

# Explaining Violence in Somalia

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Timo Kivimäki



## **Introduction**

Violence in Somalia consists of several conflicts between an increasingly complex setting of hostile parties. According to most journalistic writings the civil war started at the end of 1990, when in reality it escalated in Mogadishu and made the remaining foreigners flee from the country. After the formation of the alliance against the power of President Siyad Barre in October 1990, fighting between the government and the opposition continued until the collapse of Barre's regime in January 1991 leaving thousands of people dead. After the defeat of state, fighting continued between groups in the rebel alliance, Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM), United Somali Congress (USC) and the Somali National Movement (SNM), and later within the United Somali Congress with tens of thousands of casualties (30 000 according to Bryden 1995) and almost a million refugees inside and outside Somalia (780 000 according to Nafziger & Auvinen, 1997, table 3). After that the intervention by the United States and the international community in its efforts to curb violence and ease the food shortage involved a lot of violence and casualties (Walker 1994, 169-70). But violence had started already much earlier than in the beginning 1990s. The decline of order in Mogadishu was visible already towards the end of 1980s after a sudden increase in criminal violence in the city (Simons 1994, 819). Outside the capital area the conflict between the Somali National Movement (SNM) had already begun in the beginning of 1980s and had already killed more than 50 000 people. Some years before that, casualties were caused by the conflict between the government and the Somali Salvation Democratic Front and the army as an aftermath the domestic controversies caused by the Ogaden War (1977-8, between Somalia and Ethiopia). Even before the Ogaden war large scale violence was caused in several small scale conflicts between different groups of people and the government (for example between religious leaders and Barre's army) and simply by the dictatorial rule by President Siyad Barre since the overthrow of Somalia's elected parliament in October 1969 (Walker 1994, 164-5).

This study aims at explaining why large scale domestic violence took place in Somalia and what contributed to the continuance and escalation of this violence. This aim is instrumental to the primary aim of this study: understanding what the international aid community could have done in the 1980s to prevent and downplay violence before the collapse of almost all institutions of good/tolerable governance in 1991. The latter objective is naturally linked with the more general aim of finding generalizable prescriptions for the prevention of conflicts in developing countries.

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Answers to the two research questions were primarily sought by means of interviews<sup>2</sup> and argument analyses of Somalis (as parties and witnesses to the conflict) and aid officials. These interviews were related to and integrated with almost every international social scientific study on Somalia as listed by the Social Science Citation Index and Sociofile between the years 1986 and 1997 and the most important earlier books on Somalia referred to in studies of the last decade. The conceptual framework of the study lies in the theory of conflict transformation as outlined in Auvinen and Kivimäki (1997), while conflict related findings are related and integrated both to the more recent models and theories of collective identities, conflict rhetoric and to the more traditional analysis on economic and political structures of conflict.

### **Conceptual and Theoretical Premises**

The development of events and history consists of an endless sequence of junctures where the course of history can take alternative directions. These junctures can be conscious or unconscious decisions by individuals or groups or they can be results of several uncoordinated decisions and structures of interaction between people and groups. Equally well, junctures of history can be objectively determined changes, the emergence of objective limitations to the choices of individuals and groups and sheer accidents. Since these different types of junctures affect the alternatives to the following junctures - because the people of Somalia elected the Somali Youth League to power in 1960s, some other parties could not use governmental power to conduct certain economic policies and the objective economic conditions became different - there is a temptation for analysis to reduce history to certain types of junctures only. One can say that the Barre coup was caused by objective economic conditions (mechanical determinism) while someone else can claim that the political elite is to be blamed, because it caused the economic conditions (top down voluntarist explanation). Again another can emphasize the bottoms up dynamics of politics by pointing out that the political elite was elected by the people and that elite as well as their economic ideas might have come from the people. In another sequence of junctions some will say that the arms trade was the explanation for Barre's violent repression since it was one of the necessary junctures in the course of history that lead to violence, while some other might say that arms do not fight without people who pull the trigger and that the people pulled the trigger in the context of a clan/class conflict.

In this kind of study that aims at producing epistemic preparedness to fight for peace by means of development cooperation, those junctures are emphasized in the study in which the international donor community can have influence. This is not to mean that other junctures should be ignored, since developments before and after certain intervention by the donor community affect the effects of the donor intervention. What our focus means, however, is that this study cannot seek simplistic reductionist explanations to the conflict

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on the basis of colonialist history or clannish tradition, even if both the colonial history and clan structure of the society influence the way in which external influence affects the development of conflict potential in Somalia.

When viewing the development of Somalia conflict history from this kind of perspective it is obvious that the approach cannot aim at single variable explanations, but it seems clear that several decisions, structures and elements of objective reality had influence on violence in Somalia. In Somalia it would even be tempting to say that we cannot explain just one war, but several conflicts, instead. There seems to be large scale violence motivated by several kinds of motives in conflicts in several parts of the country between several parties and there is not necessarily anything to link the two conflicts to each other. Thus it might be that in explaining violence in Somalia, we should be talking about conflicts instead of a conflict.

When discussing violence and conflict in the developing world, one should be careful with one's concepts since some of the security-related concepts that are applicable in the discussion about European security might lose their normative relevance when applied to a third world context. When talking about stability as something opposite to war and the collapse of the state, one should bear in mind that many non-democratic states might be very violent in their normal form - they might be more failed as states than they would be if they were unstable. Violence can be part of order, rather than disorder; it can be part of continuance rather than part of change.<sup>3</sup> Yet of course, good governance and the production of public good requires order and stability, but the important thing is that this order and stability cannot be just any kind of order to be better than disorder and instability. Similarly, the western idea that public goods need to be produced primarily by the state and not some other group or institution is not to be taken for granted. When thinking of good governance one should be imaginative: while somewhere and in some issues the basic unit of governance might be the state, somewhere else or in some other issues it can be, for example, local communities or regional arrangements (on the dysfunctionality of the Somali state see Lyons & Samatar 1995). Therefore, we should not seek explanations for instability, disorder and the collapse of the state or strategies how the donor community could rescue the stability of state order, but instead we should explain violence and the collapse of institutions of good governance and seek strategies to strengthen non-violent structures of governance and ways of transforming structures of violence.

The problem of violence can be studied on three levels that have rather independent logic: 1. level of violent behavior: means and opportunities for violence, dynamics of ongoing violence (reaction: disarmament strategies, crisis/arms management strategies, prevention of escalation, cease fire strategies) 2. Explicit motivations of violence: level of the dispute (reaction: dispute resolution strategies) 3. structural roots of violence: identitive structures, discursive/argumentative structures, economic structures, political structures (reaction: conflict transformation).

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**Table 1. Approaches to Preventive Diplomacy.**

	<b>Crisis Management</b>	<b>Dispute Resolution</b>	<b>Conflict Transformation</b>
Objective	De-escalation	Dispute Settlement	Change in Conflict Structures
Target	Means, Conflict Behavior	Dispute	Structures: identitive, discursive, political, economic
Relation to Change	Status quo oriented	Status quo oriented	Change oriented
Timing	After ripening of conflict	After the emergence of the dispute	Ideally as early as possible, can be needed even after the conflict
Example	Peace-keeping; Arms Control;	Peace Treaties;	Transformation of the Cold War dispute; German integration to Europe after WW II.

The first of these approaches, the arms/crisis/violence management approach, is directed to the means of conflict and it aims at the prevention of the escalation of the conflict. This approach does not in itself try to resolve the dispute behind the conflict behavior let alone the conflict structures that give rise to the disputes. Instead, the intention is merely to control violence and try to contribute to the defence of people. From the theoretical perspective it seems obvious that crisis management is not an exclusive peace strategy, but instead it can be one of the components in support of others. Yet when the magnitude of violence is considered, there are cases where management of violent behavior in crises can offer the most immediate benefits. In Somalia, during the Barre Regime it seemed that the control, through checks and balances, of the means of violence would have reduced violence substantially. Later, after the central government had collapsed and the society had been reduced almost into a state of Hobbesian anarchy and war of every family against another, the fact that there were so many arms in the hands of civilians can be blamed for the tremendous magnitude of human suffering.

In addition to the clear humanitarian benefit of saving human lives, crisis

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management can be used to create a stalemate, which again can facilitate negotiations for deeper settlement of conflict by resolution. The fact that until the summer 1997, the peace process of Somalia has had to take place outside the country (mainly in Ethiopia and Nairobi), because of the problem of security and management of violence within its borders, has made things more complicated. In fact this has been one of the main reasons for the marginalization of certain factions of the Somali society, as well as serving as the basis for the delegitimation efforts of these same factions (especially Aideed's supporters).

There are at least three problems that an approach, which restricts itself to violence/crisis management faces. Firstly, it might be morally wrong to suppress legitimate expressions of grievances, even violent ones, unless the oppressed were given alternative ways of changing the situation, which they perceive as exploitative. The only conflict strategy that Barre's regime had during the 1980s was exactly this. Instead of addressing the structural injustices of Somali society, Siad Barre just made sure that his opponents did not have enough military power to derail him (Walker 1994, 164). The most deprived groups in the refugee camps were in fact voluntarily deprived economically as a punishment for their opposition to the government. Secondly, this kind of containment of grievances might be extremely dangerous; because that approach can later lead to a major explosion as actually did happen in Somalia. Thirdly, crisis management is becoming less and less plausible in the long run as the new technology of destruction and strategies of resistance seem to allow means of violent expressions of grievances, which are very difficult to contain with military means of crisis management. The fact that grievances express themselves increasingly in mini-wars, society level violence, crime and terrorism, gives additional reasons to go deeper than just crisis/violence management.

The second approach, dispute resolution, aims at the settlement of the dispute by persuading the disputants - or one of them - into compromises. This approach has for a long time represented the only mind set of international diplomacy, international security studies and peace research. In fact, the old idea of deterrence aims at persuasion power in disputes, not to mention the classical ideas of mediation, which are clearly focusing on the problem of disputes.

In Somalia dispute resolution takes place at very different levels and especially on the local level there are well-founded mechanisms that the international community cannot create, but do support and encourage very effectively. Especially from the beginning of 1997 and at the end of 1996 several projects had been initiated by the western donor community unified in the Somali Assistance Coordination Body to help find mechanisms to solve disputes related to local production, funding (through local taxation) and direction of public goods (Fedeli 1997).<sup>4</sup>

On the level of national politics it still seems to be very difficult to formulate the issues of disputes in a manner, which enables any meaningful discussion between disputants. Secondly, if one compares the abstract

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principles that different conflicting parties present, the differences are actually on that level very marginal (compare for example the conclusions by the Lake Nakuru and Lake Naivasha Conference and the declarations of Aideed's representatives in Nairobi). However, when one discusses with people from different sides of the conflict it is very difficult to attract interest and attention to the abstract principles and discussion easily slides into personalities and qualities of groups as well as the rights of different groups to power and wealth. The structural divisions of Somali society make it very difficult to end violence through dispute resolution even though this strategy is definitely needed also at the national level after some of the structural obstacles to peace have been cleared away. The national dispute resolution processes of Lake Naivasha, Lake Nakuru and the Sodere Process may well lay some ground for the eventual problem solving on the national level, but presently they do not seem to contribute to the reduction of violence. Yet before institutions of good government can be established on a national level in Somalia, several crucial issues under dispute need to be solved. Rather than classical questions related to categories of western political science and the study of political systems, the following issues seem to be crucial:

1. How will the national political mandate be determined?
2. How can the abuse of power by the political elite be checked? (Only a few groups seem to be willing to go any further without defining this first)
3. How is the national and local administration staffed?
4. How are education and other power-related services distributed?
5. Which assets are to be privatized, which nationalized and how?
6. What is the relationship between the central government and the regions?
7. What is the relationship between the government and different groups?
8. Who should be taxed and how?
9. How should the development priorities be designed and what are they (regionally and occupationally)?
10. What kinds of policies should be adopted in the control of national natural resources, especially pasture land and marine resources as well as the use of agricultural land and water?

The philosophy in the conflict transformation approach is that in conflicts there are causes or reasons more fundamental than are expressed on the level of disputes. Often conflicts are caused by economic, political, identitive, discursive structures, which then give rise to concrete disputes. Here economic structures deal with questions of the distribution of income and accumulation of wealth in economic interaction between agents of different sorts. Political structures are similarly related to the distribution of power resources. By identitive and discursive structures I mean two things, which are closely related to conflict problems. How people perceive groups and relations between groups is an interesting question related to the socially constructed agent structure of

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the society. These identitive structures are highly important questions for the study of conflict since they construct the potential sides in conflicts. Very much related to this is the question of discursive structures which define the bases and limits for civilized verbal argumentation in societies: The way in which different groups perceive norms and interpretations of dispute/conflict-relevant reality is crucially important for the point of view on conflicts. If there are at least some generally accepted bases for argumentation in politics discursive structures are less conflicting. If there are groups who do not have any common grounds for debate and argumentation and who would have no interlinking groups (groups that would find some elements of the argumentative basis of both groups legitimate), there is a more conflicting discursive structure.

Another starting point in the conflict transformation approach is that keeping disputes at bay by strengthening stability is not always possible or even desirable, but that instead, peace process has to acknowledge that positive peace (Galtung 1971) can only be achieved through a fundamental change. According to Galtung, positive peace is not merely the cessation of actual hostilities, but also means cooperation towards decreasing such structures of inequality which exploit the poor and which weaken the health and prospects of a long life for the less advantaged.

Transformation of conflict as an aim of preventive diplomacy is supported from the theoretical point of view also when the goal is to avoid actual (not structural) violence and destabilization of order. Economic deprivation and inequality have been identified as structural causes of conflicts (Auvinen 1996; Gurr 1970). It has also been established that political disputes are normally less violent in democracies than in authoritarian regimes (e.g. Gurr & Lichbach 1979; Graham and Gurr 1979). Because of the links between economic development and the development of conflict structures, it seems natural that structural explanations of conflict in Somalia should be looked at in more detail.

## **Structural Explanations of Conflicts in Somalia**

Many of the traditional structural explanations of conflict are based on linear correlations: a structure has a variable, which should be high or low if conflicts are to be avoided. For example, related to the aggressors, position in the conflict structure, Crane Brinton's (1938), Barrington Moore's (1960, see also North and Lagerstrom 1973) and Ted Robert Gurr's (1970) models of relative deprivation suggest that the bigger is a group's relative deprivation (caused by worsening of economic position compared to earlier or compared to other groups) the more probable it is for this group to initiate domestic violence. Furthermore, on the rebels position, Granovetter (1978, see also Gochman 1979) claims that there are economic structural attributes that reduce the threshold of violence, again in a linear fashion. Such threshold conditions are often related to the stage of economic development: the more developed potential rebellors are, the less likely is that they will resort to violence (Londregars & Poole 1990, 178; Gurr & Duval 1973, 148). Related to the structure of interaction between offenders and defenders, according to Manus Midlarsky (1975) and Charles Gochman (1979) alliances among groups increase tension and the likelihood of conflicts and in Richardson's model the more there is competition in material military mobilization among potential parties of war, the more likely a war is (1960). Modernization as a condition in the interaction between the aggressor and the defender is also often referred to and according to Huntington (1968, and many others after him) the stage of modernity is unversedly related to the risk of a conflict while modernization is directly related to it. Finally, according to the models of Hans Morgenthau (1948), Quincy Wright (1960), Arnold Wolfers (1962), Innis Claude (1967) and John Mearsheimer (1990) wars are most likely in conditions of power disparity. Related to the target of rebellion - the state - linear models of conflict suggest that the more repressive the state is the more probable conflict is (Lichbach & Gurr 1981, see also contradictory evidence in Hibbs 1973 and Marcus & Nesvold 1972), but yet the more the government allows opposition mobilization the more there is risk of conflict (Tilly 1978).

Many of the structural explanations of conflict in Somalia differ from the traditional linear explanations so that there do not seem to be ready concepts with which these explanations could be linearized. Rather these explanations seem to describe structural developments that destabilize some balance or harmony: instead of a variable (or variables) that measure too high or too low, complicated changes create turbulence which gives rise to disputes. The linear and more general explanations can, however, be related to the more detailed models, in a way that allows the Somali specific models to deepen the analysis of the mechanisms of how the general factors produce conflicts. At the same time as the general models can provide some conceptual tools for the analysis and of the complex historical explanations for the conflicts in Somalia. The historical interpretations and explanations are transformed into elements that these explanations see as crucial causes of violence and then these elements are

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related to those that are seen as causes of violence in more general conflict theories. When producing prescriptions in retrospect on what the international community should have done and what it should have avoided, the connection between the analysis on Somalia and analysis of conflicts in general makes it possible to draw some tentative conclusions on what the international community should do in developing countries in general to transform conflicts and to avoid playing up conflict structures.


The linking of general theories with Somalia-specific explanations can be done by starting from the most linear ones, which rather directly apply the general models in the Somali case. From there one can proceed to more qualitative, historical explanations. One can distinguish three main approaches to the explanation of violence in Somalia. They are

- a. **The Objectivist View:** objective economic (and political) structures directly cause conflict: Objective structures --> conflict.
- b. **The Primordialist View:** objective, relatively stable historical structures of production give rise to a culture which directly causes conflict or which has elements that are unsuitable with the modern structures of global political economy: objective historical structures --> economic grievances, antagonistic identity structures and the lack of common grounds for agreements --> conflict. And
- c. **The Instrumentalist View:** structures that cause conflicts, are produced by actions and politics rather than objective structures: politics --> antagonistic identity structures and belligerent discursive structures--> violence.

These explanations all concentrate on certain kinds of junctures of history in their explanation. They all, can then be utilized in order to produce a fuller picture of the causes of conflict in Somalia and in the effort to find junctures where the international community could have changed the course of history towards a more peaceful direction/avoided turning the course of history towards conflict.


## The Objectivist View

The willingness of Somalis to rebel can be seen related to the general conditions of life. The threshold of conflict is reduced with poverty. A picture of the general economic problems is presented in figure 1 (World Bank Database 1996):




Yet according to Fedeli (1997), Jamal (1988ab) and ILO/UNDP (1989) official statistics overemphasize the problems of Somali economy in 1980s. According to both Jamal (1988ab) and ILO/UNDP (1989) the general economic situation improved substantially in the beginning of 1980s. Due to the growth of the gray sector and especially the invisibility of the contributions of migrant workers in official statistics, the view presented in figure 1 should be treated with caution: Somali economy was in a better shape that one could assume from it. Especially, the sluggish development of the “official economy” in the beginning of the 1980s was outweighed by the increase of the contribution of the unofficial remittances from the migrant Somali workers, mainly in Saudi Arabia, sent to Somali relatives by the mail. This, according to Jamal accounted for two thirds of the urban income. Yet the sharp decline in the volume and prices of Somali meat exports (mainly to Saudi Arabia) after 1985, the related foreign disinvestments (see the deteriorating external condition in figures 2) and the growth of domestic economic mismanagement caused economic decline in the latter half of the 1980s.

## External economic conditions



If one looks at social indicators (figure 3) one can see that life expectancy was growing and child mortality declining all through the decade.

## Social development




The decline in the indigenous food production does not indicate a decline in the levels of nutrition, since it is known that in the 1980s food imports increased and as the eating habits of Somalis became more international (Farzin 1991). Yet, undeniably the economic situation became worse for some sectors of Somalis. Annex 2 reveals the deterioration of the external conditions for the

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Somali economy: the decline in the foreign investments and the fluctuations in export affected the employment situation in Somalia.

Figure 4 shows how the economic contribution of different sectors of society developed in the 1970s and in the 1980s. Here we see that the role of the rural sector grew (even though part of the apparent growth was probably related to the increasing integration of the rural sector into the national accounts) all through the period while in contribution of other sectors declined or remained stagnant.

### Contribution of Sectors



Yet the number of urban population continued to grow all through the whole period (1971:25%, in 1991:45% according to World Tables 1996) which was possible only through the urban-biased economic policies: the rural population became more and more the supporter of the less and less productive urban population. Thus the exploitation of the rural groups increased (Massey 1994, 123). According to Laitin and Samatar (1995) the government expenses from the export of livestock increased from 3% (1963) to 14% (1986) of the fob price. Within the group of rural people, the situation of agricultural people was improving rapidly in the 1980s (Jamal 1988ab). Yet, also within this group, plantation workers did not get anything from the growth in this sector (Abdi I Samatar 1993). The pastoral sector, on the other hand, got poorer during the 1980s (Jamal 1988ab, ILO/UNDP 1989). On the latter half of 1980s even the changing of pastoral food consumptions habits did not rescue the sector from very harsh conditions (Jamal 1988ab, ILO/UNDP 1989). This partially explains the increase of urbanization in the 1980s. After the increase in urban population also this sector became relatively deprived at the very end of the 1980s as the abilities of the state to subsidize the living standards of the urban poor deteriorated (see annexes 6 and 7). This group along with people in refugee camps became a rather optimal candidate for the initiation of a rebellion since in the urban areas both the ability to mobilize was good and the relative deprivation was rather absolute.

## **The Primordialist View<sup>5</sup>**

The best known explanations of conflict in Somalia is the one by John Markakis (1987), I.M. Lewis (1962; 1965; 1989), Said Samatar and David Laitin (1987) which emphasize the role of traditional clan structures. This view, which A.I. Samatar calls traditionalist theory, has been accused of primordialist, or even objectivist and reductionist connotations (Samatar & Samatar 1987; A.I. Samatar 1987ab, Ohanwe 1997).

Many followers of the traditionalist theory (Crocker 1995; Clark & Herbst 1996; Bongartz 1991; Stevenson 1993; Clark 1993; Bongartz 1991; most interviewed officials of development cooperation) might be accused of objectivism and reductionism. Yet, a close reading of the careful analyses by the traditionalists reveals that even if their concept of collective identities might be primordial and that according to them, clan identities are not completely independent of their material roots, Markakis, Samatar, Laitin and Lewis do not really reduce their explanation to some objectivist notion of tradition. On the contrary, they just emphasize the role of historical cultural roots of conflict and there are many things we can learn from the traditionalist theory. According to the traditionalist theory, clan reality of today's Somalia is primarily a product of realities of social interaction and production of bare necessities for survival and provision of security in the traditional Somalian society (one mode of primordial conception), rather than a product of elite mobilization of people along arbitrary lines (as instrumentalists claim). If pastoral production has required cooperation primarily within families for the everyday routines and within a larger group for the safeguarding of cattle and grazing land (diya-paying group consisting of a few hundred to a few thousand men, Lewis 1965, 11), it seems understandable that these groups become important for Somali individuals. When an individual's survival is dependent on a group of people, it is natural and rational that this group earns the individual's loyalty - if this was not the case, groups would be unable to provide subsistence and security for its members. Equally natural is that since Somalis need to move their cattle, that their traditional conception of order is not territorial in the modern sense (order is not rules applied within a certain territory). It was not possible for moving groups of people to create wider stable institutions of cooperation and order and thus it is not difficult to grasp that in such a setting, the emergence of stable state institutions was not feasible (in addition to Markakis and Lewis, see Barth 1973, 12; Khazanov 1983, 148 and 295 for a more general analysis of pastoral societies).

### **Conflict tradition**

Yet the traditionalist analysis of Somali violence did not see tradition as the only source of conflict, not even the primary cause. Both primary traditionalists, Lewis and Markakis, claim that Somali culture lowers the Somali threshold of violence: in pastoral production, competing for grazing land is a necessity of survival and this is reflected in the cultural values of Somalis. According to Lewis (1961) "Somali are a war-like people, driven by the poverty of their resources to intense competition to access for water and grazing". According to Markakis (1987, 16) "claims over pasture and water were the perennial bone of contention among lineage groups and clans. Force was the only effective means to secure such claims and it was a constant factor of nomadic life." Because of this reality of pastoral production, many Somalis considered peaceful order as economically detrimental (Said Samatar 1982, 19 cited in Markakis 1987, 33). According to Markakis (1987, 34) among some groups homicide was a cultural practice, a prerequisite for attaining adult status and contracting marriage, and provided added motivation for raiding. In addition to motivations, the traditional way of producing security in small groups meant that the material military mobilization is more possible among groups than if military means of conflicts were not traditionally with sub-national groups (compare with the findings of Richardson 1960). It seems that since it there are some clear elements born in culture that increase a nation's potential for conflicts, the international community should take these into consideration in development cooperation and try to concentrate on the conflict-quality of aid when dealing with these countries.

### **The Clash of Modern and Traditional Structures of Governance**

Even though culture explains some elements of Somali violence, the main reason for conflict in Somalia, according to Lewis and Markakis, is the incompatibility of modern structures of governance with the traditional Somali culture. Culture alone does not explain violence, but the clash of the modern and traditional (perhaps the most elegant explication of this thesis in a more general African context can be found in Abucar 1994).

In a sense the primordialists, theory of conflict in Somalia verifies the thesis by Huntington (1968) and many others that the modernization process is related to an increased risk of war. Instead of just seeing this connection the case study approach can provide ways of analyzing the dynamics and mechanisms that explain why this is so. Here the parsimonious and general linear model and rich and detailed models are brought together.

In production the emergence of modern structures of capitalism created changes some of which were connected to conflict motives. In addition to the need for new trade-related public services, the change from subsistence pastoralism to market pastoralism created environmental tensions. The expansion of pre-capitalist forms of production in Somalia in the 19th century and the expansion of capitalism in the 1900s and finally in the 1980s created

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imbalances in the management of natural resources (Jackson 1997; Markakis 1987). It seems that the rise of environmental problems in Somalia was linked to the rise of market pastoralism: production of meat for larger markets of colonial rulers, Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries (Dalleo 1975, 175; Markakis 1987, 33). The situation was exacerbated by imprudent national policies to control droughts and the reduction of pasture (Markakis 1987, 4-5, 16; Markakis 1997, forthcoming) as well as global climatic changes (Cardy 1997; Edwards 1997).

In the field of economic policies, the clearest dispute that the clash of traditional and modern produced was in relation to the funding of the production of public goods. While in the traditional society, the production of public goods (for example the system of finances and security) took place within smaller communities. The concepts of national taxes and national revenue were introduced during the colonial period. Because of the continuance of traditional production at the same time as the attempt to introduce national structures of taxation, there was a problem of legitimizing taxation, especially in a pastoral society, which did not really receive or need any of the public services of the state (Andrews 1997; for a more general discussion on Somali and other pastoral societies and taxation, see Castagno 1959, 367 and Monod 1975). This difficulty of legitimacy was reported by the colonial officers already very early during colonial rule (Markakis 1987, 33). In the areas inhabited by ethnic Somalis inside Ethiopia the problem of legitimacy can be recognized in linguistic practices: the word for “taxes” was the same as that for “bribes” (Hersi 1997). No wonder that the effort by the Ethiopians to tax not only urban Somalis in Ogaden, but also the rural pastoralists triggered a rebellious reaction in 1977 (Markakis 1987, 177; Fedeli 1997). What contribution the problem of taxation had in the eruption of violence in the 1990s cannot be very accurately assessed. It seems probable that this explanation for violence should not be exaggerated, since it seems improbable that the efficiency in taxation could have risen very dramatically during the last decade before the collapse of order. In fact, statistics drawn from official sources (IMF/Wider 1997) indicate that public spending did not rise dramatically in real terms and that the role of indirect taxation in the public revenue did not drop (which would have suggested the rise of direct taxation). Yet one should always consider the motives for deception when dealing with official statistics. The IMF impatience towards the growing debt and corruption within the administration can be seen as a motive for hiding any increases in direct tax revenue (Fedeli 1997). A former senior official of the Ministry of Finances and Revenue describes how the amount of direct taxes did indeed rise rapidly towards the end of the 1980s at the expense of indirect taxes (Hersi 1997). These observations can find support from Peter Schrader's (1986) accounts of the practices of resettlement of pastoral people: these policies were at least partly motivated by the interest in creating a more effective system of taxation (Schrader 1986, 642). The assumption that income taxes increased in Somalia in the 1980s can also be supported by looking at the pressures created by the international lending institutions on Somalia: among the key ingredients of

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the IMF/WB recipe for sounder fiscal policies were the measures to make tax collection more efficient (Ministry of National Planning, Somali Dem Republic 1987; UNDP 1989).

If we look at the possible consequences of the economic modernization through the environmental problems it created and through the modestly increased income taxes and the effort to make tax collection more efficient in the 1980s, we can see several possible mechanisms. On the one hand there are groups that could be seen as relatively deprived in the sense of Gurr (1970), More (1938) and Davis (1960). Especially groups involved as targets of the pastoralist resettlement programs (and to some extent urban poor) can probably be seen as such. Since many of the movements that finally came to challenge Barre's rule had their strongholds in the resettlement camps (Schrader 1986), this explanation can be considered as rather credible. Yet, of course, one has to keep in mind that economic modernization did not offer a full explanation for the emergence of resettlement camps and the relative deprivation there - climatic changes, nationalist motivations for the Ogaden war and poor management of the resettlement programs were definitely part of the explanation. Especially, the poor management of crises on the part of Barre's government, punishing opposition-supporting refugees instead of taking their deprivation seriously (Schrader 1986), naturally contributed to violence and were part of it. The environmental problems also created a problem of uncontrolled urbanization, which again, was fueled by Barre's urban-biased economic policies. After the deterioration of the government's economic position (due to the debt problem) the economic situation of the urban poor, who had relied on the government subsidies, became intolerable. Since this group was at the same time relatively deprived, and easy to mobilize (because these people were located in urban areas close to each other) it became an ideal group for a rebellion (Gurr 1970 & Tilly 1978).

What the international aid attempted to do to prevent the deterioration of the situation of the relatively deprived was to try to provide emergency relief to the most affected areas and people. It seems obvious that especially in addition to functioning structural adjustment there is a need to prevent conflicts by making sure that transformation does not seriously threaten the life of vulnerable groups and the stability of good institutions of governance (Shaw & Singer 1988; Mellor 1988; Cornia et al. 1989). However, in the case of Somalia, it has been suggested (Farzin 1991) that in the absence of effective coordination between different food aid donors and especially in the absence of prudent food security policy measures on the part of the government, food aid can produce some adverse conflict effects. In Somalia, food aid contributed to the change of consumption (urban people started to prefer imported food to the local) which again deteriorated the position of domestic food producers and thereby weakened food security in Somalia. Thus, in a situation, where the governmental subsidies for basic necessities of life collapse because of the economic collapse of the state, the situation of the already relatively deprived people suddenly gets quite desperate.

In the political sphere, the clearest exemplifications of this clash can be

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found in the incompatibility of territorial thinking with arbitrary national borders of order introduced to Somalia during the colonial period and the objective requirements of movement in the traditional and still existing pastoral requirements of movement across these arbitrary borders (see the attached UNDOS map for the movements of traditional Somali clans in annex 1). Pastoralists would kill their cattle and die of hunger if national borders were to be guarded in a strict manner<sup>6</sup>. This problem can be seen in the roots of the popular motivation for the fight for Ogaden and for a greater Somalia even if the official national motivation was related to nationalism. The fear of being blocked from escaping droughts across the Ethiopian border can be seen as one of the sources of violence between these countries - violence that seemed crucial also in the development of domestic conflict in Somalia (Edwards 1997). One should not, however, overstretch this explanation, since hostilities between Somalis and Ethiopians (especially Eritreans) date back to times far beyond the modern territorial governance. This violence has a lot to do with religious differences and possibly with disagreements in trade (Hersi 1977, 141). Since these artificial borders were created violence between Ethiopia and Somalia has been more frequent, which gives some credibility to the thesis on the clash of modernity and tradition. Yet, borders do not only create problems for the traditional nomadic life, but they also irritate nationalist sensitivities if they do not follow ethnic/national frontiers (Musa 1997; Warsame 1997; Elmi 1997; Sheikh Mukhtar Mohamed Hussein 1997). This clearly explains to some extent (perhaps even to a large extent) the fact that the extension of modern territorial rule and the erection of state boundaries in the Horn of Africa goes together with more extensive violence.

The problem caused by territoriality of the modern order is one which is probably quite definitely out of the reach of development cooperation. The post-modern economic development of lowering borders and reduction of significance of physical territories in production is however, in the long run offering a way of ignoring territoriality in governance and this seems to be more suitable for Somalia and most other African countries (Musa 1997). Europeanization (or EUnization) of African economy seems, however, quite a distant prospect and many of requirements of de-territorialization of production and governance require access to the latest information technology.

The differences in traditional and modern land ownership systems have very often been mentioned as sources of conflict in many developing countries and in Somalia (Mwaura 1997). Also the fact that there are very different expectations and needs relating to land ownership in a country with a large agricultural sector and an even bigger pastoral sector: while the pastoral conception of land is traditionally such in which treats land as a public utility (God's gift, Lewis 1965, 9) that belongs to nobody, for agriculturalists it is important to know that the sower still owns the lands when it is time to harvest. This difference lies at the heart of the competition for power between the Sabs and pastoral clans. Additionally during the resettlement programs the different conceptions of land ownership created situations where different conceptions of land ownership gave rise to disputes (Schraeder 1986).

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Finally, the traditionalist thesis of the clash of modern and traditional structures can be seen in the clannish mentalities of politicians. The objective basis of the society and production is related to the problem that the traditional family/diya/clan loyalties (rational in traditional production) are reflected in national politics: politicians are maximizing the utility of their family/clan instead of thinking nationally (of Barre's clannish mentalities see Johansson & Diesow 1993). According to Ahmed I. Samatar (1988) there are no national politicians who would not publicly reject clannism and then do their best in politics to advance what they consider particular clan interests (See also Laitin & Samatar 1988). Even the father of Somali nationalism, Sheikh Sayyud Mohammad Abdille Hassan, who rejected clan identities in Somali politics, was fought against by the Issaq (who belong to the Irir clan family along with Hawiye and Dir) and he was quoted saying "The fate of Issaq is to remain as stupid as donkeys" (Lewis 1965).

As a clannish identitive structure of national politics emerges, politics becomes structured along clan lines - not along abstract ideological lines - and politics can no longer be discussed on the level of principles: politics becomes a matter of battle for national resources (Markakis 1987, XVI). For the opposition, legitimation of power is difficult. If politics was discussed on the level of principles<sup>7</sup>, it could be possible for the supporters of the opposition to persuade government supporters into their camp. However, persuading an Issaq to become an Ogaden is more difficult and even the democratic institution of national elections can start to look very much like a clan census<sup>8</sup>. The conflict implications of this seem clear as there does not seem to be non-violent alternatives for resistance to political opposition.<sup>9</sup> Also when the only way of changing the political balance is through changing the structure of antagonistic interest-based clan alliances, it seems natural that the setting is belligerent (compare with the findings by Midlarsky (1975) and Gochman (1979)).

It seems clear that the mixing of clan identities in national politics has some direct conflict implications. Firstly, the creation of antagonistic sides is being explained with the traditional theory, by the existence of clan identities. The fact that Barre favored his family - his clan (Mareehan) was unjust towards those clans that did not belong to the ruling clan alliance (Mareehan-Ogaden-Dulhante) - certainly contributed to the rise of a rebellious spirit, not to mention that many of Barre's acts against clans (especially Issaq and later Majerteen) themselves were acts of violence.

Later when Barre had fallen, it seemed that the fact that it was very difficult for Somalis to reach any kinds of agreements was related to the fragmentation of the society and some of this fragmentation had definitely a lot to do with traditional orientations. It seems very difficult to talk about the future of Somalia on abstract constitutional or ideological terms, but instead discussion very easily degenerates: instead of thinking how politics and administration should be arranged, one ends up talking about who agrees, who represents and which groups have rights to what. Even the competing peace proposals seem to be almost identical in abstract terms the only thing that matters seems to be whether one's group has had a say in the process (see for

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Aideed's objections to the Sodere process and their own proposal in Jamma Mohamed Ghalib's (Aideed's Minister of Foreign Affairs) letter to Felix Masha (Representative of the UN Secretary General), Nairobi in 16, January 1997 or Revised Memorandum on the Sodere Process by Aideed's Foreign Ministry in January 1996). According to many interviewed former and present Somali officials and aid officials this setting and mentality leads to the conception that which ever group is to make an agreement it must count on the opposition of every other group. Thus in order to keep an order based on the agreement the mobilization of this opposition needs to be deterred by repression. For the opposition this leads to the fact that any agreement to which it is not a party needs to be resisted so that the opposition would not become a target of repression (Lindholm 1997; Andrews 1997; Bierke 1977)

In addition to structuring politics in accordance with a clannish identity structure, clan identities are related to conflicts through mobilization. In a society in which people identify themselves as members of clans rather than as Somalis, mobilization of rebellion is easy: one simply needs to utilize the existing clan identities. The case of Somalia seems to specify the mechanism of how existing group identities can help conflict mobilization and, therefore, increase the risk of violence (for the generalization of the relationship of existing divisions and violent mobilization, see Obershall 1973; Moore 1978; Klandermans & Olivier 1995, for the relationship between mobilization and violence/rebellion, see Tilly 1978). The mobilization along the family, lineage, and clan lines makes not only rebellion easy, but it also makes escalation easy. If it was a group of communists and a group of liberals, a conflict between these would not include "ordinary", politically passive people. However, clan conflicts are like ethnic conflicts there are no longer "ordinary people", but instead, everybody reveals his/her side in their accent or in their place of residence (Pireh Babi 1997).

To repel the conflict potentials associated with clash of traditional and modern and especially potentials related to the traditional clan affiliations in the context of modern governance, one should either create structures to check and balance clannish mentalities in national politics or try to manipulate collective identities. According to Abucar (1995, 8) transition to modernity requires the creation of a new situation in which checks and balances are in place and this can be achieved through mixing the traditional with modern so that the national governance would have the modern democratic national representation of all citizens balanced and checked with the traditional tribal/clan structures of representation (as in Botswana). Abucar has some evidence on how the ability to balance between modern and traditional structures seems to be one of the formulas of stability and legitimacy in Africa. The tendency of the modern structures to crush the traditional structures and especially to crush the explicit rule according to which all tribes/clans need to have a say in politics is, according to Abucar's findings, one of the reasons for conflict in Africa. The fact that oil has made Nigeria's national federal rulers strong has disturbed the fragile balance between the modern federal government and the regional (traditional, tribal) institutions of governance. Similarly, in Zaire natural

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resources strengthened the central administration at the expense of traditional structures and enabled tribal nepotism. Unfortunately the role of development cooperation functioned also in the direction of strengthening the central administration and thus weakening the sometimes formally uninstitutionalized systems of traditional checks and balances of the modern order. Some of the interviewed development cooperation workers stated that most specifically in the 1980s educational projects and the lack of surveillance in privatization (related to the SAP) contributed to the clan-based discrimination: when dealing with power resources such as education or government assets (some of which were apparently stolen rather than privatized) one should be very careful with the question of equality between those groups that perceive themselves as antagonistic towards one another (Musa 1997).

Another possible solution that the international aid could do to play down the clash of modern and traditional would be to encourage the further development of the mediation between the state and its citizen. Regions, tribes and clans serve in most African countries as mediators between the people and the abstract state, which is alien to most of the “ordinary people”: it is the lineage elders and clan sultans who deal directly with the state structures while all other direct contacts by people with the state are related to the measures the state has to punish its citizens. If the state institutions were closer to the people in a positive way there could be an opportunity, for substituting some of the roles of clans with genuinely functioning state institutions which people would trust. In this sense the education of the police and the state bureaucracy is in a crucial role: if the police are perceived as an enemy and since they represent the state, people seek security from the groups rather than from the state. The better training, education and professionalism of the police and the military would naturally contribute to a less violent future in Somalia and other African countries also more directly, since these two institutions are (independently of the state) responsible for much of the violence in Somalia and elsewhere in Africa (Mutahi 1997).

When moving further to the possibilities of manipulating clan identities, one has to switch to a slightly different view of clan identity, since one of the central claims of the traditionalist/primordialist views are that collective identities do not come from politics but from history and culture. Therefore, within this school of thought there is not much study on the opportunities offered by (international) politics for the manipulation of identities.

## **Instrumentalist Conception**

Despite the intensive criticism of the traditionalist view, the instrumentalist position (which is called transformist by Samatar 1992) is largely based on works done by Lewis, Markakis and other traditionalists. Especially, when the mobilization impacts of the traditional clan affiliations are analysed by the traditionalists, their analysis comes very close to that of the instrumentalists.

Even if neither the instrumentalist nor the traditionalist perception held that collective identities were objectively set, the point where Ahmed I. Samatar's and other instrumentalists' explanation differs from that of Lewis is in Samatar's perception of collective identities as something that can relatively easily be manipulated and moved from above by the elites. Also A.I. Samatar (1987ab), Lyons and Samatar (1995) and Samatar & Samatar (1987) claim that in addition to clan identities, there are class-based identities which are important elements of the explanation of conflict. Yet the fact that mobilization was attempted along clan lines, not, for example, so that left-handed people would have mobilized against right-handed people, proves how close this explanation is compared to those of Markakis, Laitin, Said Samatar and Lewis.

What makes the instrumentalist explanation interesting for this study is, firstly, that it sees more than just traditional clan divisions in Somali society. Since it seems that also the non-traditional divisions influence the development of violence, these divisions need to be taken into account. Secondly, the instrumentalist explanation analyses how collective identities change and that it makes a distinction between identitive division and antagonism among groups. Thereby, it reveals more junctures where influence can be exercised with development cooperation as well as more elements that need to be looked at when the effects of aid are studied.

One of the non-traditional sources of division, which the instrumentalists add to the explanation, is class. According to Samatar (1988) it is especially important to take into consideration the fact that already since the 1950s and 1960s there was a group who got its livelihood from the functions of national structures. If the traditionalist claim was that clan structures were related to the objective ways of how groups survive, then why would the way in which groups survive cease to affect the shaping of collective identities after the rise of capitalist production. The role of the group of former trader families who collaborated with the colonial officers and received the education for the national offices, was crucial in the initiation of violence in Somalia (Abdi I Samatar 1992, 638; Samatar 1988, 21). The traditional clan structures started to cause more conflict and violence as soon as the new indigenous class of Somali bureaucrats emerged, gives credibility to the instrumentalist thesis (Samatar 1988, 21). In this explanation the clash between the traditional and modern is avoidable. Conflicts and violence were primarily caused by rival elites of the new Somali bourgeoisie class (or middle class as Abucar 1995, 13 calls it). The ultimate aim was related to modern structures, since Samatar's claim that the

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rivalry over national resources, mainly tax money, escalated into a conflict where clan identities were used in the mobilization of support for one's egoistic interests (Abdi I. Samatar 1992, 634; Abucar 1995, 13).

In addition to divisions between rival elites on the one hand and the elite (traders/bureaucracy/politicians) and the rural people, modern realities of production can be seen to give rise to the division between agriculturists and pastorals (even if a large proportion of Somalis are both at the same time). Modern structures of governance offered the state quite much say in the affairs of agriculturists (especially after the banana plantations of Italians were nationalized by Barre) and the agricultural class became dependent on the state in a very different way than pastoralists. Since state policies in the 1970s and in the 1980s created a situation where the real incomes of the pastoralists dropped dramatically compared to the those in the farming class (Jamal 1986; 1988), some of the land-related disputes and violence in Southern Somalia can probably rather accurately be seen as inter-class hostility caused by the relative deprivation of the pastoralists comparing themselves with farmers. The rivalry in national politics between the northern parts of Somalia and the south, can also be seen in the light of class conflict, but here historical differences (Italian vs. British colonialism) and in some cases differences in clan affiliations need to be taken into consideration in the explanation (Searle 1992).

The fact that modern structures created deep divisions in Somali society has many conflict implications to consider in relation to development cooperation. The north and the south as well as pastoralists and farmers identified themselves as groups opposed to one another. In this kind of setting the declining of economic status of one group vis-à-vis another increases the risk of conflicts. The relatively deprived group has an increased motive for political rebellion if the decline of its relative status is caused by governmental policies. Therefore, development cooperation should have been very careful in targeting funds so that they did not increase the relative deprivation.

In addition to seeing different kinds of divisions in Somalia (and not only clan divisions), the instrumentalists claim that identitive structures can be manipulated from above is interesting. From the point of view of explaining violence it is crucial to know how groups can be mobilized against each other, whereas for the development aid community it would be more important to know how to avoid the antagonization of clans, regions and classes and how to contribute to the emergence of uniting collective identities - loyalties to groups to which all the competing factions would be considered as belonging to.

In the study of antagonization of group relations in Somalia, instrumentalist interpretations suggest that the main elites mobilizing clans against each other are those belonging to the collaborationist petite bourgeoisie, whose competition for state resources has caused the civil war. This interpretation can receive support from almost all Somalis interviewed for this study. The impression has been that most people (especially since our sample of Somalis has largely consisted of refugees) see themselves as outsiders who cannot help getting involved. The use of clan identities creates a situation where belonging to a clan is interpreted as a sign of antagonism, even if this

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belonging does not mean anything more than speaking with a certain dialect or having a few politically active distant relatives. Since this is the perception, it is merely rational to be cautious of people belonging to other clans and to defend the security of one's own family against others, which again fuels antagonism. Here again models of mobilization apply and the conflict potential based on mobilization of clans by the class of petite bourgeoisie can be seen in the light of the conceptual parsimony of the more general models (by Obershall 1973; Moore 1978; Klandemans & Oliver 1995 and Tilly 1978).

What the aid community can learn from this source of conflict is perhaps the most important lesson that it can learn from the case of Somalia. Since aid was one of the most important sources of national resources, it was also one of the most important causes for elite competition and one of the most important motivations for the antagonistic mobilization of Somali society along clannish lines. Aid can be especially harmful if it benefits its administrators (as in Somalia) and if the criteria for the access to its administration were the *de facto* rule in the country and if its centralized management was not conditioned to democratic national rule. If the way to get one's hands on the aid money was the ability to monopolize the use of force in a nation (*de facto* control), it seems clear that aid is creating a structure of deadly competition. If the ability to kill is a criterion for the access to national resources (as in dictatorships), instead of the ability to gain popular support (as in democracies) any increase in national resources increase the incentive to the "killing competition." Instead, if aid was decentralized in dictatorial countries and administered by smaller entities of governance, and the criterion for getting to administer aid was efficiency in good governance, it would be possible for the donor to create a competition for efficiency in assistance instead of efficiency in military competition. On the level of states, giving the administration of aid only to democratic governments could possibly create constructive structures of competition between governments.

The manipulation of traditional and non-traditional structures through aid is not only possible, if we take the instrumentalist position, but it seems to be rather unavoidable. If group identities are somehow instrumental to the aims of individuals, development of the economy is bound to affect the way in which people can collectively pursue their interests and thereby any influence on the economy is bound to influence the collective identities of the people. The so-called non-political approach to development cooperation is thus rather a strategy of ignoring one's (responsibility for one's) influence in the creation of the (group) agent structure in developing countries. According to Abdul I. Samatar (1992) the only way to undo the mobilized and antagonized clan divisions is to encourage the creation of an economy with productive resources widely distributed and a structure of competition which would rule out the material benefits for ceasing the *de facto* control over the national resources. Production that would diversify the setting of economic interest coalitions and pluralize the society would, according to the pluralistic politics view, have the effect of playing down the mobilized antagonistic collective identities.

Colonialist rule and Siyad Barre's dictatorship can be seen as mobilizing

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clannish identities. In the fight against the Somali national hero Sheikh Sayyud Mohammad Abdille Hassan, the British military started to use proxy war strategies in which the Issaq clan was used and supported to fight against the Dervish movement of the Sheikh (Lewis 1965, 75-6). This colonial use of the divide and rule is, in fact, very often seen as the main reason for the antagonization of the factions of African peoples (See for example Bowen 1996). Also Siyad Barre who belonged to a small clan had to mobilize clans and factions in Somali society "from the outside" and play them against each other, in order to avoid the emergence of a strong anti-government coalition (Johansson & Diesow 1993; Ohanwe 1997; Auvinen 1997). This policy may have affected the fact that after the fall of Barre, chaos resulted instead of the emergence of an organized opposition force. The manipulation by the dictatorial government of the identitive structure towards a more antagonistic direction played, thus an important role in increasing violence and the number of casualties in Somalia, and to some degree the assistance that the international community provided by economically strengthening the state contributed to the same result.

If we analyse the discursive structures in Somali society and try to seek a basis where argumentation, instead of fighting, could take off, one can see three sources of common identity and common normative bases: anti-colonialist Africanism, ethnic nationalism and Islamic unity.

The most obvious source of unity among Somalis during the first years of independence was naturally the anti-colonialist feeling. While it was true that this feeling was also mobilized by the class of people who had grown dependent on the state structures, it is rather clear that the anti-colonialist sentiments were shared by an enormous majority of Somalis. The weakness of this source of unity was that anti-colonialist euphoria can only last a certain number of years and after that a nation needs to have other sources of unity.

It seems clear that the influence of ethnic Somali nationalism had an important part in motivating the establishment of the Somali nation. The national flag already symbolizes the five areas (North, South, Djibouti, Ogaden and NFD) inhabited by ethnic Somalis. However, this motivation for unity was reduced by several factors of which the following is probably the most important. A government who based the Somali unity on ethnic Somali nationalism would be forced for the sake of consistency to seek the reunification of Somalis, which would have required conquering of Ogaden, Djibouti and the Northern Frontier District of Kenya. Since these policies were frustrated by superior enemies and by the defeats in wars, the whole ethnic rationale for unity was weakened. Furthermore, if one is considering identities which, by uniting people, would prevent violence, ethnic Somali nationalism would probably not be the best possible identity strengthener in this situation where a large proportion of the ethnic Somalis lived under an alien rule.

Finally, analysis of the rise of the nationalist movement of Dervishes at the turn of century reveals the power of the third source of common identity and norms. According to Samatar (1988), Lewis (1962; 1982) and Markakis (1987) the leader of the movement, Sheikh Sayyud Mohammad Abdille Hassan, could

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bridge the gaps between clans by referring to the common Islamic normative basis of all clans. The unifying influence of Islam can be found even earlier in the history of Somalia (Hersi 1977), but in the nationalist movement this influence was very obvious. During independence, the role of Islam declined partly because of Barre's conscious strategy to remove the challenge posed by Islamic leaders (Ohanwe 1997; Hersi 1997; Simons 1994, 818) and especially in the latter years of the Cold War (after the Iranian revolution) because of the conscious efforts by the United States to play down its influence. This is probably one of the most important problems that the Western development aid community had in relation to the structures of perception and identity: it tried to play down the only viable source of unity in the society instead of working together with Arab donors to encourage this source of common norms and morality.

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## Notes

<sup>1</sup>Juha Auvinen & Timo Kivimäki, *Aid and Conflict. Opportunities for Finnish Preventive Action in Somalia*. Department of Political Science, (Acta Politica no. 5, Helsinki, 1997).

<sup>2</sup>Interviews are normally not referred to unless the reference is important for the purpose of credibility of arguments or unless some theoretical ideas are intended to be credited. In some cases, however, interviews are not referred to due to their confidential nature.

<sup>3</sup>The fact that violence, in our political history might be a matter of order rather than disorder is suggested by Rummel (1994) whose studies show that political violence has caused more than four times as many casualties in the context of governmental actions than in interstate or civil wars (for analysis of this in Somalia see Walker 1994, 164-7). If we consider violence as suggested by

Galtung (1971), we also realize that more years of life are lost in politically caused structures than in the effort to change these violent structures.

<sup>4</sup>See for example, work of the United Nations Development Office for Somalia, Local Administrative Structures Unit (LAS) as described in UNDOS 1996; Musa 1997; Bierke 1997; Illing 1997.

<sup>5</sup> The primordial view of collective identity is based on assumptions that collective identities are of cultural, rather than political origin and they are deeply rooted in history and relatively unchangeable and spontaneous. The contrary view (instrumentalist view) holds that collective identities are easily politically manipulated by elites. The former view in more general literature is represented by Murdoch (1965) and the latter by Gough (1963) and Young (1995). A model which integrates the two is presented by Lonsdale (1994) and a good discussion of these two can be found in McKay (1982) and Jerman (1997).

<sup>6</sup>This, however, is not typical in Africa other than in the context of interstate tension, Odeira 1997; Mwaura 1997.

<sup>7</sup>The lack of ideology (and abundance of interest politics) in African politics can also partly be explained through the influence of the international community (especially the World Bank and the IMF) in conditioning many political choices with liberal economic orthodoxy and thereby reducing the political alternatives to the minimum (Laakso 1995). This is one of several possible ways of explaining the role of international politics and dependence in the failure of African states (see also Samatar 1988).

<sup>8</sup>The term racial census was used by Zartman 1995, in reference to what he perceived in South Africa. The problem that in a divided society, democratic elections do not produce legitimacy and stability is discussed in detail also in Abucar 1995, 5; Hayward (ed. 1987) and Fanon 1968.

<sup>9</sup>The generalization on the relationship between the perception of the lack of non-violent alternatives and the probability of war can be found in Stockpol 1979; Huntington 1968.

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