and South Africa.

Yet the fears for personal safety (related to the determination of the ANC alliance) were considered greater threats in apartheid.⁷⁵ More importantly, some of the threats to the South African economy, partly caused by external influence, could well be considered permanent - e.g., the loss of foreign investors. Thus there were permanent factors shifting the balance of power towards the ANC group, and this neutralized the realist argument against assisting the weaker side (unless the international community was prepared to stay involved permanently).⁷⁶ Thus de Klerk could credibly claim that the situation had changed permanently and that it was in the interests of the white community to start negotiating while it still had a strong economy so that it could negotiate from a position of power.⁷⁷

The analysis of the influence of timing strategies on determination and dependence can be summarized with the following figure:

Figure 1. Determination, Dependence and Choosing Sides

	Pressuring the Weak	Pressuring the Strong
Effect on determination	Positive: If the weak can be made to yield, the top dog can become less determined	Positive: providing the top dog can be persuaded to compromises that reduce the underdog's determination
Effect on dependence	Positive: manipulates the dependence of the side which is easier to make dependent	No effect: Only permanent change of power balance can make the stronger more dependent than the weaker

Here we can easily see that in cases where the manipulation of dependence on peace can be expected to produce results, it is better to pressure the weak. However, since in South Africa we were dealing with an overly determined desperate bargainer, the problem that prevented the ANC from compromises was not that it would not have been sufficiently dependent on peace, but that it did not consider peace on apartheid terms as peace at all. Therefore, the increase of dependence of the underdog was impossible, and the ending of the conflict needed to address the problem of the ANC's desperate determination, by increasing the difference between the ANC perception of a solution and violence. This could only be made by pushing the stronger side into compromises: only after some progress had been made could the ANC prefer peace to the continuation of the liberation struggle: the initiative for negotiations had to come from the government.

To intervene early or to wait for the ripening

In a fashion similar to the above, the integration of our basic theoretical problem of timing into our system of understanding conflict resolution as facilitation of compromises by attacking strongholds of partial bargaining power can be illustrated with the following figure:

Figure 2. Determination, Dependence and Timing

	Early intervention	Ripening
Effect on determination	Positive: reduces the risk of escalating increase of determination	Negative: allows demonization and escalation
Effect on dependence	Negative: does not demonstrate the costs of the dispute	Positive: demonstrates the costs of the dispute

As can be seen in Figure 2, the strategy of early intervention pays more attention to the limitation of the determination on their claims of conflicting parties. At the same time, the ripening model follows more closely the development of dependence on a peaceful solution. If the conflict escalates and spawns hostility, it is natural that determination grows, quite as it is natural that a continuance of a mutually hurting stalemate demonstrates to the parties the costs of continuing hostilities and thus makes the belligerents more dependent on peace. Thus the paradox of timing seems to be reduced to a phenomenon in which time affects two elements of conflict resolution differently: one element is affected negatively and the other positively. The choice between letting the conflict ripen or pressuring negotiations in time should be made by judging how much determination and dependence in each case can be manipulated and how much that manipulation can facilitate compromises.

In South Africa, the question of timing was a complicated one since the conflict proceeded in an alarming direction in two respects in the 1970s and at the beginning of the 1980s.

On the one hand, the rise of the dependence of the white community on a peaceful solution proceeded too slowly: confidence in the white repressive apparatus against any black uprisings could be sensed from most of the government documents related to security issues.⁷⁸ Also, the perception that there was no unified resistance to white rule but, instead, tribes with conflicting interests was strong. The governmental declarations and terminology referring to black/non-racial movements revealed that the official perception was that the regime was opposed by a marginal group of terrorists who gained their strength from the global communist movement. The ripening of the white government's attitudes towards compromise was also delayed by the above discussed self-justifying mythology of "the total onslaught" against the western order, which helped in explaining away any criticism against apartheid as an expectable provocation orchestrated by the Soviet Union.⁷⁹

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At the same time, on the other hand, the revolutionary spirit of the ANC camp grew faster, as evidenced by the escalation of violence in 1984. On the government side, escalation meant legislative measures to remove restrictions on the "anti-terrorist fight"⁸⁰ against the ANC and other "illegal" anti-government organizations. On the ANC side, it implied further activation of armed means in the anti-apartheid conflict. As a result, the number of political fatalities jumped from some hundreds in 1984 to more than three and a half thousand in 1990⁸¹.

The advocates of early intervention to establish negotiations base their view on the risk of escalation of not only the means but also the agency and the perceived differences between parties in the case of a protracted conflict. Naturally, the fact that an early solution saves lives is also used as an argument. In ethnic and nationalist conflicts, it has been argued that instead of ripening, the positions of violent bargainers solidify in time. In order to bolster one's own bargaining position, the collective bargainer (or the constituency of the negotiation team) creates a set of norms, which contributes to one's own determination: conciliatory attitudes towards the opponent receive moral condemnation and normative sanctions. An advocate of concessions is seen as a traitor. This makes it very difficult for the negotiators to proceed rationally without losing their legitimacy as representatives of their constituencies, and, therefore, according to this position, external influence is to prevent these conflicts from spiraling as soon as possible.⁸² In some cases of prolonged disputes, manipulation of the constituency through the encouragement of radical, unyielding attitudes and movements has been used as a myopic bargaining tactic by the negotiating panel.⁸³

In the South African case, some of these "true believer" culture features could be identified on both sides: de Klerk was often referred to as "comrade" in the white parliament by conservative MPs, suggesting that soft approaches were seen as a sign of treason, i.e., a shift to the enemy (socialist) camp.⁸⁴ On the side of black/nonracial nationalists, the true believer cultures could be seen as one of the many reasons for the black-on-black violence. The non-Marxist, anti-sanction, pro-federal, pro-tribal positions of the Inkatha and those blacks who had adapted to apartheid rule were treated by some of the supporters of the ANC as signs of treason, and this treason needed to be punished to maintain the bargaining power of the nonracial/black nationalism. According to Oliver Tambo, they were "stooges of the white dictatorship ...Buthelezis, the Manglopes, Mantazimas, the Rajtanzis and all other sell-outs who have sold their birth rights to the South African nation for a mess of pottage."⁸⁵ According to an ANC spokesman, Alosi Moloi,⁸⁶ the purification of the anti-apartheid rank was an essential part of the struggle: "Among us we have people who have openly collaborated with the enemy. You have to eliminate one to save hundreds of others." Additionally, the populist tactics of mass action by the ANC camp in the midst of negotiations can be categorized as demonstration and conscious utilization of the true believer cultures.

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In addition to the true believer cultures, prolonging of conflicts easily creates emotional obstacles to compromise. As soon as there are political casualties, the enemy is seen not in terms of his ends, which seem to justify the violence of one's own camp, but his means. A dead brother, not the abstract principles presented at the negotiation table, is the best available and most representative proof of what the enemy wants.

One can clearly see these features in the South African conflict. The motives and ends of the opponent become interpreted through the means they use. According to the "Manifesto for the Future" by President P.W. Botha, "[The] Violent and brutal means [of the ANC] can only lead to totalitarian and tyrannical ends." In Botha's speech "Partners in Terror" to the Parliament on April 17, 1986,⁸⁷ the ANC side was clearly linked to the horrors of violent conflict.

Similar comments can be found in the ANC camp. For example, in 1987 the chief negotiator of the ANC, Cyril Ramaphosa, felt that it was legitimate to kill white South Africans because a majority of them had used their power to vote to support apartheid.⁸⁸ Yet one of the peculiarities of the ANC negotiation strategy was its caution in the demonizing of the opponent. According to Elijah Barayi, President of the Cosatu, black people do not hate whites, but instead wish them God's forgiveness "for they know not what they do."⁸⁹ The willingness of the ANC to accept (on November 14, 1992) leader of the South African Communist Party, Joe Slovo's proposal (October 1, 1992) for general amnesty and job security for civil servants of the apartheid government would probably have been enormously more difficult had the demonization of the enemy been allowed to go further before the initiation of the resolution effort.

The determination of the white government not to yield any power to the ANC would also have probably been greater if the ANC had tried to increase its own determination through extensive demonization: if the government had believed that the ANC group saw the people in the government as criminals, they would have anticipated problems if the ANC were to have gained any substantive amount of power.⁹⁰

Despite the limits of demonizing among the ANC and the evidence of the escalation in other fields (means and growth of antagonism), it seems that the spiral of antagonism and the rapid development of a revolutionary spirit among the South African blacks was a strong argument for those in favor of swift action and early interference by the international community.

In spite of the benefits of early intervention - avoidance of the escalation of hostilities - there are several risks involved in premature conflict management. According to Haass,⁹¹ it is a waste of time and effort and can serve as a discouraging experience of the inefficiency of negotiations in a dispute. Premature efforts can lead to partial solutions that avoid tackling the causes of the conflict or that might lead to more permanent external involvement in the conflict when the level of dependence of the conflicting parties is not high enough to motivate a more permanent transformation of the conflict setting. Furthermore, early

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international pressure towards an excessively hasty process of transformation can trigger a counter action on the side of the privileged group. Rebellious potential can be activated by creating a relative deprivation among the people whose privileges are drastically cut.⁹² Therefore, allowing the time to become ripe before strong interventions can permit a more peaceful "pacted transition."⁹³

In South Africa the argument about ripening can be applied to the analysis of the violent potential of the South African white securocracy, the white government and the white extreme right. Incidents of provocations of black-on-black violence by individual or a network of South African policemen at the beginning of the 1990s clearly indicate that the willingness to compromise had not reached all segments of the coercive machinery of apartheid. Also, the risk during the Boputhatswana emergency in 1993, when the intelligence community estimated that the South African Defence Forces would not enforce the negotiated agreement if this meant resisting the rebellious armies of the former SADF Commander-in-Chief,⁹⁴ suggests that more time and more help for the ripening should have been used before the resolution was finalized. Furthermore, the reaction of the extreme right would have possibly been less violent if more time for adjustment had been allowed.

However, since the revolutionary spirit and a less compromising culture was growing in the ANC camp despite a mutually hurting stalemate in the struggle, it seems that time could not heal or help on the side of the desperate bargainer. The ANC was abundantly aware of its inability to enforce its conditions with military means upon its opponent, and yet all the costs of the continuing struggle and the dependence on peace did not help. The ANC seemed to be simply too determined to give in an inch. There was nothing time could do about it.

All in all, it seems that the ripening hypothesis seems to gain support from the analysis of the potential white violence, whereas the early intervention prescription originates from the experiences on the ANC side. Time, so it seems, needed to be helped, as Zartman puts it, on the white side, whereas it needed to be checked on the ANC side: the ripening of the white acceptance of compromise needed to be catalyzed, whereas the ripening of the black revolutionary spirit needed to be slowed down.

Conclusions

After the settlement of a conflict, the analyst is in a better position than the policy maker, who does not have this retrospective perspective to assess which of the factors contributed to the success and which did not. Due to the complexity of conflicts and the large number of possibly ignored variables, it nevertheless seems, somewhat difficult to make very far-reaching conclusions even afterwards. If everything had been done in a similar

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manner, de Klerk could still have decided not to make his speech in February 1990; Mandela could have refused to accept some crucial compromises; the grassroots ANC supporters could still have acted in a less disciplined manner; and the whole story would have been different. Or perhaps a butterfly could have flown in China causing a thunderstorm in Europe and ...

Should we then conclude that everything the international community did or every structure that existed was pushing the negotiations towards a failure? Despite the difficulty of tracing all the elements that contributed to the success, and despite the fact that some strategies that turned out to be successful could have led to a disaster, it seems fair to say that there are some things one can pinpoint with reasonable reliability, i.e., some successful and some unwise choices made in the strategy, timing and focusing of the external influence to encourage negotiation.

It seems that the policy to weaken the mythological stronghold of the government and the ANC was a success in the creation of conditions for negotiation. With the interpretation that apartheid was a way to fight communism and protect Christianity, de Klerk would never have accepted negotiations. Neither could negotiations have been possible with the atmosphere of decolonization. Mythical obstacles for rational negotiations needed to be destroyed in order to give negotiations a chance.

Furthermore, in the question of choosing sides between the underdog and the top dog, South Africa provides us with an extraordinary case. The diplomacy of the 1970s and 1980s was very much affected by the stability-oriented realist thinking, according to which the international community should never assist, especially not because of moral imperatives, the suppressed underdog, which might be encouraged to start a revolutionary change. Instead of following this mainstream prescription, the international community took a change/emancipation-oriented approach. Within the model of rational bargaining, this approach seems to have been a wise choice in that it avoids not only structural violence but also direct violence and bloodshed as well. And one could hypothesize from the South African case that the *ceteris paribus* conditions that the South African context would suggest to the realist mainstream theorizing would be related to the fact that the ANC was a desperate bargainer. The hypothesis of desperate bargainers says that the realist conception of stability-oriented conflict management overemphasizes the extent to which the underdog can be persuaded to compromise by using coercion and by manipulating its dependencies. The reason why the desperate underdog does not yield even if it is dependent on peace is that its determination is too strong: accepting negotiations and peace on the opponent's terms would not feel any better than continuing the hopeless battle.

In the question of timing, too, the South African case provides some new insights and complicates the simple models. It seems that in South Africa both the position of the "political psychologists," which favors an early settlement, and the position of the "ripeness school" were given partial support.

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The international community apparently did the right thing in trying to hasten the initiation of negotiations and to help the ripening of the idea of compromises among the white leadership. Also, the international community seemed to find a good way to help the ripening by attacking the apartheid mythology without provoking or encouraging the ANC to intensify the ripening of its revolutionary preparedness. On the contrary, on the basis of Mandela's accounts, it seemed that, at least in relation to Amnesty International, the ANC recognized the need to reduce violence in order to gain acceptance.⁹⁵

However, what was extraordinary in South Africa, where timing was concerned, was the need to try to stop the clock on the ANC side. It appears that the determination of the ANC side only grew and the perception of the opponent demonized as time went on. Instead of ripening for resolution, time only made the ANC more impatient, and this again can be credited to the fact that the ANC was a desperate underdog. The ripening hypothesis manipulates dependence - ripening is caused by a mutually hurting stalemate which demonstrates to the disputants their dependence on a peaceful arrangement. However, since the problem with the desperate bargainer is not that it would not feel dependent but that it is overly determined, time cannot ripen, in a positive manner, the attitudes of the desperate underdog.

The problem with ripening in South Africa was thus that of synchronization: the hurt on the ANC's side had been sufficient to warrant crucial decisions, for a long time before the actual initiation of negotiations and this is what made the ANC a desperate bargainer. However, if the ANC had become truly ripe for the crucial decisions - to escalate into a full-scale war or to negotiate - before the ripening of the government side, the only option left for the ANC would have been war, since it takes both sides to negotiate. Thus it seems that the crucial timing question in the encouragement of negotiations is not whether to push for an early negotiation or to wait for the ripening, but how to synchronize the ripening processes of the parties to the conflict.

The synchronization of the ripening seems to have succeeded only because the Soviet Union took measures to discourage the ANC from a revolutionary path (1987-1990). This, of course, was not a conscious synchronization strategy, but rather a reaction by the Soviet leadership to their country's economic problems. Ironically, the most important measure the international community "took" to stop the ripening of the revolutionary spirit in South Africa was again a result of something quite unintentional. It seems that the collapse of the socialist economies created tremendous confusion in the ANC camp: there was no longer a set of clear goals and objectives for the organization, and thus there was no longer any hurry to rush forward on the revolutionary path. On balance, while one can say that the international community succeeded in many respects in the question of timing and focusing of influence, the greatest blessing for South Africa followed from the failure and final collapse of an international empire.

Notes

1. Juha Auvinen & Timo Kivimäki, *Early Warning and Conflict Management in South African Democratic Transition*. Department of Political Science, (Acta Politica no. 7, Helsinki, 1998).

2. Dispute is understood here as discrepancy of preferences between actors in relation to alternative outcomes that can be produced by the actors. Disputes can be conflicts if they involve conflict behavior: acts intended to harm/destroy the other agents' welfare/life.

3. Conflict management refers to activity to prevent conflicts and their violent escalation into a full-scale war. Prevention here refers not only to activity to prevent the conflict altogether but also to prevent further conflict behavior. Prevention of escalation in conflict management does not necessarily mean that management effort could not use non-violent strategies to create additional costs for the sides of the conflict or to exacerbate conflict if that is needed for the ripening of the resolution. Thus, for example, one can treat sanctions as prevention of violent escalation if they reduce the risk of a full scale war, even though sanctions might in a sense escalate the conflict in a non-violent way by adding new dimensions to the conflict moves and countermoves.

4. I. William Zartman, *Ripe for Resolution: Conflict and Intervention in Africa*. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985); Saadia Touval & I. William Zartman (eds), *International Mediation in Theory and Practice* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985).

5. Herbert C. Kelman, *International Behavior: Social Psychological Analysis* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1986); Roger Fisher, *The Social Psychology of International and International Conflict Resolution*. (New York: Springer, 1989); Joel Brockner & Jeffrey Z. Rubin, *Entrapment in Escalating Conflicts*. (New York: Springer Verlag, 1985); Michael E. Brown & Chantal de Jong Oudraat, "Internal Conflict and International Action," in Michael E. Brown, Owen R. Coté, Jr., Sean M. Lynn-Jones & Stephen E. Miller, *Nationalism and International Conflict. An International Security Reader* (Cambridge, MA.: MIT Press, 1997), 256.

7. Henry Kissinger, *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy* (New York: Pinter, 1958); Russell J. Leng, "Conflict Management in a Changing International System; Sovereignty, Self-determination, and Human Rights," paper at the annual conference of the International Association of Conflict Management, at Elsinore, Denmark, June 13, 1995.

7. Interviewed by the author in January 1996; see also Hennie J. Kotze, "The Transition from Apartheid to Democracy in South Africa: An Elite Survey," in Stuart Nagel, *African Development and Public Policy* (New York: St Martins Press, 1994); Hennie J. Kotze & Pierre Du Toit, "The State, Civil Society, and Democratic Transition in South Africa," in *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 39:1 (March 1995), pp. 27-48.

8. Nelson Mandela. *Long Walk to Freedom* (London: Abacus (Little Brown & Co), 1995 (1994)).

9. Especially the Macro Economic Research Group, MERG, see Nicoli Natrass, "Politics and Economics in ANC Economic Policy," *African Affairs*, 93 (1994), 343-5; see also Steve Johnson, "ANC and the N-Word," *Star* (October 17, 1991).

10. Professor Esterhuise was one of the initiators of the government-ANC dialogue in 1986. According to Prime Minister De Klerk, he "represented" the Afrikaner point of view in the negotiations and even though he was not negotiating with governmental consent, his role was known by the former Prime Minister, P.W. Botha (David Walsh, interviewed by the author in 1996).

11. Here, declaratory policies and public rhetoric cannot be contrasted with "real politics" but must be taken seriously, since it does constitute part of the reality in bargaining.

12. John Harsanyi, "Approaches to Bargaining Problem Before and After the Theory of Games," *Econometrica* 24, (1956), 144-56; John Nash, "The Bargaining Problem," *Econometrica*, 18:1, (1950), 155-62.; Timo Kivimäki, *Distribution of Benefits in Bargaining between a Superpower and a Developing Country* (Helsinki: Finnish Society of Sciences and Letters, 1993).

13. Roger Fisher & Ury William, *Getting to "Yes"* (Boston, Mass.: Houghton Mifflin, 1981).

14. In negative terms as in Johan Galtung, "The Changing Interface Between Peace and Development in a Changing World," *Bulletin of Peace Proposals*, 2, 1980, 145-9.

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15. Compare, for example, the views of the ANC's chief negotiator, Cyril Ramaphosa on socialism and nationalization in Alan Fisher & Michael Albeldas, *A Question of Survival. Conversations with Key South Africans*. (Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball Publishers, 1987), 284-94, and in later comments on the government's recent needs to privatize some of its economical assets to fund affirmative action. See also MERG (ANC's

Macroeconomic Research Group), *Making Democracy Work: A Framework for Macroeconomic Policy in South Africa* (Cape Town: Oxford University Press, 1993) for rationales of the new market-oriented policy.

16.Kate Manzo & Pat McGowan,"Afrikaner Fears and the Politics of Despair: Understanding Change in South Africa," *International Studies Quarterly* 36 (1992), 1-24.

17.de Klerk in Fisher & Albeldas (fn. 16), 488.

18.Steven Friedman, *Interview in Johannesburg*, December 22, 1995 (Director of the South African Institute of Policy Studies).

19.Harsanyi (fn.13); Nash (fn.13); Kivimäki (fn.13).

20.Citations in Adam Heribert & Kogila Moodley, *The Negotiated Revolution: Society and Politics in Post-Apartheid South Africa*. (Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball Publishers, 1993), 41.

21.The idea that conflicts are often caused by misperceptions which prevent agents from making rational compromises is well argued in James Fearon, "Rationalist Explanations for War," *International Organization*, 49:3 (Summer 1993, 379-414); and David A. Lake & Donald Rothchild, "Containing Fear", 97-131, in Michael E. Brown, Owen R. Coté, Jr., Sean M. Lynn-Jones and Stephen E. Miller, *Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict. An International Security Reader* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997).

22.Donald Horowitz, *A Democratic South Africa? Constitutional Engineering in a Divided Society*. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991); Willie Esterhuysen & Pierre Du Toit (eds.), *The Myth Makers. The Elusive Bargain for South Africa's Future* (Stellenbosch: Southern Book Publishers, 1994).

23.Hermann Giliomee, "The Third Way," in Hermann Giliomee & Lawrence Schlemmer (eds.) *Negotiating South Africa's Future* (London: MacMillan, 1989), 11;

24.Pierre du Toit, *Interview in Stellenbosch*, January 15, 1996 (Professor, University of Stellenbosch).

25.Willie P. Esterhuysen, *Interview in Stellenbosch*, January 16, 1996 (Professor, negotiator at the pre-negotiation phase); Willie P. Esterhuysen, "Realistic Visionary Leadership," in Willie P. Esterhuysen & Pierre du Toit, *The Myth Makers. The elusive bargain for South Africa's Future*. (Stellenbosch: Southern Book Publishers, Centre for African Politics, Stellenbosch,1990), 126-144.

26. For a more detailed discussion of the "conflict about the conflict" in South Africa, see Esterhuysen 1990 (fn.26); Pierre du Toit, *Power Plays. Bargaining Tactics for Transforming South Africa* (Stellenbosch: Southern Book Publishers, 1991); Pierre du Toit, "The Tragic Theory of Bargaining," in Willie P. Esterhuysen & Pierre du Toit, *The Myth Makers. The elusive bargain for South Africa's Future* (Stellenbosch: Southern Book Publishers, Centre for African Politics, 1990), 1-9 ; Pierre du Toit, "Contending Regime Models and the Contest for Hegemony in Divided Societies," unpublished paper. (Stellenbosch: University of Stellenbosch, 1989); Donald L. Horowitz, *A Democratic South Africa? Constitutional Engineering in a Divided Society* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1991); Heribert Adam, "The South African Elite: A Survey of Ideological Commitment," in Heribert Adam, *South Africa: Sociological Perspectives*. (London: Oxford University Press, 1971) 73-102.

27. Brockner & Rubin (fn.6).

28. In March 1990, Mandela was quoted as saying to his supporters that "The nationalization of mines, banks and monopoly industries is the policy of the ANC and a change or modification of our views in this regard is inconceivable" (*Sowetan* March 5, 1990), see also Nicholi Natrass, "Politics and Economics in ANC Economic Policy," *African Affairs*, no. 93, 1994, 343-359.

29. Fisher & Albeldas (fn.16), 488-91.

30. See, for example, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs, L. Nel, "Opening address" in M. Hough (ed.), *Psychological Strategies*. (Pretoria: University of Pretoria, Institute for Strategic Studies ad hoc Publication no. 21, 1981); Chief of SADF, C.L. Viljoen, "Revolutionary Warfare and Counter-Insurgency," in M. Hough (ed.), *Evolutionary Warfare and Counter-Insurgency*. (Pretoria: University of Pretoria, Institute for Strategic Studies, ad hoc publication no 17, 1980); P.W. Botha, *Partners in Terror*. Excerpt from an address in Parliament, 17 April 1986. (Pretoria: Bureau of Information publications, 1986); see also Vice-President Thabo Mbeki's analysis of this in Thabo Mbeki, "The End of the Beginning," *Africa Forum*, 1: 2 (1991), 41-45, 41.

31. Alexander Johnson, "Weak States and National Security. The Case of South Africa in the Era of Total Strategy," *Review of International Relations* 17 (1991), 151.

32. Mark Swilling, "The Extra-Parliamentary Movement," in Giliomee & Schlemmer 1989, (fn. 24), p. 67.

33. Rupert Taylor and Andre Du Toit, interviewed by the author in 1995 and 1996. Accordingly, the settlement of situations in the neighboring

countries, and especially the clear signals after 1987 from the Soviet Union to the ANC to settle rather than battle, were weakening the cold war rationale of apartheid.

34. South African Government, *Defence White Paper* (Pretoria, 1973) p.1, as quoted in Alexander Johnston (fn.32), p. 151.

35. Willie Esterhuysen, interviewed by the author in 1996.

36. Good arguments by liberal thinkers, such as Esterhuysen (see especially Willie Esterhuysen, *Apartheid Must Die*. Cape Town: Tafelberg, 1981) were also very important especially if the critic of apartheid was in a position where she/he could not easily be marginalized (as in the case of Esterhuysen, who was an important figure in the Afrikaaner Broederbond).

37. Malan in *Argus*, July 30, 1991.

38. Andre Du Toit and R.P. Nel 1996, interviewed by the author in 1996.

39. W. Claiborne, "Slowly but surely, black resolve - and economic sanctions - are destroying apartheid," *The Washington Post*, January 14, 1990.

.

40. Arnold W. Millard, "Engaging South Africa after Apartheid" *Foreign Policy* no 87, 1992, 143.

41. Yet the fact that many of the truly capitalist, competition-oriented international businesses (as opposed to state-privilege oriented businesses) were owned by South Africans of English origin complicated the channels of influence from private businesses to the Afrikaner-dominated politics (see, for example, Merle Lipton, "Reform, Destruction or Modernization of Apartheid?" 34-55, in Jesmond Blumenfeld, *South Africa in Crisis*, (1987, Groom Helm, London). Apartheid and nationalism in its early days of National Party rule was much more expressed in its restrictions against the English dominance vis-à-vis the Afrikaner, rather than in its privileges for whites.

42. Interviewed by the author in 1995 and 1996.

43. J Hofmeyer, *The Impact of Sanctions in South Africa. Part II: White's Political Attitudes* (Washington, DC: Investor Responsibility Research Centre, 1990) pp. 22-27.

44. Kate Manzo & Pat McGowan (fn. 17), 11.

45. *Ibid*, p. 14. The rest of the statistics in this paragraph are from the same

page.

46. Hubert M. Blalock, Jr., *Power and Conflict. Towards a General Theory* (London: Sage, 1989), 67.

47. For these underestimates in the context of justifying sanctions, see Eliyah Barayi, President of Cosatu (LU), interview, pp. 274-84, in Alan Fisher & Michael Albeidas, *A Question of Survival. Conversations with Key South Africans*, (Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball Publishers, 1987); Cyril Ramaphosa, Secretary General of the NUM, Interview, 284-94 *ibid*; Curtis Nkondo, vice-president of the United Democratic Front, pp. 376-84, *ibid*.

48. Nel (fn. 31), 1.

49. Hermann Giliomee, "Democratization in South Africa," *Political Science Quarterly*, vol 110, no. 1, 1995, 83-104.

50. A powerful argument against the myth was presented in Willie P. Esterhuyse, *Apartheid Must Die* (Cape Town: Tafelberg, 1981).

51. Pierre Du Toit, interviewed by the author in 1996; Willie Esterhuyse, interviewed by the author in 1996; Marina Ottaway, "Liberation Movements and Transition to Democracy: The Case of the ANC," *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 29:1 (1991) p. 61; for a political view on this see Mangusutho G. Buthelesi, *South Africa. My Vision of the Future* (New York, NY: Saint Martin's Press 1990), p. 18.

52. Nelson Mandela (fn. 9), 628.

53. For these pressures led by the British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and US President George Bush, see European Union, *Statement of the European Political Cooperation (EPC)*, September 16, 1991, Files of the ANC Information Office in Helsinki, Archives of the Institute of Development Studies, University of Helsinki.

54. It seems very convenient that the initiator of non-violence was the leader of the Communist party. After all the status of the Communist party had been one of the problems that Mandela faced during his visit to the UK and the USA in his effort to persuade the West not to abandon the sanctions and to convince officials that the ANC was worth the support of the West despite the fact that it was associated with the South African Communists. Also for the ANC, Slovo as the initiator was convenient and efficient since if the initiator had been one of the less radical opponents of the apartheid this could have divided the movement.

55. This rationalization was confirmed in Mandela's biography (fn. 9, pp. 626 & 660) and by Willie Esterhuyse in an interview with the author. It

seems that the question of negotiations divided the security apparatus and created a dispute between the National Intelligence Services, whose official was involved in the meetings, and the Department of Military Intelligence, which was the power base of those with a rigid stand against negotiations, such as the Department of Constitutional Affairs and President Botha and later right-wing opponents of President De Klerk. See Herbert Adam & Kogila Moodley, *The Negotiated Revolution: Society and Politics in Post-Apartheid South Africa* (Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball Publishers, 1993), pp. 42 and 126. See also Africa Confidential, July 31, 1992; Interview of David Walsh by the author in 1996.

56. See Mandela (fn.9) p. 623.

57. Kissinger (fn.7).

58. See the "Resource Mobilization Model" by Charles Tilly, *From Mobilization to Revolution*. (New York: Random House, 1978); Edward Muller, Henry A. Dietz & Steven E. Finkel, "Discontent and the Expected Utility: The Case of Peru," *American Political Science Review* 85:4 (19, 229. See also Augustine J. Kposowa & J. Greig Jenkins, "The Structural Sources of Military Coups in Post-Colonial Africa, 1957-1985," *American Journal of Sociology* 99:1, 126-63; J. Greig Jenkins & Augustine J. Kposowa, The Political Origins of African Military Coups, *International Studies Quarterly* 36, 271-92; Donald L. Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985).

59. Johan Galtung & Tord Höivik, "Structural and Direct Violence; A Note on Operationalization," *Journal of Peace Research* 7:1, 1971; Galtung (fn.15).

60. Mark Hoffman, "Critical Theory and the Inter-Paradigm Debate," *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 16, 1987, 236; see also Marieke Kleinboer & Paul't Hart, "Time to Talk?" *Cooperation and Conflict*, 30:4 (1995), 307-348.

61. Introduction of the UNSC mandatory arms embargo, UN Docs IXXC, vol. 452, no. 4358, 1977.

62. Maria Hadjipavlou-Trigeorgis & Lenos Trigeorgis, "Cyprus, An Evolutionary Approach to Conflict Resolution," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 37:2, 1993, 340-360.

63. See this view also in I. William Zartman, "Putting the Humpty-Dumpty Together Again," in David A. Lake & Donald Rothchild, *Ethnic Fears and Global Engagement* (forthcoming, cited in Lake and Rothchild, "Containing Fear," 113 in Michael Brown, Owen R. Coté Jr., Sean M. Lynn-Jones and Steven E. Miller, *Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict*. Cambridge, MA: MIT

Press, 1997).

64. du Toit (fn. 14); R.P. Nel, *Interview in Stellenbosch*, January 15, 1996. (Professor, University of Stellenbosch); Friedman (fn. 11).

65. According to David Hirschmann, "Of Monsters and Devils, Analyses and Alternatives," *African Affairs*, 89:356, 1990, p. 247, 64 of the 74 prominent Black South Africans were of the opinion that Black South Africans were becoming more radical, while only one was of the opposite opinion. When asked about whether Blacks were to accept that more violence is essential in order to bring about change, 51 of the 58 answered "yes" and only 4 "no" (page 348).

66. Fisher & Albeldas (fn.8), 283-94; see also a similar assessment by NDF Vice-President Curtis Nkondo, *ibid.*, 376-84, and Elijah Barayi, President of the Cosatu, *ibid.*, 280-84; Mandela (fn. 9), p. 653.

67. Hirshman 1990, 341-369.

68. Richard Nisbett & Lee Ross, *Human Interference. Strategies and Shortcomings of Social Judgement* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1980), 18.

69. T. Robert Gurr, *Why Men Rebel*. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1970).

70. The association between the anti-apartheid movement and the anti-colonialist battle was clear: movements like the ANC were called liberation movements, as were the anti-colonialist movements. This association was analyzed in greater detail in Frederick van Zyl Slabbert, "Watershed Years," in *Leadership*, Special Issue, (Cape Town: Leadership Publications, 1991), 37.

71. G.M.E. Leistner, *Southern Crucible, South Africa: Future in Microcosm*. (Pretoria: Africa Institute of South Africa, 1980); Peter Vanneman & W Martin James III, *Soviet Foreign Policy in Southern Africa* (Pretoria: Africa Institute of South Africa, 1982).

72. Leistner (fn.72).

73. Vanneman & James III (fn.72).

74. The fact that the international community supported a non-racial society was slightly surprising, firstly because this was exactly the position of one of the conflicting parties and because most of the multi-racial countries themselves had adopted a multi-racial, rather than non-racial, concept of social peace.

75.Ibid.

76.If we compare this to the situation in the Persian Gulf between weak Kuwait and strong Iraq, we find that military intervention in favor of a weak party is more problematic than economic. To keep the weaker side strong enough to contain the attacks of the stronger, one needs constant power projection in the area, which in turn requires a strong commitment and a lot of money. However, if apartheid causes a permanent security risk, it can permanently discourage foreign investors from investing in the apartheid economy. Permanent influence here does not require strong commitments.

77. Frederick De Klerk in *Die Burger*, March 31, 1990.

78. See, for example, Department of Defence, *Defence White Paper 1973 and 1977* (Pretoria, 1973, 1977).

79. Even UN declarations; Esterhuyse 1996 (fn. 26).

80. The practice of the use of death penalties after 1979 and the State of Emergency Act of 1985, as examples.

81. South African Institute of Race Relations, *Freedom Frontiers* 2/1995.

82. Kelman (fn.6); Fisher (fn.6); Brockner & Rubin (fn. 6). For an excellent review of this "political psychology" perspective, see Kleinboer & Hart (fn.61).

83. Kivimäki (fn.13), 68-69, fn 26.

84. Christopher Streeter (Ambassador, negotiator at the Multi-Party Negotiations), interviewed by the author 1995.

85. *Radio Freedom*, (July 5, 1985).

86. *Speech at California State University*, Los Angeles (October 10, 1985).

87. P.W. Botha, *Manifesto for the Future*. (Pretoria: Government Printer, 1985), Botha (fn.31).

88. Fisher & Albeldas (fn.16), 284-94.

89. Ibid., 280-84.

90.The strategy of avoiding demonization of the enemy was consciously chosen by the ANC; see Mandela (fn. 9).

91.Richard N. Haass, *Conflicts Unending* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1995), 140.

92.Gurr (fn.70).

93.Gillermo O'Donnell & Philippe C. Smitter & L. Whitehead (eds.), *Transition from Authoritarian Rule: Prospects for Democracy* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986).

94.Allister Sparks & Broadcast Enterprises, BBC, *Death of Apartheid* (Videofilm, Johannesburg: Audiovisual Archives of the University of Witwatersrand, 1994)

95.Mandela (fn.9), 734. This was not, however, the case in relation to the Nobel Committee, which gave the Nobel Peace Prize to the ANC's Bishop Desmond Tutu. This in fact seemed to give some encouragement to the ANC to continue to use violence. See Mandela (fn.9), 734.

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