

Integrated Approach to Security in Northern Mali

Timo Kivimäki

A study based on a project commissioned by the United
Nations Institute for Disarmament Research

CTS-Conflict Transformation Service
HELSINKI & COPENHAGEN

CTS-Conflict Transformation Service
Studies in a Nutshell, No. 1

© Timo Kivimäki 2001

Distribution: CTS-Conflict Transformation Service, cts_dk@yahoo.com
Cover design: Nina Kivimäki. Series logo: Anton Kivimäki
The cover frame is modified from a traditional Javanese head cloth design.

ISSN 1457-960X
ISBN 952-5397-00-9

Foreword

This study is based on my research as a head of a research team, Conflict Transformation Group, contributing to a UNIDIR project on “Disarmament, Development and Conflict Prevention in West Africa”. It draws heavily from Kivimäki, Lehtinen & Laakso (1998). I am very much indebted to other members of the team, Terhi Lehtinen and Liisa Laakso. I am also very grateful for the financial support and ideas that we received in the seminars organized by the UNIDIR and the Finnish Foreign Ministry. Comments by Deputy Director Christophe Carle, Edward Poulton, the Principal Researcher in the West Africa Project and Lara Bernini, the coordinator of the project were much appreciated. Conclusions presented here are, however, mine and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the above mentioned.

Copenhagen, March 1, 2001

Timo Kivimäki

1 Introduction

The conflict in Mali's North had elements common with many other protracted and extremely violent African conflicts. However, the containment of escalation and resolution of this conflict and the contribution of the United Nations in this process has widely been considered a success. When compared to the UN efforts in Somalia, the effort to support the Malian peace process by assisting the arms management and disarmament component can be seen as highly encouraging. The failure in Somalia and success in Mali is an important motivation to studies within and outside the UN institutions on the "theory of arms management and disarmament" in civil conflicts. The question that arises from these experiences is "Why do such missions sometimes fail miserably and succeed in other cases?"

Was the success of the Malian experience related to the conflict management approach (the "integrated approach"), which integrated arms management to the development effort and the transformation of the material root-causes of the conflict? Is there something in the integrated approach of the Malian peace process that could be applied elsewhere?

Answers to the research questions were primarily sought by critically processing earlier research on the case with more general insights of conflict theory and by using a conflict transformation analysis (See Väyrynen 1991, Lodgaard 1991 and Auvinen and Kivimäki 1997) as a conceptual tool in the penetration of the causes and cures of the Malian conflict.

2. Conflict and its Management

In Mali it seems fruitful to identify the two partly separate and yet interdependent conflicts, the conflict in the North and the one related to the ousting the Moussa Traore military regime in 1991. Only the former is dealt with in this paper. The national conflict between Moussa Traore and his democratic challengers was about the quality of the national policy, while in the North the dispute was more fundamental. It was not about who held the power and how decisions were made in the national political decision-making, but instead about whether (and which) decisions should be made as national, regional or transnational/federal units. As challenges of explicit national claims were made in an effort to move decision-making about the affairs of the North to the independent nation of Aswad (FPLA).¹ At the same time according to Poulton and Youssof (1998, 30) older Malian civil servants and intelligencia had for a long time during the Moussa Traore rule, articulated a Soudanese identity and decision-making within the larger Soudanese unit. Furthermore, a more transnational federation had been suggested by certain Tuareg groups already in 1957, later causing suspicion of Tuaregs not supporting the national independence of the young Republic of Mali (Imperato 1989, 81-6; Bourgeot 1996, 99-115).² These disputes were the apparent motive for the conflict behavior and violence in the 1990s, after July 1990 when Moussa Traore claimed that Tuaregs were planning a secessionist state and declared a state of emergency in the North which escalated the tension into the level of open direct violence.

Behind the disputes, however, there were several structures of antagonism, perceived injustice and conflict, which gave rise to different demands regarding the unit of political integration. On the one hand, there was the antagonism between ethnic and regional identitive affiliations; on the other hand, there was antagonism in vertical, hierarchic fragments between the center and the periphery as well as between the Tuareg nobles (MPA)³ and vassals (ARLA)⁴. These two and the former slaves exploited and pillaged sedentary populations (Ganda Koy)⁵. Furthermore, most parties in the conflict had their internal divisions between the political moderates and militant extremists. Finally, there were the root causes related to the problem of insufficient integration within the

Integrated Approach to Security in Northern Mali

state apparatus, indiscipline, insufficient controls and insufficient funding and training of military officials in the North, which were all intimately related to the disputes that motivated fighting.

Parties in the conflict in Mali's North can be illustrated in the Table 1:

Acronym	Name	Established	Represents	Affiliation	Support
MFUA	Movements et Fronts Unities de l'Azwad	1988, gained meaning in negotiations in Jan 1992	Tuareg, Snghoy, Arab, 3000-10 000 combatants, modern unlike the traditional Tuareg political representation in UDPM	A roof organization for ARLA, FPLA, MPA & FIAA	Algeria government, Libya
ARLA	Armée révolutionnaire de libération de l'Azwad	Separated from MPA in 1991	Tuareg, anti-Muslim, in Kidal/Gao. Revolutionist, modernist, vassal population	Under MFUA	
FPLA	Front populaire de libération de l'Azwad	Accepted peace in 1994	Tuareg, Timbuktu, Gao urther south from Kidal, closer to Northern riverain people, radical (indep of Aswad), traditionalist	Under MFUA	
FIAA	Front Islamique Arabe de l'Azwad	1990 as a response of indiscriminate Malian army attacks ag. Arabs & Tuareg	Arabs, from Timbuktu + Mauritanian border, militant Islamic. Most militant Northern rebels	Under MFUA	Libya, Mauretania
MPLA	Populaire de Liberation de l'Azwad	1988	Tuareg in Kidal, collaborationist.	Became MPA in 1990	
MPA	Mouvement Populaire de l'Azwad	28.6. 1990 Signed the National Pact	Tuareg in Kidal, nobles, tradition of collaboration, moderate & traditional		Army, ARLA, competed with FPLA
MPGK	Mouvement Petriotique Ganda Koy	19.5. 1994 as a response to government's inability to control rebel Tuareg violence	Songhoys, sedentary people, anti-Tuareg, from Kidal. Later northern riverain people against looting by MFUA		MFUA and FIAA
Government & Army	Malian govt & Army	1960	South		MFUA, and officially also MPGK

Integrated Approach to Security in Northern Mali

The conflict did not have to ripen for long before negotiations for peace were initiated. The first meeting between the leaders of Algeria, Mali, Libya and Niger in Algeria took place already in September 1990 and in this meeting progress was made on the issue of border controls and the facilitation of the return of refugees to the regions of their origin. Also, a new administrative region was created in Kidal to address the special concerns of the North. Thus, the first compromise in the dispute about the unit of production of political values was already made, constituting a rather different approach to the conflict than in the previous rebellion in the North in 1963-4, when the government contained grievances with military repression (including the use of air force).

The first meeting between the enemies, the Malian government (represented by Chief of General Staff, Col. Ousmane Coulibaly) and the MPA & FIAA, took place in Algeria (Tamanrasset) on the 6th of January 1991. The resulting Tamanrasset peace accords were signed to the effect that cease-fire was agreed upon (not implemented, however), as well as the release of Tuareg prisoners and the revoking of the state of emergency. Moussa's dictatorial regime fell on March 26, 1991 and the Tamanrasset accords were consequently rejected by the new government. However, in the new transitional government one other important concession was made to alleviate the perception of exclusion among the Tuareg and Arab populations: MPA and FIAA received representation in the transitional administration and MPA's Cheikh Bayes became a spokesman for the North. Militant elements of both the MPA and especially the FIAA did not, however, accept compromises made by the political wing of their groups and thus both groups, and in fact also the government, experienced tremendous difficulties in implementing the agreements they had made (Poulton & Youssef 1998, 59-66; Englebert 1995, 606-7).

At the end of 1991 (December 15, 1991) MPA, FPLA, FIAA, ARLA had another meeting with the Malian government, this time at Mopti. In addition to the agreement about the exchange of prisoners an establishment of a commission to investigate violence in the North was decided upon (Englebert 1995, 606). For the implementation of the Mopti agreement the rebel groups, associated in the MFUA (the FPLA stayed outside of this meeting), met with the government in Alger in January 1992. Another truce agreement was made

Integrated Approach to Security in Northern Mali

and the commission decided upon in Mopti was inaugurated shortly after February. The Alger negotiation brought a breakthrough and a National Pact was signed on April 11, 1992. This pact accepted a special position for the North in Mali's administrative structure, established a commission to monitor the cease fire (CCF), decided upon the demilitarization of the North and introduced the idea of integrating rebel Tuaregs into the National Defense Forces, as well as the idea of integrating the Tuareg in national politics and in the national economy (Englebert 1995, 606; Poulton & Youssef 1998, 64-66). This did not only constitute a major compromise in the dispute about the unit of production of political values - Tuaregs accepting the national formula, and the government accepting the special status of the North - but it also introduced the idea that military containment, arms management and disarmament has to be integrated with economic measures: as Poulton and Youssef (1998) put it, the participants of the negotiation accepted that arms management is not only about guns, it is about the people as well. Thus in addition to tackling the dispute, socio-economic root-causes that gave rise to disputes were intended to be transformed.

Despite good intentions and innovative formulae the fighting continued. Refugees did not return and the militant members of the armed organizations kept on rejecting the peace process. As Alpha Oumar Konaré was installed as the first democratically elected president of Mali in June 1992, the fighting continued if not escalated and the economy of the North was paralyzed by conflict. Several more steps needed to be taken before the National Pact could take effect.

A meeting in Taouardeï in October 1992 at the MFUA congress, was one of these steps where the government of Mali met with the rebels. As a result, joint patrols were established to end the illegitimate violence on both sides. In November 1992 the new president inaugurated the Northern regional administrative authorities as was agreed upon in the National Pact. The integration of Tuaregs into the National force was also started to be implemented and the first 600 rebels started to receive their salaries from the national pay roll in February 1993. A few months later the Secretary General of the FPLA, who had stayed at a distance from the peace process, declared that the revolt was at end, and returned from Burkina Faso (Englebert 1995, 606).

Integrated Approach to Security in Northern Mali

Yet, several difficulties existed in the implementation of the National Pact. The repatriation of Tuaregs proved to be more difficult than expected. Class-based fighting between ARLA (former Tuareg vassals) and the MPA (perceived as an organization of the Tuareg nobility) escalated. The integration of Tuaregs met resistance from the military cadres of the North, while conflict between the 'collaborants' and militants within the rebel groups, especially the FPLA, intensified and the looting and pillaging of sedentary people continued (Poulton & Youssef 1998, 606-7; Englebert 1995, 606).

The implementation from above of the National Pact continued as the Government and the MFUA decided in May 1994 (in Alger) to integrate another 1500 former rebels into the national army and another 4860 into civil service (Englebert 1995). Dismantling of military bases in the North was also decided upon, as the government committing itself to a development program in the North. Yet at the grass root level, fighting continued and even intensified and spread to the military camps between the 'integrated' Tuaregs and the old cadres (Englebert 1995, 606). The problem of military indiscipline against the Tuaregs did not very much improve (Amnesty International 1994) until a meeting in Tamanrasset in June 1994 between the MFUA and the government determined on a more effective integration of Tuaregs into the Army and until a major army reshuffle later changing the Chief of general staff, and moving the Commissaire au Nord to the post of Inspector-General of the Armed Forces (Poulton & Youssef 1997; Englebert 1995). Indiscipline among the rebel groups was reacted against in the decision in Tamanrasset to reinforce the army in the violence-inflicted areas.

The government's concessions towards the Tuaregs created a backlash not only within the Northern military personnel (and in the whole army, Poulton & Youssef 1998, 68-9), but also among the sedentary Northern population where the Mouvement Patriotique Malien Ganda Koy (MPGK) was established as a force against looting and disorder apparently caused by the Tuareg rebels (Bourgeot 1996, 99-115).⁶

With regional international agreements in Bamako in August 1994, Mali, Algeria, UNHCR and IFAD decided on measures to facilitate voluntary repatriation of Tuareg refugees, guaranteeing the fundamental rights and dignity of returning Tuaregs with governmental guarantees and international

Integrated Approach to Security in Northern Mali

protection. Even though the MFUA did not participate in this meeting, it lent its support to the decisions. Finally, as some of the socio-economic root causes of conflict had been removed in 1995, dissident groups started slowly integrating the peace effort. FIAA did so on June 8, 1995 and even the Ganda Koy movement initiated a dialogue with the MPA and FPLA (a meeting with FPLA took place in Bourem in January 1995). Together with the MFUA, the Ganda Koy toured the North and the rebel refugee camps in support of the National Pact. Economic development and transformation of the conflict structures in the North was aided by the Malian government as finally the time was ripe for the major disarmament phase of the process. An encampment program was agreed upon to integrate the rebels into the uniformed service provided each surrendered weapons before February 1996. On March 27, the weaponry of about 3000 MFUA and Ganda Koy fighters were burned in Timbuktu: at which time the MFUA and the Ganda Koy issued a joint statement in support of Mali's constitution, national unity, territorial integrity and the National Pact. Finally, as confidence was restored, the refugees started to return.

The role of the UN was very active throughout the peace process led by the UNDP in Bamako. The UN Center for Disarmament Affairs and the UNIDIR provided the Malian government with technical assistance in terms of military resolution aspects of the peace operation, including the physical destruction of weapons, while the UN Centre for Human Rights examined the civilian aspects of the process. UNDPA in New York provided political advice and assistance to the UN Resident Coordinator in Mali in the context of preventive diplomacy, peace building and micro disarmament. UNIDIR, focused on the relevance of the Mali case to the research community, particularly with regard to micro-disarmament and the integrated "Security first" assistance approach in international development cooperation. The responsibility for funding of the UN integrated development and peace effort was largely assumed by a trust fund entitled "UNDP Trust fund to Support the Peace Process in North Mali", which financed demobilization of armed rebels and the re-integration into society of some 11 000-12000 displaced persons in the North by the end of 1997.

3. Arms Management and Conflict Transformation

Security and development have a complex relationship. On the one hand security is needed in order to promote development. According to Puolton and Youssouf (1998) security is such an important ingredient in development that in countries like Mali “a part of the development aid should be invested in improving the security forces”. Development often involves competition, which should encourage productivity rather than a buildup of coercive resources. “Competition for resources typically lies at the heart of ethnic conflict. Property rights, jobs, scholarships, educational admissions, language rights, government contracts, and development allocations all confer benefits on individuals and groups” (Lake & Rotchild 1997, 100-101) and in absence of norms and their enforcement, this kind of competition takes opportunistic, violent, anarchistic forms (Fearon 1995, 379-414). Any society needs to protect itself against from coercive competition and lessen its temptation by sanctioning violent behavior in accordance to some moral code. Otherwise, competition often leads to a *security dilemma*⁷, in which all groups must arm themselves and fight for their rights and security no matter their original orientation towards violence (Brown 1997, 6; Kaufman 1997, 276-277). This was certainly the case in Mali during the 1990s where “people felt obliged to obtain arms not in order to become rebels, but to defend themselves against the bandits among the rebels”(Poulton & Youssouf 1998). The Sahara-Sahel Advisory Mission Report (1995), which studied the arms management process in Mali, describes this with the concept of auto defence “wherein individuals and groups, given easy access to light weapons and the absence of security provided by the government, have taken the law into their own hands. This often escalates beyond ‘defence’ and takes on the character of militias with their own agenda, often a political one.” According to Lake and Rotchild, “intense ethnic conflict is most often caused by collective fears of the future” (1997, 97) and it seems that there is a whole rationalist school of civil wars emphasizing insufficient control of competition and the logic of security dilemma as components in the escalation of domestic battle (Fearon 1995, 379-414; Posen 1993, 103-24; Ferris 1973; Kaufman 1997, 265-304).

Integrated Approach to Security in Northern Mali

At the same time, prioritizing security over development can also lead into problems. According to Christophe Carle and Sverre Lodgaard, however, “pursued in isolation, arms control may become a misguided endeavour...At worst, the word can even justify oppression, perpetration in the name of security and stability.” (Carle & Lodgaard 1997). In addition to security for development there should be development in order to bring about security.

Development for security is especially important for the transformation of the root-causes for offences that are perceived by the offenders as “legitimate violations” against an order and norms. Here the agent fears his/her rights being violated and life threatened if he/she does not act against the violent order or unjust norms. In the case of these “fearful offenders”, simple containment of grievances does not bring about peace: there is a need to address the welfare needs of the potential fearful offenders. Raymond Tanter makes a distinction between *fearful* and *gainful* rogue agents (offenders) in his current book *Rogue Regimes* (1998, xii-xii) , and his finding is that while opportunistic, gainful agents can be deterred from offence, fearful agents cannot. In our terminology, if demonstrations of grievances or criticism against the government are made security matters and contained with force we are talking about counterproductive securitization⁸ and this, in itself, increases violence and militarizes society.⁹

The problem with the attempt to address the question of security on the level of containing violent behavior is that the roots of *fearful offences* and violence are deeper than the desire to gain by violence: the problem is not on the level of violent behavior. In *gainful offences* there are no disputes behind the violent behavior, whereas fearful offences spring from dissatisfaction towards the defenders of existing order. If the motivation for violence is resentment towards a certain order, there cannot be a solution in bringing more of that order. In the absence of the resolution of the dispute, and with continuing differences in the interpretations of what is just, fearful offenders will need to be constantly coerced from offences and they are constantly seeking ways to shake the order they perceive unjust. Whenever revolt and offences are based on dissatisfaction towards the order (not just calculations of gains offered by illegitimate actions) there is a need to relate arms management to the transformation of the material root-causes of dissatisfaction. This could be one of the explanations for the UN successes in Mali: disarmament was not simply

Integrated Approach to Security in Northern Mali

seen as a matter of guns but also as a matter of people (Poulton & Youssouf 1998), but at the same time it was recognized that development requires disarmament of illegitimate weapons.

4. Economic Conflict Structures: Sources of Grievance and Relative Deprivation

Economic deprivation and inequality have been identified as economic structural sources of violent disputes and dissatisfaction vis-à-vis the existing order (Auvinen 1996; Gurr 1970). For example, Crane Brinton's (1938), Barrington Moore's (1966) and Ted Robert Gurr's (1970) models of relative deprivation suggest that the bigger a group's relative deprivation, the more probable it is for this group to initiate domestic violence. According to Gurr (1970) relative deprivation means the worsening of economic position compared to earlier or compared to other groups. Also relationships of exploitation are often seen as related to motives of violence (Moore 1966; Gurr 1970; Auvinen 1996). Furthermore, Gochman (1979) claims that there are economic structural attributes that reduce the threshold of violence: the level of grievance there needs to be before people take up arms. Such threshold conditions are often related to the stage of economic development: the more wealthy potential rebels are, the less likely it is that they will resort to violence (Londregan & Poole 1990, 178; Gurr & Duval 1973, 148).

In Mali, economic structures are related to both national economic realities and to regional realities. On both levels there is the problem of poverty, which lowers the threshold of violence. For a long time, Soudan/Mali (with Niger, Chad and Sierra Leone) has been among the poorest nations in West Africa (Foltz 1965, 31-48). The development of per capita GDP, has been slow and in the 1990s negative (World Bank 1997) partly due to political instability, but also due to the poor government to the dominance of unfavorable trading patterns, to the urban bias of western aid and investment, the inappropriate imported development models etc. Economic development has fluctuated very much, leaving very little room for long-term planning. Mali is among the 18

Integrated Approach to Security in Northern Mali

poorest nations in the world and there are only very few stable, non-violent states in the world which are poorer than Mali. The macro-economic indicators can explain in a limited way the propensity of people to feel that they have little if anything to lose in violent conflicts. The poverty of Mali explains the initial difficulties in the economic absorbing of the returning Tuaregs in the 1990s.

A better indication of the struggle-nature of everyday life is the consumption of calories per capita. According to studies by Jacqueline Mondot-Bernard (1981) the population of Mali lives close to the minimum level of survival and due to the strong fluctuations both in traditional and modern economies the struggle for survival is a daily reality.

When examined regionally the northern areas, where the Tuareg conflict has taken place, have been politically, economically marginalized and they are comparatively less developed. Even though it is probably fair to say that the disparity between the center and the North is not best illustrated with the indicators of modern economic exchange, the certainty of obtaining basic needs is much less in the North than in the Bamako area. This is partly related to certain changes and structures of economic vulnerability, which will be discussed below. Given the low level of economic development of Northern Mali and its contribution to lowering the threshold of violence, it would seem that increased economic development in northern areas of Mali could be sufficient to bring about a situation in which the willingness to take up arms will be reduced. Against this background it seems also probable that the idea of integrating the fighters into the national administration with a relatively secure livelihood was probably the crucial element in the persuasion of Tuaregs into giving up their arms.

At the national level, we can see several structures and conditions making the economic development of Mali vulnerable. Fluctuations in overall, sectoral and regional economic growth have been characteristics of Mali and obviously this has prepared fertile ground for the emergence of relative deprivation. When the pace of development is not steady, but progresses and stagnates randomly, there is a greater probability for the emergence of groups whose worsening economic position, compared to previously or compared to other groups, cause problems to domestic peace (relative deprivation).

Integrated Approach to Security in Northern Mali

The dependence of the national economy -- and especially the balance of payments -- on the price of cotton in world markets makes Mali's economy fluctuate along with the world prices. The drop of cotton prices in the latter half of 1980s made it increasingly difficult for the Traoré government to contain revolt, whose primary basis was, however, related to the political structures. It seems clear that the economic measures taken to make Mali's national and public economy more sustainable need to be supplemented with a lot of consideration for the reduction of heavy dependence on the price of cotton (over 50 percent of export earnings still in the 1990s, see Hodgkinson 1995). If we look at the development of Mali's terms of foreign trade, we see that the period of optimism and peace building in the 1990s have taken place in an economic context of improvement in the terms of trade: even though the international prices in trade turned worse for Mali in 1992 (Leisinger & Schmitt 1995, 121), by 1995 the terms of trade had more than recovered from the shock of 1986 (World Bank 1997). If development is to serve the interest of security, it would need to be built on a less vulnerable basis.

Another structural change creating instability is the uncontrolled expansion of cities. Due to droughts and more generally to the crisis of the traditional economy in Mali, a situation has been created where relatively frustrated populations get together in urban centres and make violent mobilization easier. During the 1980s (1977-1990) the population of Bamako increased by 75 percent and Gao by 50 percent (projections by Regional Country Studies 1986).

A more severe structure of vulnerability is related to food security. The dependence of agricultural production on good rainfall and insufficient infrastructural investments in irrigation, conservation and storage, leave the strategic sector of food production vulnerable to random changes. For example in the droughts of 1983-4, 40%-80% of Mali's livestock died and in 1984 alone the decline in crop production is especially in doubt in the sc. Sahelian zone, from Timbuktu towards the North (Leisinger & Schmitt 1995, 121).

It is understandable and universally observable that severe food insecurity and drastic decline in food supply provoke revolt: when survival is threatened, people adopt harsh measures (Shipton 1990, 353-94). The link in Mali between

Integrated Approach to Security in Northern Mali

food insecurity and conflict was demonstrated also by Poulton and Youssouf (1997).

In the North, especially among pastoralists, who still during the latter half of 1970s constituted almost half of the population in Gao and a third in Timbuktu (Tiessa-Farma Maïga 1997) the problem of food security is an old one, with some new deteriorating elements. In Mali as in so many other places, economic history seems to lend understanding to some elements of present grievances. Studying these grievances and antagonism means, by necessity, amalgamating several centuries of history with the analysis of the present: the roots of present attitudes, cultures and structures, even conceptions of collective identity, are often observable in the material conditions of the present and the past (de Braganca & Wallerstein 1982, iv-v; Cooper 1981; Jawziewisky & Letourneau 1975).

Among the Tuareg pastoralists food insecurity has always been an essential ingredient shaping the way of life. During the dry season very little milk was available and Tuaregs were forced to eat cereals. This was made possible in the 1800s by the social structure in which captives were held (and protected as a quid-pro-quo) to produce this supplementary food source (Imperato & Imperato 1982, 90-91). Already this can be seen as a traditional form of structural violence in the North caused by the structure of vulnerability of traditional pastoral production. In earlier times food insecurity during the dry season also meant pillaging then trading the sedentary farmers for cereals, especially if the crops of captives failed, constituting a tradition of more direct violence (Imperato & Imperato 1982, 91). Even though both of these violent practices have ceased¹⁰, they might have contributed to a hierarchical fragmentation of the civil society along ethnic lines. This has definite conflict implications. To justify the pillaging and keeping captives, Tuareg culture created (already a long time ago) a hierarchy between groups. The unacceptability of keeping captives or robbing people was rationalized by the idea that the targets of this violence were not as valuable as the nomadic Tuaregs. The association between the colour of the skin and social status could be seen in the Tamacheq language. In the names of Tuareg classes, the name of the lowest class (indoor slaves), Iklan can be translated as to “be a black” (Norris 1975, 5). In the Tuareg political texts the claim that not only Bamako or the nation but “black Africans are dominating the Tuareg”¹¹ appears frequently indicating that the

Integrated Approach to Security in Northern Mali

blackness of the oppressor has relevance in the unacceptability of its rule. The resistance against the Ganda Koy was seen in ethnic terms as the Ganda Koy was also portrayed as “a Black racist movement advocating the extermination of the white skins (Tuareg) in Mali”(Assa-Imaziahen 1996, 50, emphasis added). It seems fair to say that the traditional nomadic practices of production are reflected in the Tuareg political thinking, i.e. the unacceptability of black rule as well as the association between lower social groups and the color of the skin in language practices in the form of perceived hierarchies between ethnic groups, although original material roots have vanished and directly violent practices have ceased.¹²

The introduction of a modern political economy with a role for the state did not mean that all economic sources of dispute, grievances and relative deprivation disappeared. Instead new ones arose, many of them related to increased competition for the over-exploited natural resources. Modest modern investments in pastoral production as far back as the colonial period (mainly in the form of vaccinations and wells) made the increase in the herd size and the end of the traditional practices of violent pillaging and the keeping of captives possible (Imperato & Imperato 1982, 91). Development projects involving the Tuareg from the 1940s into the 1970s installed new wells attracting enormous herds to these sites (Childs and Chelala 1994, 17). Later the exploitation of farming land also intensified with the land law of 1983 according to which all lands left fallow could be taken over by the state, caused an over-utilization of lands for agricultural purposes (Poulton & Youssouf 1998). Because of the growing herds, the fact that they settled around the new wells for too long, and also the new land law, pasture areas declined and became overgrazed, thus creating new forms of structural and direct violence. Due to the inefficiency of the state as an arbitrator, coercive capabilities remained tremendously important in the definition of rights to pasture. In the relationships between groups especially, capability to subordinate and coerce has implied the ability to gain access to pasture and water. Within groups, the competition for resources has implied vertical social fragmentation, and class formation (Bourgeot 1995, chapter 6). According to Imperato and Imperato (1982) the scarcity of pasture made the economic interests of the groups in the North antagonistic towards each other.¹³ The increase of wealth (that is, the number of animals) of one group implies the decline of the pasture available for others (Imperato 1989; Imperato & Imperato 1982; Bourgeot 1995). During times of

Integrated Approach to Security in Northern Mali

drought this kind of setting are known to create relative deprivation and thus intensifies violent competition between groups (Auvinen & Kivimäki 1997).

In addition to traditional and modern sources of conflict some of the economic sources of conflict in Northern Mali were related to the immediate economic history of the 1980s. The droughts of the 1980s changed the life of a substantial proportion of Tuaregs and Arabs in Northern Mali. Due to the lack of pasture, tens of thousands of nomads had to sell their herds for a very low price to rich bureaucrats, businessmen and military officials who represented for the nomads the nation of Mali, and move to cities and refugee camps inside and outside Mali (Childs & Chelala 1994, 18). In the Tuareg tradition of considering nomadic lifestyle as part of their cultural identity, it is natural that becoming sedentary was not easy (Claudot-Hawad 1993, 109; Cissé 1989, 30-38). Also the fact that animals are a source of prestige (Imperato & Imperato 1982; Bourgeot 1995, chapter 6) and now their animals were owned by bureaucrats and soldiers caused an additional source of antagonism against the nation of Mali. In fact, in Niger, it seems that one of the main targets of recent violence by Tuareg rebels have been the new camel herders, against whom some areas have been land-mined (Reuters 1997). Against this background it seems that the efforts made for the improvement of the quality of local national administration (especially military administration) and the control of concessions, and extra-legally obtained properties, for bureaucratic are important ingredients of the Mali peace process.

The realities of production of daily bread in exile also explain some of the structural material roots of violence. On the one hand, the frustration was increased by the fact that in new circumstances, traditional Tuareg social structures were threatened. Tuareg clan chiefs became increasingly reliant on younger and formally educated Tuareg who had communication skills to facilitate a working relationship with the government and NGO community. This accelerated the deterioration of the traditional social order of Tuaregs and in fact threatened the cultural survival of the Tuaregs, making it less easy for the returning Tuaregs to integrate into the local Tuareg community and thus making the people more prone to looting and illegitimate violence (Childs & Chelala 1994, 18). On the other hand, the proximity of potential rebels contributed to the probability of mobilization. Humiliated, relatively deprived people, concentrated in urban centres or refugee camps were naturally easy to

Integrated Approach to Security in Northern Mali

mobilize for violent protest. According to Charles Tilly (1981), the ability of frustrated masses to mobilize their protest is one of the main causes of domestic political violence. The conditions of refugee populations, therefore, seem to have influence in the conflict potentials of the homelands of the refugees.

Finally the grievance in the North was related to the fact that the national economy was not in shape to balance against the decline in the economic position of relatively deprived, potential rebel groups. As an inheritance from the socialist economic policies, and as a consequence of a tradition of considering the state as a means of promoting the economic position of the dominant group and to some extent due to the state-expanding foreign aid, there was a structural imbalance in state finances.¹⁴ Thus the state was unable, as well as often also unwilling, to take decisive action against the economic marginalization of fragments of its population. The weakness of the national economy was acutely demonstrated during the peace process in the devaluation of the franc CFA by 50 percent, even if this measure has been seen as a good thing for Mali, and especially for the North.

Within this setting of unhealthy national economics, peace action was also difficult. In Mali, reforms to integrate Tuaregs into the civil service and the military were met with fierce resistance from the bureaucracy, opposition and from the labor union in the national capital,¹⁵ which is natural, taking the national problem of imbalances in state budget. Without improving terms of trade, favorable weather conditions, linked with the increase in the productivity of agriculture and the life-stock industry in 1992-1994 (Hodgkinson 1995), the peace process could have been much more difficult. The problem of economic sustainability is one of the problems in the UN-assisted strategy for peace, since integration of Tuaregs into the public sector necessarily increases the public economic burden and makes Mali more dependent on aid, loans or the ever increasing price of cotton. It can be asked whether this is economically sustainable in the long run, or does it strengthen Mali's economic structures of vulnerability.

5. Political Conflict Structures: Sources of Antagonism, Division and the Dispute About the Political Unit

Frustration and relative deprivation gives motives to desperate action, but it is often the political structures that give the form for political disputes, determine the violent character of protest and against whom this frustration is directed at. At the same time political structures of governance and power, most purely expressed in coercive political domination or authoritative arms management, constitute another objective source of the dispute, another objective question of survival along with production.

Often, the forms of political administration of common interests are related to the collective requirements of survival: in agrarian societies, for example, politics can be about the management of collective goods necessary for farming (security, order which secures the farmer his right to his harvest, organization of irrigation, etc.). However, in Africa, it has been said that the two objective fundamentals of survival, security and food, are at odds (Herbst 1997, 374-5; Bayart 1993, 8-9; Badie & Birnbaum 1979, 181; Coulon 1972, 9). Political structures do not reflect the requirements of production or societal norms related to collective survival. Social structures born out of the realities of production were altered by coercion, which as another objective force outweighed the concerns related to economic production. Even if there was an economic rationale for a certain form of organization, coercion in form of political sovereignty of the colonialist nation-state made it rational for African society to adopt another form of organization, a form that might have reflected realities of production in the colonial power. With the decline of colonial order and the structures of colonial administration, the state especially, became a valuable tool for the indigenous elite, i.e. Malians with an education, if it only could monopolize it. National identity became a requirement for the modern way of living of the urban educated indigenous bureaucrats and businessmen (Herbst 1997, 376-8; Wallerstein 1961, 47; Wallerstein 1964, 327; Chatterjee 1993). Thus the post-colonial order was characterized by anti-colonialist nationalism, which consisted of the rejection of European domination (anti-colonialism), but also by adoption of the political organization (state) that colonialism had brought with it (nationalism). This new post-colonial objective

Integrated Approach to Security in Northern Mali

structure of political power, i.e. state resources of oppression in the hands of an indigenous elite, provides the setting for disputes about the unit of political administration that was central to the conflict in the Northern Mali. The commitment to a national order was partly strengthened by the key formulae of the peace effort and the National Pact.

In the North the core of the dispute between the national versus Azawad or federal administration and sovereignty was in the difficulty of combining the rationales of pastoral production with a larger unit of modern administration. It seems that national and non-national identities have a material basis in production (Markakis 1987, xvii), as it seems that pastoral production does not give rationales for the formation of states (Gellner 1981, 21). Nomadic societies have very seldom been able to establish stable national order and states (Barth 1973:12; Khazanov 1983:148). The formation of collective identity for a large group of people, the emergence of nationalism, has often been seen to require sedentarization of the people (Gellner 1981, 21). In Mali, the traditional, non-national identities have been important also because modern governance has offered only little to the rural population (Imperato 1989, 81-86). According to many Tuaregs the national feeling and the political relevance of the state of Mali is not at all spontaneous, but rather imposed.

The specific problems in compromising pastoral needs and modern state-centered governance are related to taxation, land ownership patterns, patterns of environmental protection, security structures and the territoriality of governance with national borders. These problems seemed to be the foundation of many open disputes in the Malian North. Already in colonial times administrators of nomadic areas sometimes felt awkward with taxing nomadic people, since after all, the state has very little to offer them in return (Markakis 1987, 33). The nomadic production is guaranteed with lower levels of social organization (and, thus, costs of this organization) (Khazanov 1983, 148), even investment and finances are normally managed without economic institutions (Barth 1973, 12): thus it is natural that “it may be difficult to get them to share in such obligations of citizenship as taxation” (Castagno 1959, 367). Among the Somali pastoralists in Ogaden, this illegitimation of taxes, based on the lack of reciprocation, was wonderfully reflected in language: the term taxes was in the local language the same as bribes (Hersi 1997). Among the Tuaregs the influence of the state was associated with the bombardment of the North during

Integrated Approach to Security in Northern Mali

the rebellion of 1963, repression and privilege dealt out by the state-bureaucrats and the national military forces in the Malian North and with “the castles of drought” build by the central administration bureaucrats for themselves allegedly with the international aid intended to help drought victims of the North. Furthermore, as a poor country, Mali has not been able to create infrastructure for communication between the regions in the country. Poulton and Youssouf describe the difficulties of moving between the capital area and the North and about the lack of telephones, television and other means of communication to link the North with the rest of the country (Poulton & Youssouf 1997; Imperato & Imperato 1982, 259-263).¹⁶ In this context it not surprising that people of the North do not want to contribute to the funding of the state. In Mali taxation is often mentioned as if it was an offence against the Tuareg pastoralists along with military repression, governmental injustice etc. (See for example Ass-a Imazighen 1996, 49). It seems evident that taxation -- such an essential component of the national administration, and yet so incompatible with pastoral life -- was one of the sources of dispute about the unit of political organization.

International recipes for peace are often recipes of national reconciliation and they often have an inherent element of expanding the costs of national administration (by the expansion of the state).¹⁷ This was quite evident in Mali.¹⁸ At the same time as compromises were made to the anti-state rebels regarding decentralization and thus about the unit of production of certain political values, the formula for making the nation more beneficial for the North also increased the overall costs of politics, and thus increased the pressures for increasing the national tax burden. The problem of economic feasibility becomes an important issue here, as also mentioned earlier in the analysis of economic conditions of the peace operation in Mali. When a peace process tries to integrate the logic of development and peace making, which are interrelated, this formula could be developed on a theoretical level by both security and economic specialists. The integrated approach should thus not only be studied by security experts but by economists as well.

In addition to taxes, the pastoral and national production of security seem to be rather incompatible and this seems to have created disputes and problems also in national arms management. In traditional pastoral societies “claims over pasture and water were the perennial bone of contention among lineage groups

Integrated Approach to Security in Northern Mali

and clans. Force was the only effective means of securing such rights, and it was a constant factor in nomad life.”(Markakis 1987, 16). Thus the need to produce security within small groups is a reality of pastoral life and thus violence against people outside of ones own group was quite acceptable (Lewis 1993, 64).¹⁹ In Tuareg groups there was also a class of people whose primary duty was to produce weapons for the group they belonged to (Casajus 1997).

It is obvious, that a system, where weapons and security have traditionally been produced in small groups, is very much in contradiction with the idea of the state having a monopoly in legitimate violence. In the national pact type of peace formula this contradiction was solved very much in favor of the national system. Yet, along with the effort to enforce discipline among the military officers serving in the North, the nature of national effort to bring security was changed. It seems very much that this is one of the elements in the Malian peace formula which can be generalized and applied elsewhere. When containing the illegitimate, gainful opportunistic violence, controlling the national security apparatus is definitely one of the main issues along with controlling the looting and pillaging of the rebels. It is difficult to assess whether the Malian formula for the incompatibility of security systems could have been more compromising towards its opponent. Despite many of the rational characteristics of the Tuareg pastoral order, in the realm of security, judging by the standards of structural and direct violence introduced above, it seems difficult to justify the traditional pastoral system with capability to coerce as an important ingredient in the determination of rights to pasture and water. Compared to national security in a democracy, the relations between different pastoral groups (as in fighting between Tuareg classes in the ARLA-MPA hostilities) on the one hand and between pastoralists and sedentary riverine people (as expressed in Ganda Koy-MFUA fighting), the pastoral security order is much less efficient in avoiding violence.

However, when it comes to the question of the use of land, many more compromises could have been made in the national formula, which was indirectly accepted in the peace process as the rebel groups accepted the Malian constitution. The conception of land among pastoral people normally reflects the rationales of the ecosystem of semi-arid regions. Since Tuareg nomads had to move their herd in large areas, it was natural that a modern type of private ownership in the use of land was not considered a prerequisite. There were

Integrated Approach to Security in Northern Mali

traditional rules for the use of pasture among Tuaregs (Bourgeot 1995, ch 6), but generally “pasture land and water resources are public property” (Imperato & Imperato 1982, 90). This conception, while rational in a nomadic context, was naturally in conflict with that of sedentary people, such as farmers, who had to secure their right to the produce of their land (otherwise cultivation would not really make any sense).²⁰ Very clearly the modern national idea of private land ownership, imposed on the North in the land laws of 1983 and 1986, reflected the needs of the sedentary people, even though it caused some problems for the farmers, too.²¹ The fact that the peace process was successful, despite the fact that no compromise was sought in the objective conflict of interests in the land ownership patterns, should not be considered as a proof in general that modern rules of private ownership can be imposed on pastoralists. The problem of modernization, which has very often been shown to be a source of conflict (see Huntington 1968), is essentially a question of land ownership patterns in most areas where modernization has caused problems for stability. Especially in pastoral areas, it seems that while there should be less violent mechanisms of solving disputes about rights to pasture than the traditional mechanisms,²² the imposition of modern ownership with land titles is often an invitation to problems. Pastoral use of marginally productive land is very rational, and often more suitable for pastoral areas than the modern system. According to Peter Schraeder (1986, 643-4) traditional subsistence pastoral use of land is not only relatively efficient in economic terms, but it is also environmentally sound. I.M. Lewis, an authority in Somali pastoralism, argues that the pastoral tradition is a rational response to changing economic conditions within marginal societies (Lewis 1975, 429, cited in Schraeder 1986, 643). The reason why the government of Mali managed without compromising the land question (communal or private ownership), was probably because the prospects for successful traditional pastoral production in the North and especially among the most frustrated, relatively deprived rebels had already declined due to the environmental conditions. The case of Mali should show that decentralization and giving lands back to local agro-pastoralists is useful. However, the international community cannot disregard the problems of different types of ownership (communal vs. modern private) in its effort to create a model for an integrated approach to domestic conflicts.

Integrated Approach to Security in Northern Mali

The idea of a modern, territorial national administration with guarded national borders also causes a problem when the power of the state expands to the peripheral areas of nations. There is a clear incompatibility between the arbitrary national borders of order introduced to Mali during the colonial period and the objective requirements of movement across these arbitrary borders in the traditional and still existing pastoral communities. Pastoralists would kill their cattle and die of hunger if national borders were to be guarded in a strict manner. This problem can be seen in the roots of the popular motivation of many pastoral groups for the fight in many internal and inter-state wars. Fortunately, most borders in Africa, as those of Mali, are not very well guarded and thus do not normally create problems for the pastoral movements except in times of inter-state tension. If with the successful national reconciliation, the ability of the state to extend its power to its peripheries expands it would be necessary to admit that there are needs to develop transnational integration for the production of collective goods shared by “transnational (cross-border) societies” like the Tuaregs. In the peace process of Northern Mali, the *UN Sahara-Sahel Advisory Mission Report* (1995; see also the paper by the deputy head of mission, van der Graaf 1996) was probably well advised in prescribing a regional approach to the arms management. If the Tuareg society is transnational, surely also arms move in and out of the country. Yet, this regional approach cannot restrict itself to regional arms management and joint patrolling of illegal transborder movements by rebel groups. On the contrary, at the same time as arms management can benefit from restricted transborder movements, the motivation to resist states is increased the more movements of transnational groups are restricted. The idea of borderless economic and cultural development should be adopted in the development of the Malian North and this should be considered as an effort to accommodate within the national context, the desires that lead to the anti-national Tuareg claim for a Saharan federation in 1957.

5. Conclusions

The intention of this study has been to carry, with conceptual and theoretical bags, some of the experiences of the Malian integrated approach of the peace process into other cases. Thus, in conclusion it is time to take a look inside the bags and see what has been found. The first lesson we can find is the idea, which was submitted to the peace process by the Sahara-Sahel Advisory Mission Report in January 1995 according to which in peace processes development efforts and arms management and disarmament must be integrated together. This lesson was refined by using the conceptual distinction between gainful and fearful offenders. In any society, there are people who try to gain by illegitimate, violent behavior, and if the society cannot protect itself from this, a lot of productive energy is wasted in violence and efforts to defend oneself and one's group from gainful violence. This gainful violence, which needs to be checked, is not only a phenomenon of the rebel groups, but also of the security apparatus. Where the political control cannot reach this apparatus, the use of "legitimate" arms can turn into gainful offences. At the same time some violence is considered as the last resort in the protection of legitimate rights. Here protection of security is not enough, since this type of violence can be a reaction to structural violence caused by "lawful" institutions. In cases of fearful offences and violence, the peace effort needs to do more than contain violence: it needs to address the disputes behind the violence, as well as the root causes behind the disputes. As in Mali, in these cases, disarmament is not only about arms but it is about people, desperate enough to take up arms for the defence of their rights.

Despite the obvious merits of the idea of not considering disarmament merely as a problem of guns, but as a problem of people, the practical method of taking care of the people, the state-centric approach to the transformation of socio-economic conflict in Mali, was not necessarily something that can be applied elsewhere. Even in Mali, the chosen approach has caused pain and will possibly create further problems. It is a solution of security specialists to integrate anybody with problems to accept the state into the very same state, while an economist might think differently. When the rationales of a peace operation are to be integrated and made compatible with the rationales of economic

Integrated Approach to Security in Northern Mali

development, it seems that the old division of labor between disciplines need to be changed. In order to make arms management an economically sustainable project, security expertise needs to be integrated with the expertise of development economists.

What can be learned about the relationship between arms management and the transformation of political structures of conflict is that resistance against national unity can be reduced by compromising national centrality. Making it possible to produce political values in subnational units does not mean an end of a nation, but can give the nation another chance. The political formula for peace in Mali was not, as it was named, a national pact, but a pact that accommodated some of the important needs for decentralized governance. This is probably something that peace efforts could learn: even if arms management aims at monopolizing the use of violence and possession of arms by the democratic national system, a single, monopoly of a state security system does not imply that all other political values should also be produced by the nation. On the contrary, it seems essential for the success of a democratic nation, which has a monopoly in the maintenance of security that it does not suppress the needs of fragments of a nation to have political governance of their own for the production of political values specific for their own fragment. In cases of transnational communities, such as the Tuaregs, decentralization needs to be complemented by the facilitation of transnational, regional forms of interaction, integration and governance.

Antagonistic identities and political cultures in Mali were not only sources of conflict, but were also factors in its escalation and obstacles in the resolution of disputes. According to Blalock (1989, 67), the creation of precommitting war ideologies is related to the mobilization priorities and to the problem that the temptation to free ride in the conflict effort increases as the costs of conflict increase. The purposive nature of the social construction of the reality of conflict by the parties in the Malian North was very clear. In this kind of setting it seems evident that the peace process should have also intervened in the process of myth making by aiming at de-escalation. It seems obvious that with the use of psychological strategies, along the lines suggested by Raevsky (1994), some of the antagonizing myths could have been discredited and some dialogue between rival interpretations could have been facilitated.

Sources

Adibe, Clement: *Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Liberia*. Disarmament and Conflict Resolution Project, UNIDIR, Geneva 1996.

Amnesty International: *Mali: Conflit ethnique et massacres de civils* (Document externe, Index AI AFR 37/8/94, Londres, 21 septembre 1994.

Amnesty International (1997) Country Report AFR 37/01/97 [<http://www.amnesty.org//ailib/aipub/1997/AFR/13700197.htm>]

Ass-a, Imazighen: "Tuareg: the Tragedy of a Forgotten People", "Touaregs -pacification d'un peuple dérangeant", Paris 1996, 46-52.

Auvinen, Juha Y.: *Economic Performance, Adjustment and Political Conflict in the Developing Countries*, D.Phil dissertation at the Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex, United Kingdom 1996a.

Auvinen, Juha Y.: "IMF Intervention and Political Protest in the Third World: A Conventional Wisdom Refined", *Third World Quarterly* 17:3 1996b, 377-400.

Badie, B. & Pierre Birnbaum: *Sociologie de l'État*. Grasset, Paris 1979, 178 and 181.

Badie, Bertrand: *L'Etat importé*, Fayard, Paris 1992.

Badie, Bertrand: *Culture et politique*, Economica, Paris 1993.

Barth, Frederick: "Preface", in Aparna Rao: *The Other Nomads*. Böhlau, Köln 1987, i-xi.

Barth, Fredrik: "Enduring and Emerging Issues in the Analysis of Ethnicity" in Vermeulen & Govers (eds.): *The Anthropology of Identity*", Het Spinhuis, Netherlands 1994, 11-31.

Integrated Approach to Security in Northern Mali

Bayart, Jean-François: "Civil Society in Africa" in Patrick Chabal (ed.) *Political Domination in Africa: Reflections on the Limits of Power*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1986, 109-125.

Bayart, Jean-François: *The State in Africa*, Longman, London 1993.

Blalock, Hubert Jr.: *Power and Conflict. Towards a General Theory*, Sage, London 1989, 67.

Bourdieu, Pierre: *Ce que parler veut dire*, Fayard, Paris 1982.

Bourgeot, André: *Les sociétés touaregs-nomadisme, identité, résistances*, Karthala, Paris 1995.

Bourgeot, André: "Les rébellions touaregs: une cause perdue?" in *Afrique Contemporaine*, Trimestriel n°180, octobre-décembre 1996, 99-115.

Brinton, Crane: *The Anatomy of Revolution*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ, Prentice-Hall 1938.

Brown, Michael E. & Chantal de Jong Oudraat: "International Conflict and International Action", in Michael E. Brown, Owen R. Coté, Jr., Sean M Lynn-Jones and Stephen E. Miller: *Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict. An International Security Reader*, The MIT Press, Cambridge 1997, 235-264.

Brown, Michael E.: "The Causes of Internal Conflict", in Michael E. Brown, Owen R. Coté, Jr., Sean M Lynn-Jones and Stephen E. Miller: *Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict. An International Security Reader*, The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA 1997, 3-25.

Carle, Christophe & Sverre Lodgaard: Preface in Poulton, Robin-Edward & ag Youssouf, Ibrahim: *A Peace of Timbuktu: Democratic Governance, Development and African Peacemaking*, a manuscript, Geneva 1997.

Casajus, Dominique: "Crafts and Ceremonies: the Inadan in Tuareg society", in Aparna Rao: *The Other Nomads*, Böhlau, Köln 1987, 311-310.

Integrated Approach to Security in Northern Mali

Chabal, Patrick: *Power in Africa*, Macmillan, London 1992.

Chatterjee, Partha: *The Nation and its fragments -Colonial and post-colonial histories*, Princeton University Press. Princeton, MA 1993.

Childs Larry & Chelala, Celina: "Drought, Rebellion and Social Change in Northern Mali" in *Cultural Survival*, Winter 1994,17.

Claudot-Hawad, H el ene: *Les Touaregs-Portrait en fragments*, Edisud, Aix-en-Provence1993.

Ciss e, Salmana: "Pratiques de s edentarit e et nomadisme au Mali" in " tats et soci et es nomades", *Politique Africaine*, 34, Karthala, Paris 1989, 30-38.

Cooper, I.F.: "Africa and World Economy", *The African Studies Review* 24:2-3, June - September 1981.

Coulon, Christian: "Syst eme politique et Soci et es dans les  tats d'Afrique Noire", *Revue Francaise de Politique Science*, 22 (5), October, 1972, 1050-51.

Davidson, Basil, *The Black Mans Burden: Africa and the Curse of the Nation* State Times Books, New York, N.Y. 1992, 102-103.

Diamond, Larry: "Introduction: roots of failure, seeds of hope", in Diamond, Lintz & Lipset: *Democracy in Developing Countries*, Boulder, CO 1988.

Englebert, Pierre: "Mali: Recent History" in *Africa South of Sahara*, Europa Publications Limited, London1996, 603-608.

Fearon, James: "Rationalist explanations for war," *International Organization*, vol 49, no 3 (Summer 1995) 1995, 379-414.

Ferris, Wayne: *The Power Capabilities of Nation-States*, D.C. Heath, Lexington 1973

Foltz, William: *From French West Africa to the Mali Federation*, Yale university Press, *Yale Studies in Political Science*, 12, New Haven & London 1965.

Integrated Approach to Security in Northern Mali

Galtung, Johan & Højvik, Tor: "Structural and Direct Violence: A Note on Operationalization", *Journal of Peace Research* vol 7, no. 1, 1980.

Gamba, Virginia: "Introduction", in Andrei Raevsky: *Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Aspects of Psychological Operations and Intelligence*. Disarmament and Conflict Resolution Project, UNIDIR Geneva 1996.

Gellner, Ernest: *Nations and Nationalism*, Cornell University Press, New York 1983.

Ginifer, Jeremy: *Managing Arms in Peace Process: Rhodesia/Zimbabwe*, UNIDIR Disarmament and Conflict Resolution Project, Geneva 1995.

Gochman, Charles S.: "Studies of International Violence. Five Easy Pieces?" In David Singer: *Explaining War, Selected Papers from the Correlates of War Project*. Sage, London 1979.

Graaf, Henny van der: "Proliferation of light weapons in the Sahel", Presentation to the experts Panel on Small Arms and Light Weapons. Regional Workshop in Pretoria, South Africa, September 23, 1996.

Gurr, Ted Robert: *Why Men Rebel*. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ 1970.

Gurr, Ted Robert & Duvall, Raymond: "Civil Conflict in the 1960s", *Comparative Political Studies* 6, 1973, 135-170.

Herbst, Jeffrey: "Responding to State Failure in Africa", in Michael E. Brown, Owen R Coté, Jr., Sean M Lynn-Jones and Stephen E. Miller: *Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict. An International Security Reader*, The MIT Press, Cambridge 1997, 374-98.

Hersi, Abdul, Interviewed by Kivimäki 1997

Hertz, John: "Idealist internationalism and the security dilemma." *World Politics* 2, 1950, 157-80.

Hodgkinson, Edith: "Economy", in *Africa South of Sahara*, Europa Publications Limited, London 1996, 608-614.

Integrated Approach to Security in Northern Mali

Huntington, Samuel P.: *Political Order in Changing Societies*. Yale University Press, New Haven, Conn 1968.

Imperato, Pascal James & Eleanor M. Imperato: *Mali: A Handbook of Historical Statistics*. G.K. Hall & Co. Boston, MA. 1982.

Imperato, Pascal James: *Mali: A Search for Direction*, Dartmouth, Aldershot 1989.

Jackson, Robert H., "Sub-Saharan Africa", In R.H.Jackson and Alan James, eds., *States in a Changing World: A Contemporary Analysis*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, U.K. 1993, 367, 139.

Jawsiewicki, B. & J. Letourneau: *Mode of Production*. Sage, London 1975.

Kaufman, Chaim: "Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars", in Michael E. Brown, Owen R. Coté, Jr., Sean M Lynn-Jones and Stephen E. Miller: *Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict. An International Security Reader*, The MIT Press, Cambridge 1997, 265-304.

Konczacki, Z.A: *The Economics of Pastoralism: a case of Subsaharan Africa*. London 1978.

Lake, David A. & Donald Rothchild: "Containing Fear", in Michael E. Brown, Owen R. Coté, Jr., Sean M Lynn-Jones and Stephen E. Miller: *Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict. An International Security Reader*, The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA 1997, 97-131.

Leisinger, Klaus & Karin Schmitt: *Survival in the Sahel*. International Service for National Agricultural Research. Ciba-Geigy: The Hague & Basel 1995.

Lewis, Ioan M.: *Understanding Somalia: Guide to Culture, History and Social Institutions*, Haan Associates, London 1993 (LSE 1981).

Londregan, John B. & Poole, Keith: "Poverty, the Coup Trap, and the Seizure of Executive Power", *World Politics* XLII:2, 1990, 151-183.

Integrated Approach to Security in Northern Mali

Regional and Country Studies: Mali: Industrial Development Review Series. UNIDO 1986.

Markakis, John: National and Class Conflict in the Horn of Africa. African Studies Series 55, Cambridge University Press. Cambridge 1987.

Mondot-Bernard, Jacqueline: Satisfaction of Food Requirements and Agricultural Development, volumes I-III. Development Centre of the OECD, Paris 1981.

Moore, Barrington: Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy. Boston, Beacon 1966.

Norris, H.T.: The Touaregs-Their Islamic Legacy and Its Diffusion in the Sahel, Teddington House, Warminster, Wilts, England: Aris & Phillips LTD, 1975.

Posen, Barry: "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict", in Michael Brown: Ethnic Conflict and International Security. Princeton University Press, Princeton, MA 1993, 103-24.

Poulton, Robin-Edward & ag Youssouf, Ibrahim: A Peace of Timbuktu: Democratic Governance, Development and African Peacemaking. UNIDIR publications, Geneva 1998.

Raevsky, Andrei: Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Aspects of Psychological Operations and Intelligence, UNIDIR Disarmament and Conflict Resolution Project, Geneva 1996.

Rao, Aparna (ed.): The Other Nomads, Böhlau, Köln 1987.

Reuters, Niamey, November 20, 1997: "Niger holds Tuareg rebel talks in Algeria", 1997.

Rummel, Rudolph J.: Death by Government. Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick, NJ 1994.

Sahara-Sahel Advisory Mission Report, January 1995.

Integrated Approach to Security in Northern Mali

Samatar, Abdi Ismail: "Structural Adjustment as Development Strategy? Bananas, Boom and Poverty in Somalia", *Economic Geography*, vol 69, no 1, 1993,117-31.

Schraeder, Peter J.: "Involuntary Migration in Somali: the Politics of Resettlement" *Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol 24, no 4, 1986, 641-662.

Shipton, Parker: "African Famines and Food Security: Antropological Perspectives", *Annual Review of Antropology*, vol 9, 1990, 353-94.

Snyder, Frank Gregory: *One-Party Government in Mali*, Yale University Press, Yale College Series New Haven & London 1965.

Tanter, Raymond: *Rogue Regimes. Terrorism and Proliferation*, St. Martin's Press, New York 1998, xii-xii.

Tiessa-Farma Maïga, Mohamed: *Le Mali: de la sécheresse a la rébellion nomade*, L'Harmattan, Paris 1997.

Tilly, Charles: *From Mobilization to Revolution*. Random House, New York 1978.

Waever, Ole: "Securitization - Desecuritization" In Lipschutz, Ronald (ed.), *On Security*, Columbia University Press, New York 1995.

Wallerstein, Immanuel: *Africa, Politics of Independence*, Random House, New York, NY 1961.

Wallerstein, Immanuel "Voluntary Associations", in James S. Coleman & Carl G. Rosberg, Jr.: *Political Parties and National Integration in Tropical Africa*, University of California Press, Berkeley & Los Angeles 1964.

World Bank: *World Development Report 1997*. Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK 1997.

World Bank: *World Development Report 1996*. Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK 1996.

Integrated Approach to Security in Northern Mali

Zartman, William: "Introduction: Posing the Problem of State Collapse", in I. William Zartman: *Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority*, Co: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder 1995, 1-11.

Zartman, I. William: "Putting the Humpty-Dumpty Together Again", In David A. Lake and Donald Rothchild: *Ethnic Fears and Global Engagement*, forthcoming

Zavels, Estanilao Angel, Stephen John Stedman, Donald C.F. Daniel, David Cox, Jane Boulden, Fred Tanner, Jakkie Potgieter and Virginia Gamba: *Managing Arms in Peace Processes: The Issue, UNIDIR Disarmament and Conflict Resolution Project*, Geneva 1996.

Notes

¹ This claim with the idea of an Azawad army and a national flag was explicitly made by Rhissa Sidi Mohamed of the FPLA, who as a consequence received a lot of support among the people of the North (interviews among Tuaregs by T. Lehtinen, see Kivimäki, Lehtinen & Laakso 1998).

² All these challenging claims to Malian nation-building were also presented in less absolute form. Instead of producing all political values in the North it was naturally possible to claim that more independence should be granted to the North or that more integration should take place transnationally.

³ Mouvement Populaire de l'Azawad.

⁴ Armée révolutionnaire de libération de l'Azawad.

⁵ Mouvement Patriotique Ganda Koy.

⁶ This dissatisfaction cannot, however alone explain the creation of the MPGK. The Ganda Koy was probably primarily a reaction against the looting and killing.

⁷ The Anatomy of security dilemma in international politics was first analyzed by John Hertz (1950).

Integrated Approach to Security in Northern Mali

⁸ By securitization, it is meant that government uses the positive normative value of the concept of security, and the effort to maintain security legitimizes some extra-normal (extra-democratic) measures, in order to legitimize harsh interference to maintain stability of a regime (see Waever 1995).

⁹ The fact that violence might be a matter of order rather than disorder is suggested by Rudolph Rummel (1994) whose studies show that between years 1900 and 1987 political violence has caused 169 million casualties in the context of governmental actions while interstate or civil wars have “only” killed 38 million people.

¹⁰ The introduction of more modern, national security structures in the North, ended the keeping of captives and robbing of sedentary villages and the Tuaregs also lost their ability to control and provide protection to trade routes (Bourgeot 1995; Childs & Chelala 1994, 17).

¹¹ For this perception see for example reports by Reuters, Niamey, November 20, 1997: “Niger holds Tuareg rebel talks in Algeria”; Claudot-Hawad 1993, 97-109.

¹² The social structure of Tuaregs is introduced here only as it relates directly to the material realities of production. A more detailed presentation follows in the context of identitive structures.

¹³ Yet it has been claimed that this was more true for the West and the Middle of Mali, with Fulani-Arab-Soninke-disputes and less true of the Tuaregs of the North.

¹⁴ A good review of the development and trends in the Malian national economy can be found in Hodgkinson 1996.

¹⁵ See for example Englebert 1996; Tuareg: “Time for Truces” in *Focus on Africa Pamphlet*, September 1994.

¹⁶ The objective difficulties of communication was reflected already in the administrative practices of the colonialists, who separated the effort of pacification of the riverine areas, and gave it to the Navy, while the nomadic people were administered by the Army.

¹⁷ On the nation-bias of western political thinking and on the of paradoxes of the African state as a provider of political values, see for example, Samatar 1993; Bayart 1993, 8-9; Kaufman 1997, 303; Davidson 1992, 102-103; Jackson 1993, 367 and 139.

¹⁸ In fact, if we look at the model of integrating guerillas into the national army Zimbabwe is another good example where the peace process lead to problems of economic unsustainability, which again seem to have had serious conflict implications. For a good example of the case see Ginifer 1995, for a more general analysis of the UN approach see Zavel, Stedman, Daniel, Cox, Boulden, Tanner, Potgieter and Gamba 1996.

Integrated Approach to Security in Northern Mali

¹⁹ In Somalia among some groups (Afar and Issa) homicide was a cultural practice, prerequisite to attaining adult status and contracting marriage, and provided added motivation for raiding (Markakis 1987, 34). In Mali pastoralism did not have such extreme consequences on its culture: The need for pasture entails movement of peoples. The consequence of this has meant that there are large distances between relatively small groups and subsequently society has fragmented into small units who do not welcome close proximity to each other (see also Bourgeot 1995, ch 6) .

²⁰ This conflict does not necessarily imply that the relationship between people would bring conflict.

²¹ The land law of 1983 stipulated that all land left fallow could be claimed by the state, while the traditional pattern of agriculture in Mali was to leave long fallow periods, in order to avoid abuse of the fragile soil (Poulton & Youssof 1998).

²² There seems to be disagreement about the degree of violence in the traditional Tuareg system of settlement of rights to pasture. While Imperatos describe it as violent some others claim it was more consensual.

Studies in a Nutshell

ISSN 1457-960X

1. Integrated Approach to Security in Northern Mali.

By Timo Kivimäki (ISBN 952-5397-00-9, 2001).

2. Promoting Democracy and Human Rights in Kenya.

By Timo Kivimäki (ISBN 952-5397-01-7, 2001)

3. Encouraging Negotiation in South Africa.

By Timo Kivimäki (ISBN 952-5397-02-5, 2001)

4. Explaining Violence in Somalia.

By Timo Kivimäki, (ISBN 952-5397-03-3, 2001)

5. Territorial Disputes in the South China Sea.

Edited by Timo Kivimäki (2001)

6. Konfliktipotentiali Indonesiassa ja Itä-Timorilla

By Timo Kivimäki (2001).

7. CAPACITY \Rightarrow OWNERSHIP \Rightarrow LEGITIMACY \Rightarrow COMPLIANCE.

By Timo Kivimäki (2002) (ISBN 952-5397-04-1)

8. Democracy, Decentralization, Identity and Conflict.

Proceedings of NIAS-ICSN Conference, Copenhagen, August 31-September 1, 2001.

By Michael Jacobsen, Timo Kivimäki & Pius Suratman
Kartasasmita, eds (2002) (ISBN 952-5397-05-X)

Distribution: CTS-Conflict Transformation Service, sales@conflicttransform.org