

Promoting Democracy and Human Rights in Kenya

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A study based on a project commissioned by the
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Preface

This study results from a project funded by the Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs. The project, *Human Rights and Development Cooperation* was launched in January 1998 and it submitted its final report in August 1998. Later in Fall 1998 the final report was published as a booklet in the Acta Politica Series of the Department of Political Science, University of Helsinki.¹ The case study on Kenya was just a small part of the project, but in this publication it has been re-contextualized and made an independent contribution to a more general debate on the promotion of democracy and human rights in development cooperation.

I am grateful for the financial support and ideas by the Finnish Foreign Ministry. Comments by a large number of officials of the ministry, Finnish Embassy in Nairobi and the European Commission were also much appreciated. Most of all, however, I am indebted to Terhi Lehtinen, who was the leader of the Foreign Ministry project of which this publication is a part.

Copenhagen, March 5, 2001,

Timo Kivimäki

Introduction

Promoting human rights and democracy has become a central objective of development co-operation. In addition to the level of political declarations, also the practice of North-South relations most often reflects the concern over the objective. However, promoting human rights, democracy and good governance by using aid as a tool is not easy. Sometimes donors lack the interest and then making the necessary political decisions is difficult. Often the policies and political commitments are made because of ulterior motives, which then are reflected on how policies are implemented by reducing the efficiency of the measures taken. Often the promotion is interfered by other compelling needs, as was the case during the Cold War when the strategic priorities occasionally overruled all ideological values in development cooperation and forced countries to support friendly dictators. Also humanitarian considerations sometimes are so pressing that any ideological objectives have to wait until the more urgent matters of survival can be addressed.²

Finland's development cooperation in Kenya provides a case where the problems are related to implementation rather than the lack of political will or intervening interests. Thus the starting point for generalizations on the basis of observations of this case, is that genuine efforts are challenged by practical, institutional difficulties. These are easier to analyze in the absence of the intervening problems. Finland as a small, neutral country with no colonial history (which is often reflected in certain kinds of perceived obligations) does not have any power ambitions, strong economic interests, the Finnish political elite does not have preferences over Kenyan ethnic, religious or other groups and thus can concentrate on the promotion of its ideological values without disturbances.

This study aims at bringing new light to the problem of the implementation of human rights and democracy promotion by studying how Finland's decisions on the implementation of the policies affect and what kind of concept of democracy, and human rights they reflect. Furthermore, it aims at lessons on Finland's experiences of the problems of donor cooperation and here also compares the conceptions of the practice of donor coordination on democracy and human rights with some of the theoretical interventions of the theory of democracy.

Finland's Development Cooperation in Kenya

Finland's development co-operation in Kenya can be divided into two categories: normal development co-operation and support for human rights and democracy. The volume of normal development co-operation is still much bigger than activity directly concerned with human rights and democracy (the latter allocated 4m FIMs in 1996-1998, while the allocations in normal development co-operation projects varied between 15.5m and 35m FIMs) (UM 1997a, 7-10). Yet at the present time the latter category tends to be expanding and the former to be shrinking (Viljanen 1998; Hellman 1998). Development co-operation in both categories reflects and serves the priorities set by the Finnish government and by the organisations of which Finland is a member (EU, UN and DAC most importantly) on human rights, democracy and good governance.

In co-operation, efforts to support human rights, democracy and good governance Finland operates in co-operation with different organisations all over Kenya. The general aim is a better popular understanding of the principles of democracy, improvement of human rights, societal equality, popular sovereignty and good governance in Kenya. More practically, Finland aims at improvements in the area of human rights and democracy, better popular empowerment, a functioning system of justice, free and democratic elections (UM 1997, 10).

Previously, Finland has operated in conjunction with the Kenyan government in support of projects with the above aims. A project to improve the conditions of victims of tribal wars was funded for the UNDP (United Nations Development Program) and presently there is a co-operation project with the UNDP aiming at "Enhanced Public Administration and Participatory Development". This project, which lasts until the end of 1998 and consists of five components of which Finland is supporting three, components 1,2 and 4. The five components are³

1. Activity of the Office of the Attorney General in the field of law reform. Legal reforms regarding the status of women, children and the disabled.
2. Enhancement of the capacity of the judiciary through training. In this component especially, records' management is targeted in order to establish a system of consistence in verdicts.
3. Administration of elections focusing on the capacity of the electoral commission with regard to the management of elections: This component consists of civil education, voter registration, voter education and the computerisation of elections' database. This component was the most problematic, slow and inefficient.

Promoting Democracy, Human Rights and Good Governance

4. Overview of the legislative with the aim of the effective management of the parliament: To achieve this, one would wish to strengthen
 - a. Records management
 - b. General purpose committees (3 were working before the project, 11 now)
 - c. General capacity of the parliament
5. Local governance focusing on local authorities. Here the question of revenue collection and management is central. This component involves poverty alleviation in co-operation with the World Bank.

During the year 1997, Finland's support for human rights, democracy and good governance has shifted to working with NGO's and the private sector rather than with the government (Viljanen 1998, Hellman 1998). This practice was made a more general official practice in Kenya by the Finnish Foreign Ministry, in March 1998, as Finland decided not to start any bilateral development projects with the Kenyan government. This change was part of aid-conditionality and it was related to the insufficient progress in political rights, especially in questions related to the execution of the general elections and slow pace of constitutional reform. Additionally, and perhaps equally importantly, the difficulties in the economic management of co-operation projects on the part of the Kenyan government contributed to the decision (Hellman 1998, Viljanen 1998).

As a result, Finland's support for Kenyan human rights, democracy and good governance is presently channelled principally through a variety of NGO projects. The amounts are still very small (in most cases 3 540 000 Kenyan shillings, 320 000 FIMs) and the selection of NGOs is conservative in the sense that only those NGOs that are very well established and appreciated by Africans and other donors receive Finland's aid. The present NGO projects supported by Finland are⁴

1. The Media institute's "Freedom of expression project 1997-8" (KSH 3540 000= 320 000FIMs),
2. The Civil Resource and Information Centre's (CRIC) "Civil awareness through radio programmes 1997-8" (KSH 3 540 000)
3. The Center for Law and Research International (Clarion): Community-based election monitoring project (KSH 3 540 000)
4. The Kenyan Human Rights Commission's "Activism and Mobilization" project, "Prisons project" 1997, (KSH 1 030 000=80 000 FIMs), core funding 1998 (KSH 2350 000, 210 000 FIMs),
5. The Institute for Economic Affairs' (IEA), production of "Agenda 2000"-publication, 1998 (KSH 1 000 000 = 80 000 FIMs).

Promoting Democracy, Human Rights and Good Governance

The Media institute was established only in October 1997 and the project Finland is funding ("Freedom of expression project 1997-8) consists of two parts: the publication "Expression today", and monitoring of freedom of expression.⁵

The journal is a forum for studies (both by people at the institute and those outside it) on problems of freedom of expression in Kenya. Its editorial board consists of distinguished people (albeit, not academic scholars of communication studies)⁶. It addresses the problem of incompetent local administration, which reduces freedom of expression as well as the government-level problems of freedom of expression, such as the inaccessibility of information, sanctions caused by repressive legislation and the government's abuse of power against the critical media. The analyses of the publication were of a high quality and they represented several angles of the problem of freedom of expression.

The monitoring was conducted by establishing e-mail, fax- and phone line with 150 journalists who report on incidents of restrictions of press freedom. Journalists call to the media institute about such incidents and report to and stay in touch with the institute "all the time" (Makali 1998). During the elections they reported informally about the press freedom related electoral frauds that took place.

In the future the Media institute intends to do research on the state of the media in Kenya to offer a researched basis for the reforms to free the media, including the freeing of the radio waves. The intention is to study who consumes what kind of media and make the journal (Expression today) a self-financing monthly.

The Civil Resource and Information Centre (CRIC) is a small and relatively young (est. June 1994) organisation which concentrates on the role of enhancing civil society in Kenya.⁷ Compared to other NGOs who receive Finnish aid the CRIC is slightly more responsibility-oriented and less critical and has been accused of sympathies towards the government. Yet, it seems to have maintained a distance from government views in several important issues of democracy and human rights.

The central idea in the work of the CRIC is that the widening of peoples' participation is not sufficient in a country where politics is structured along ethnic lines: democratisation needs to be complemented by the development of the democratic instruments (and mentalities) of conflict resolution. For this there is a need for civic education and the building of institutions of dialogue. Finnish support is targeted to civic education activity, especially through support for a series of Swahili language radio programmes. These programmes dealt with the responsibilities of the citizen and responsibilities towards the citizens and which was transmitted in 41 episodes by the Kenyan broadcasting company every Monday before the main news for a period of 8 months right before the elections. The themes of programs varied from "the duties of a good citizen" and "the adverse-effects of tribalism" to the

Promoting Democracy, Human Rights and Good Governance

importance of dialogue in society” and “the responsible citizen and democracy”. In Kenya radio is a prime mean for reaching the large variety of rural communities and the Kenyan Broadcasting Corporation estimates that they have a regular audience of five million listeners (CRIC 1998).

The main function of the CLARION (Centre for Law and Research International) is to conduct research on socio-political issues and engage in civic education on democracy, elections and the constitution.⁸ Even though the function of the CLARION is very similar to that of the CRIC, the profiles of these institutions are very different. While the CRIC has been accused of Kanu-sympathies (Kanu is the government party), the CLARION personnel has suffered several repressive provocations by the government. Even though CLARION is a non-partisan NGO, not affiliated to any political party, it acknowledges that it has a political role: “whenever one acts for the advancement of democracy, one is on a political path.” It seems that CLARION’s activities are closest to the strategic aims of some donor missions in Kenya who, by support for the NGOs aim “to create effective demand for sustainable political, constitutional and legal reform.”(USAID 1998)

The project Finland was financing was related to community-based election monitoring project, which involved 60 communities. The idea of the project was to monitor the WHOLE PROCESS of elections, from the beginning of political activity preparing for elections to the final declaration of the results. It concentrated on observing and resisting vote buying, community violence, voter registration and campaigning failures etc. All other monitoring efforts were, according to CLARION people, partial in the sense that the early activities were not covered. The other main idea of this project was to involve communities in national politics and thereby secure fair and free elections and reduce election violence. By offering communities a role in national politics, less room was left for inter-community antagonism and traditional politics.

The Kenyan Human Rights Commission (KHRC) is a very well established and well connected NGO on a broad basis. It acts as a clearing-house, which does not take human rights violations to courts but refers them to other agencies. KHRC is independent of the government and after the multiparty reform in the early 1990s is has been legal, not underground. Its relations with the government are tolerable even though the government officially reacts in a very negative way to the reports of the KHRC. Yet reporting on human rights is among the most valuable contributions from the Finnish point of view. Most of the reports are considered reliable by the Finnish Embassy in Nairobi and many of them end up without further analysis at the Finnish Foreign ministry in Helsinki. Presently the KHRC is critically involved in a process of dialogue on the question of constitutional reform, and its role in this process is not without controversy among the donors.

Finland’s contribution to the KHRC is in its support of specific publications related to civic rights, such as the publication on the conditions of women in prison and a publication on the rights of mobilisation.

Promoting Democracy, Human Rights and Good Governance

The Institute of Economic Affairs “is a civic forum which seeks to promote the pluralism of ideas through open, active and informed debate on public policy issues. It advocates liberal values in society i.e. the individual's economic, social and political liberties, property rights, democratic government and the rule of law. The IEA is independent of political parties, pressure groups and lobbies or any other partisan interests”. “The mission of the IEA is to facilitate and promote open pro-active public debate of key economic and related issues. To that end, it provides a forum for the articulation of key public issues, the formulation of realistic and informed solutions and the provision of alternative policy choices.” (IEA 1998).

The two main contributions of the IEA are, however, related to opening of different structures of public debate about public spending. Firstly, the institution contributes in providing the Kenyan political debate with a perspective, which tries to avoid the artificial separation between the spheres of economics and politics. According to the fundamental idea of the institute these two cannot be separated (Muganda 1998; Shaw 1998).⁹ Secondly, closely related to the first main contribution, since economics and the management of public expenditure are not something strictly restricted to the world of economic rationality, but is also a political issue, the institute tries to stir up popular political discussion on the issues of economics (Muganda 1998).

The main functions of the IEA are served by their publication “The Point. Bulletin of the Institute of Economic Affairs”, which contains seemingly high-class economic analysis of public policies.¹⁰ However, Finland supports a more visible product of this public debate program to which the Point belongs i.e. the Agenda 2000 project.¹¹ This project, rather than just providing a forum for an informed public debate, aims at presenting position papers and a blueprint on the key questions of Kenyan political economy. A similar publication has been produced previously by the IEA in 1992 with a focus on microeconomics (tea-industry, tourism etc.) and in 1994 when the aim was more macro-economic. Agenda 2000 is a collection of position papers on public policy issues, not academic, but expert perspectives, aimed at the opinion leaders, private leaders, parliamentarians and decision-makers.

The agenda is divided into five sections. Section I is on overcoming political problems: constitution-making, media, corruption and the land question. Section II is on professional governance i.e. reforming government, civil service, agricultural management. Section III deals with the challenges of creating an environment for economic growth i.e. questions like infrastructure development and environment. Section IV concentrates on Human development, i.e. health, education etc. Section V analyses the possibilities for enhancing productivity, i.e. agriculture, livestock, industry, tourism. This section is the main part of the Agenda 2000, but cannot be approached before dealing with questions of sections in I-IV, because of the holistic approach of the IEA discussion.

The book, Agenda 2000, will be given out to opinion leaders, as a basis for workshops with the media people, MPs, leaders in the tourism industry, etc.

Promoting Democracy, Human Rights and Good Governance

The intention is to sensitise important decision-makers about the tremendous economic problems in public policies on the basis of the Agenda 2000 reports.

In recent times ordinary development co-operation has used the channels of the Kenyan government with target groups, co-operation areas, geographical areas of the projects and many other details coming from the Kenyan side. Yet, all the projects that have been planned for the years 1997 and 1998 have a significant intended contribution to the human rights and democracy situation in Kenya. These projects also contributed to the objective leverage of Finland on the government of Kenya in Human Rights and democracy issues: the more the Kenyan government gets from Finland the less it wants the relationship of its co-operation to end. In the future, however, Finland will deal with questions of development through the NGOs.¹²

The ongoing phase II of the Livestock Development Project (1995-8, 20m FIMs) concentrates on the improvement of human conditions, which is related to the question of economic human rights. The project operates also in such areas in West Kenya which are generally considered as discriminated against by the government and it specifically targets the improvement in the incomes of women.

The project to support the Forestry Master Plan (1996-1997, allocations of 35m FIMs) in the whole country was aimed at the strengthening of the environmentally sustainable forestry sector. Environmentally sustainable production was also related to economic human rights. Despite good intentions this project was operated completely by the Kenyan governmental administration and contributed possibly more to corruption than to the environment and it was discontinued by the Finnish Foreign Ministry as recommended by the Finnish Embassy in Nairobi.

The Community Water Supply Management Project (1996-1998, 15.5Mmk) aims at improving the capacity of water consumers to use and maintain water installations and at protecting water resources in West-Kenya. In addition to the environmental targets, this project aims at the empowerment of ordinary people and emphasises women's and women's group active involvement and thus, if implemented as planned, is of a high democracy and human rights quality.

Of the Ministry's 22 support projects through Finnish NGOs in 1997, more than half (13) are targeted at marginalised or under-powered groups eight at the disabled, two at the economically disadvantaged, two at women and one at orphans. Of the remaining projects five were related to the protection of the environment or the fulfilment of basic needs - health and education - (economic human rights) and one was specifically aimed at community development (democracy). Thus, on paper, also this channel of Finland's development co-operation has a high human rights and democracy production quality as well.

What Kind of Human Rights and Democracy Concept Do Finland's Policies in Kenya Reflect?

The human rights support one can identify in the selection of ordinary development projects and projects through Finnish NGOs is concentrated on economic and social dimensions - Nonetheless a clear commitment to the empowerment of the discriminated against and under-powered can also be found. However, when considering the results of the projects Finnish officials in Nairobi are less confident of the quality of co-operation, especially in projects that have been undertaken with the Kenyan government.

The democratic and human rights content of this aid has to a large extent only been evident in the rhetoric and aims whereas the implementation of these projects in the correct spirit has been difficult due to poor economic management on the Kenyan side. Also it must be noted that while the improvement of Kenyan economy and the alleviation of poverty might be considered as contributions to the economic human rights of Kenyans, at the same time they can have a causal linkage to the slowing of political democratic reform. According to Samuel Huntington (1993, 4), one of the key reasons of the wave of democratisation of late 1980s was the fact that many authoritarian governments lost their ability to maintain "performance legitimacy" through economic growth. In this sense helping an authoritarian regime to deliver economic growth might have an unintended consequence of suppressing the popular demand for political democracy.

The shift from ordinary development co-operation to specific support of democratisation and human rights narrows the scope of the Finnish support for democracy and human rights and focuses on addressing the protection of mainly political and civil rights and the liberal concept of democracy. On the one hand, it means a shift from a broader concept of human rights to a more narrow and political one.

On the other hand it has meant that the support of democracy has shifted from output-democracy (which produces decisions desired by the people) to input-democracy (in which decisions are made according to a democratic process)¹³. Instead of helping the government deliver values that reflect the popular preferences (output democracy) in addition to widening participation, the emphasis is now more on the democratic process, no matter what the political system delivers to the people.¹⁴ Even though the reasons for this change might be beyond Finland's control it needs to be recognised that this development distances Finland's actual policies from the wider objectives defined by the multilateral forums Finland operates with. Widening the focus in co-operation with NGOs could possibly offer an opportunity to return to development co-operation, which addresses not only the narrow values of political rights but also social and economic rights. Another factor, which might

Promoting Democracy, Human Rights and Good Governance

benefit this development is the fact that Finland becomes a member in European Commission's development co-operation when the EDF-8 National indicative Program for Kenya begins in July 1998.

The change from operating with NGOs rather than the government has many implications for the content of support to human rights and democracy. This is because the objective basis for leverage of aid-conditionality and democratic demands towards the government is lost with the change. If the government does not get anything from Finland, why should it listen to it?

The change of the channel of support shifts the focus from the state apparatus to civil society. Support for the NGOs can create new forms of dialogue between different fragments of society (support for the CLARION and the KHRC), it can create new channels of articulation of political inputs in the political system (support for the Media Institute and for the Institute of Economic Affairs) and it can improve the preparedness of the civil society for democracy and democratic conflict resolution (support for the CRIC and KHRC).

However, it cannot improve the political meaningfulness of popular input in the political decision-making nor does it improve the democratic quality of political decisions, since it does not address the state apparatus. This is probably a problem since it does not help the democracy situation very much, even if all voices are heard in the society, if the political apparatus is not affected by any of these voices. According to Claude Ake (1993, 75), "*Kenya is one of the African countries in which rural grassroots organisations are the most advanced... Yet Kenya is anything but democratic.*" The strength of the civil society is not enough and "*the grassroots movements do not appear to have brought about, as of now, any substantial decentralisation of power, and they have not diminished the states arbitrariness and coercion.*" (Ake 1993, 75)

The change from government to NGOs has two human rights and democracy related conflict implications too. The channelling of money through NGOs has increased "NGO-corruption" (quite as government-centred aid often increases corruption within the state apparatus): more NGOs are competing for donor money and obviously this increases the role of money, instead of commitment to the objective, as a motivator of activity (not that the pursuit for profit should necessarily be something contradictory to the commitment to democratisation). However, competition between NGOs does not have adverse conflict effects since they are obviously competing with demonstrations of efficiency rather than with violence. Thus the operation with NGOs removes one of the adverse conflict effects of aid. If development and democracy support were channelled through the government, only the monopoly of state power would enable groups to get their hands on aid money. And as we know competition for state power is very often violent in countries with early-stage level of democratic institutionalisation (Auvinen & Kivimäki 1997).

At the same time operating with democracy-activist NGOs can have adverse conflict effects. In a transition process the timing of the ripening of attitudes towards change is essential (as shown in Kivimäki 1996). If the

Promoting Democracy, Human Rights and Good Governance

“change-forces” become ready for change too early, at a point when the “status quo-forces” are still unwilling to change, and if the latter fails to realise the desperation and determination of the former, the transition is likely to become violent. The international donor community now operates with the NGOs by making them ready for change and encouraging the demand for change (cf. USAID document (1998) for the explanation of the strategic objective). If at the same time the international community does not make the necessity for change sufficiently plain to the government, and it cannot since it is operating through the NGOs, the present formula can lead to violence in Kenya.

The selection of NGOs is also indicative in the question of the definition of human rights and democracy that Finland’s actual policies are supporting in Kenya. All the NGOs supported by Finland naturally declare their independence of parties and interest groups. They all, however, seem to be rather critically oriented towards the present government, which, of course, is natural. If Finland considers that Kenya has a problem with democratic development and that the present government is not sufficiently democratic nor does it respect human rights properly, it is natural that Finland supports forces of change rather than forces of the status quo. Of the NGOs, the CRIC is often considered closest to the government and this is reflected in its focus on conflict resolution mechanisms and duties of the citizens in democracy rather than building a counter-force to the poor governance of the state. The latter is sometimes perceived as the line of the CLARION or the KHRC, who are presently taking many political actions against the government.

There is not necessarily a contradiction in operating at the same time both with less critical and more critical forces. What the CRIC aims at is valuable (any impact analysis would naturally be outside the scope of this research). Its position as one of not directly opposing the government has enabled it to get resources necessary to do what it does, most specifically the ability to work with the Kenyan Broadcasting Corporation. At the same time the support for the CLARION (and to some extent to the KHRC) can be seen as support of the demand for democratisation and better respect of human rights. Furthermore, community-based election management by the CLARION, and reports of the conditions of prisons by the KHRC reflect the importance Finland gives to fair and democratic elections and civil rights.

It is important to scrutinise the question of the future relationship between supported NGOs and the government as well. In some cases simply trying to create pressure on the government by supporting critical NGOs means operating with extremely blunt instruments. Sometimes it would be useful to select agents who can mediate between the demands and the decision-making. Pressure is rarely sufficient in human rights diplomacy, there is a need to lower the resistance against changes by encouraging the middle-ground between the radical demand and the resistance to it. In Indonesia in the 1970s (in the case for the release of political prisoners) the international community used a strategy, which exerted tremendous pressure in the form of (military) aid conditionality.

Promoting Democracy, Human Rights and Good Governance


At the same time it made it possible for the government to react to the “internal pressure” (from the government itself) rather than to the “external” pressure (foreigners and the opposition) and thus saving the face of the government and making it easier for it to yield. Agents, perceived by the government as insiders were very important in this process (Kivimäki 1994). In Kenya the possibilities of using the governmental Standing Committee for Human Rights in this kind of internalisation of the pressure should probably be studied by the donor community.

Support for the Media Institute is well in line with the rather political conception of human rights and the process-oriented conception of democracy. The media is undeniably an important component of the democratic process of vertical communication within the political system and freedom of expression can be seen as one of the fundamental components of political human rights.

Support for the Institute of Economic Affairs is still very small and is striking as an exception to the rest of Finland’s policy line in the support of a more political and more process (rather than outcome) oriented democracy-conception in Kenya. This institute and especially the project that Finland has supported aims at democratic output, better public policies, rather than a better democratic process. Instead of concentrating on the participation aspect as such, Finland could probably broaden the kind of assistance, which focuses on the outcome.

From the point of view of the theory of democracy there is very little value for an ordinary citizen in the democratic channelling and collectivisation of popular interests and preferences if the implementation of these preferences is inefficient due to lack of resources, training and will in the units that implement democratic decisions (Schmitter & Karl 1993, 45-6). Democracy as an “*institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote*” (Schumpeter 1943, 269), in order to be meaningful, requires three components and without one of these components the nature of the political system becomes undemocratic. The first of these components is a free input of democratic demand and support, the process of popular voice - free expression, free assembly and regular elections. The second is a fair process of decision-making in which the power of alternative policy-lines is determined by the popularity of the line, as measured in the elections. Finally an efficient implementation of democratic decisions is needed in order to ensure that the free process and fair decision-making has some meaningfulness in the real output of the political system.¹⁵

Illustration 1: Phases of Democratic Process



Finland's growing concentration on the first of these components seems to suggest a perception that the problem in Kenya's democracy would be increasingly obvious in the first component of democracy: weakness of the political system to allow a voice for different groups within the civil society. Yet most political scientists would claim that due to the weakening of the state in Kenya, civil society has strengthened and despite some repressive legislation media has, already for some years, expressed views very critical to the government (Mutahi 1997; Odera 1997; Makali 1998). Yet the at the level of implementation, tax-money and aid intended for the people is embezzled and is used for private purposes or for ceremonial purposes (Shaw 1998), the frustrated and under-resourced police is misusing its power (Mutahi 1997; Paul 1998).

With the support of the donor community, several democracy and human rights NGOs have gained a lot of visibility and influence in Kenya. In an aid-dependent political culture one basis of political legitimation for the state has been its ability to attract international aid and now part of that legitimation has been lost. Since then some of that legitimacy has been gained by some of the NGOs. This might be problematic as the separation of components one and two of a democratic political system is not fully understood. When voicing interests and values, any Kenyan should have a free say, but when it comes to decision-making, choosing between alternative values should be weighted according to their political support.

Discussions with some of the leaders of supported NGOs reveal some confusion in the perception of NGOs about the process of democratisation. Even though the NGOs have replaced the state as a channel for aid, they should not be encouraged to take on the roles of the state in a more general way. NGOs are important in the voicing of various preferences, but they do not represent

Promoting Democracy, Human Rights and Good Governance

the people in any democratic fashion and, therefore, they should not claim power in political decision-making. In order to support genuine democracy, donors should be careful to avoid the signal that the role of NGOs in the democratisation can be interpreted as NGOs having a democratic mandate to represent some groups of people. The democratic mandate is given by the Kenyan people in elections, not by the donors who declare their support of democracy.¹⁶ Yet, of course, NGOs should be encouraged to take a role in ensuring that decision-making is democratic (albeit not necessarily of their liking) and that democratic decisions are implemented.

If we look at the selection of supported NGOs, Finland's choices have not been very different from other donors. All recipients of Finland's human right and democratization aid were also short listed by USAID for further co-operation (USAID 1998). Of Finland's NGOs the Kenyan government has recognized the CRIC, KHRC and the Media Institute in its list of NGO's invited as representatives of the civil society to the dialogue on the reform of the Kenyan constitution. When asked in the beginning of 1997 about the most important Kenyan NGOs in the field of human rights, Kenyan Human Rights Commission's deputy director, Njuguna Mutahi (Mutahi 1997) named only his own Commission from the list of NGOs supported by Finland. Two other Human Rights activists interviewed later named also the CRIC and the CLARION. This was due to the fact that many of the NGOs supported by Finland are so new that they were established only in late 1997.

Yet, it seems that the list of Mutahi and other activists included many more NGOs involved in the legal surveillance of the implementation of human rights norms rather than in the dialogue process as seems to be the focus of donors in Kenya. Another difference in the lists of Finland and the Kenyan activists and of some other donors is that Finland does not yet assist religious NGOs, which according to many democracy and human rights activists represent the most powerful civil society component in opposition to the undemocratic practices of the government. The benefit that the religious NGOs have is that they are not resisted as strongly by the government as are the more political NGOs. Churches are not seen by the government, as competitors and their power is perceived as being on a different dimension.

The potential of Catholic churches as an engine of democratisation around the world has also been acknowledged in analyses of more general focus. Huntington (1993, 4) mentions the changed role of the Catholic church after 1965 from defenders of the status quo to opponents of authoritarianism as one of the five key factors that have caused what he calls "the third wave of democratisation" in the 1980s. Furthermore, Christian churches in Kenya seem to be a backbone of society's normative order and thus they cannot be marginalised as easily as the so-called political NGOs. Yet of course, Kenya is a multi-religious nation and external support of the political role of one religion or one religious community would naturally be a dubious undertaking (civilisational engineering) with nationalist (or inter-civilisational) sensitivities.

USAID has solved the problem by assisting several religious NGOs, Christian and Muslim.

Dialogue and Coordination

Since development co-operation is a co-operative venture, the substance of Finland's support of Kenyan democracy and human rights cannot be analysed by only looking at what Finland does with its own money. It is also very important to see how Finland and different units of Finland's foreign policy administration and decision-making influence the other agents. At least four relationships of dialogue are important: those between different units within Finland, between different donor agencies, between Finland and the government of Kenya and between Finland and the Kenyan NGOs.

The role of aid in the promotion of human rights and democracy is often perceived differently from the perspectives of different administrative units. Thus the content of support for democracy can vary from one unit to another. It is possible to see aid as a contribution to economic, political and social well being. This again minimises the threat of human rights' violations (positive measures such as normal development co-operation, police training, professionalisation of government officials, strengthening of the media and NGOs) or as a quid pro quo to the government for improving its human rights record (aid as a bargaining chip).

The relationship between positive and negative measures is problematic, since willingness to give positive aid makes threats of conditionality less credible and thus reduces the bargaining leverage of the HR-diplomacy. This has been seen in Finland's Kenya-policies: the move towards channelling aid through the NGOs has meant an increased flexibility in the use of positive instruments, but at the same time it has removed the economic muscle from the political persuasion of the government.

Policies regarding the choice between positive and negative measures vary depending on the position of the bureaucratic/political agency of the donor country (Kivimäki 1993, 1994). The recipient country-based administration is constantly aware of the difficulty of making aid conditional in the often nationalist political climate of the recipient. These officials are also more fully aware of the need for economic prosperity and causal links between poverty and human rights. On the other hand, parliamentarians have to consider their priorities in the light of domestic economic realities: aid has to be made cost-efficient and politically acceptable. In Finland's case it seemed that the need for instruments of conditionality (for example support to the balance of payments-type of assistance) was much more clearly felt in Helsinki (Toivonen

Promoting Democracy, Human Rights and Good Governance

1998). The confidence in the Embassy towards the effectiveness of political conditionality (outside the project administration) in general was much weaker (Viljanen 1998).

It has been emphasised by the officials that the Finnish Foreign Affairs bureaucracy is so small that major differences between bureaucratic units do not exist. Thus the role of the Embassy is to provide the ministry with the information necessary for decision-making (which is done in Helsinki). Yet the spirit of the Embassy seems to be that it is more important to get things moving in the right direction rather than to have some absolute criteria as conditions for aid (Viljanen 1998; Hellman 1998). However, the general observation of the differences of opinions between positive and negative measures does not entirely fit the Finnish case. For example the decision to move to more flexible options, such as the support of the NGOs was made in Helsinki (on the basis of information provided by the Embassy). There do not seem to be major differences between various Finnish bureaucratic units in the making of bigger decisions related to the choice between positive and negative measures. Yet the decision to support NGOs rather than the government is more as a result of flexibility of the Embassy and therefore it has increased the power of the Embassy officials vis-a-vis officials based in Helsinki.

If aid is to be utilised as a source of political bargaining leverage, how is the donor to define what actions are to be punished and what ones are to be rewarded? The greatest deterrent would be to draw a line between two generally defined political orientations (democratic vs. undemocratic) and sanction them with all or nothing options. A less powerful but more flexible option would be to punish and reward actions not orientations. Then it would not be important where the object of power stands but rather where it moves: one step towards the respect of human rights will cost the loss of a certain amount of aid. If the donor orientation on this is vague or if it is not clearly signalled to the recipient, sanctions and conditionality are ineffective.

In the question of whether to sanction positions or actions there seems to be a general tendency of recipient country-based officials to prefer action-oriented policies while the Parliament (and sometimes the highest donor-country-based officials of the Foreign Ministry) to prefer more blunt instruments, such as the position-oriented sanctioning (Kivimäki 1993). In Finland's case it seemed that also Helsinki-based officials tended to prefer action-orientation rather than position-orientation, leaving only the Parliament with the tendency to prefer more position-oriented policies (Toivonen 1998).

The Parliament and the leadership are normally unable to manipulate the policies of conditionality in a flexible manner. As they are also "global-norms-oriented", it is natural that these sectors were in favour of more position-oriented globally applicable categories for aid. The recipient country-based officials of the administration, on the other hand, generally tend to support a more flexible policy for aid. The Embassy put a lot of pressure on the ministry to end the forest project (discussed above) in 1997; it was difficult for Helsinki to take such strong measures (Viljanen 1998; Toivonen 1998).

Promoting Democracy, Human Rights and Good Governance

Even though it is only the information, which comes from the Embassy and the actual policies from the capital, this minor difference in lines between the Embassy and the officials in the capital indicate the general difference in bureaucratic perspectives. If one has the means and flexibility to direct strategy on who and what to influence, there is a temptation to use them. There is, however, an exception to this rule. Whenever there are necessities, that require flexibility, within the project, Embassies tend to be more supportive than the donor capital. However, if the need to discontinue a project is related to realities outside the project, such as a decision that the recipient country is too undemocratic, for example, to receive aid, not to mention if the reasons are in the donor country's budget constraints, the people closest to the realities of the project tend to hesitate (Toivonen 1998; Myllymäki 1998). This is, of course, explained with the inherent tendency of Embassies to prefer positive measure to non-flexible conditionality.

Also in the question of whether to consider the recipient state as a monolithic agent in donors human rights and democratisation diplomacy there has been general evidence (from other countries) that the higher placed a bureaucratic agent, the less inclined the unit is to operate on the level of bureaucratic agents and the more prone it is to consider states as monolithic agents (Kivimäki 1993). However, on this there does not seem to be any evidence in the case of Finland's development co-operation in Kenya.

Co-ordination between donor agencies is very advanced in Kenya. On the one hand at the level of project planning Finland participates in a group called "Donor Group on Governance and Democracy" (DGD, previously known as the *Small like-minded democracy group*) which consists of those countries most interested in aiding NGOs for democracy (Nordic countries, US, the Netherlands etc.). This group operates on an operational level i.e. project implementation level co-operation with a "technical" orientation. An example of its work was co-operation in the support of the Institute of Economic Affairs, in its preparation of the Agenda 2000 or the support of the election observation by Kenyan NGOs (through the CLARION).

A bigger and more political group of donors is the "Democratic Development Group" (DDG) consisting of all major donors to Kenya and some non-donors (EU-countries and the delegation of the European Commission, Norway, Switzerland, USA, Australia, Canada, Japan, Romania, Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary, Brazil). This is a political group exchanging views and aiming at some degree of commonality in the donor policies towards the Kenyan government. DDG is represented by ambassadors or their representatives. An example of its work is the production of the document *Principles of Free and Democratic Elections*, which was presented to the Kenyan government before the election preparation process. Partly as a result of this intervention, Kenya made the most necessary changes to its constitution to allow freer and fairer elections. Another example of the work of the DDG is a public declaration of regret over the excessive use of force by the police in breaking up a peaceful political meeting in Trans Nzola in May 1998.

Promoting Democracy, Human Rights and Good Governance

According to many donor officials the main focus of support for democracy and human rights of the DDG is in the first two components of democracy: freedom of expression, freedom of assembly and elections. Yet, as can be seen in the above-mentioned statement on the incidence of police brutality very recently, the implementation element is also monitored.

In addition to these groups, members of the EU often meet before the DDG meetings at the level of political councillors. This group, however, does not publicly take common stands since obviously this would weaken the role of the DDG, which, after all, represents more countries and represents broader donor-co-ordination.

Many governments send their political officials in Nairobi to the DDG while aid-officials represent them in the DGD. Some others like Finland do not want to make the distinction between aid and political affairs so marked and have some of their officials dealing with these issues at both forums. For example the US government's responsibilities are divided between the Embassy, with most power in the DDG and USAID, which is more influential in the DGD.

The fact that there is a need for two separate groups for economic development and political affairs like democratisation and respect of human rights reveals something of the conceptions of the donor community in Kenya. The integrated approach of seeing economic and political development as inseparable from each other has not yet reached the donor community in Nairobi. Even though governments such as Finland aim at an integrated foreign relations approach, the institutional arrangement of country specific donor-co-ordination sets certain limits to the degree of this integration. The division between economic and political developments is especially harmful in the question of conditionality. If aid and political conditionality are separated, political persuasion loses its muscle.

According to many, the economic muscle of persuasion is not really with the donors' countries or their institution of political persuasion, the DDG. Instead, the economic muscle is with the World Bank (Wasonga 1998; Ross 1998; Delcroix 1998), whose allocations to Kenya are more than ten times as big as allocations by any individual country. At the same time the World Bank cannot find itself able to participate at the DDG, due to the fact that the Bank cannot be a political mover (Matsuda 1998). Yet the World Bank is interested in the question of good economic governance as an aspect of the third component of the democratic political system. Thus it has established an institution of donor-co-ordination in support of good economic governance (Wasonga 1998).

EGG, the Economic Governance Group is an informal group of multilateral and state-donors who meets frequently but not regularly in order to co-ordinate their efforts to foster good economic governance in Kenya. The members of the group are the WB, IMF, UNDP, EU, US, UK, Japan, Germany, Canada, Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden, Italy and France. To the

Promoting Democracy, Human Rights and Good Governance

disappointment of our Embassy, Finland has so far been left out of the group (Hellman 1998).

The EGG has acted as a group from time to time vis-à-vis the Kenyan government in order to force the government to recognise some of the problems of economic governance in Kenya. The presence of the group is more frequent in the form of individual contacts by the donor governments with the government of Kenya. Very often, the country director of the World Bank, Mr. Harold Wackman, also makes public and private statements complaining of the poor economic governance of the co-operation projects between the Bank and the Government of Kenya.¹⁷ Even in these contacts consistency of policies is aimed at by the members of the EGG. The focus of EGG influence is in the reduction of corruption and more broadly good economic governance in forms of

1. Rule of law,
2. Accountability of public economic policies
3. Transparency of economic administration,
4. Efficiency in the control and management of expenditures and participation of citizens.

There is not really very much dialogue between the EGG and the DDG even though Mr Matsuda briefed the DDG about the EGG in order to co-ordinate activities, so that not too many overlaps would exist. According to the Bank view the areas of activities of the EGG and the DDG are sufficiently apart to allow two different groups (Matsuda 1998).

A huge junk of international aid money is administered by the World Bank. This means that not only aid and political persuasion are separated, but also that democratisation is divided largely between the support of the first two components on the one hand and the third on the other. The aim of good governance is separated from that of participation, and is treated as a question of rationality rather than democracy. What the World Bank is doing is tremendously important, and as an institution of its size it might well have a true thrust towards the better.

However, from the point of view of democratisation it is probably less than optimal that the greatest effort in democratisation is taken by an agency who perceives itself as non-political (i.e. does not acknowledge its political responsibility). The fact that Finland is not yet a member of the EGG means that Finland's role in questions related to the support for good governance is very limited.

In the analysis of the substance of Finland's real effort to support democracy and human rights in Kenya the dialogue with the Kenyan government is absolutely essential. The main forum of political dialogue, where Finland's development co-operation is concerned, are the annual program review negotiations, where Kenya presents its wishes for the new projects, and Finland presents its wishes and conditions for the continuation of co-operation.

Promoting Democracy, Human Rights and Good Governance

Participants in the negotiations, on the Kenyan side, have been the highest bureaucratic directors or their representatives of co-operating ministries, heads of units involved (or who would like to be involved). The Department of Finance (external resources section) organises meetings and co-ordinates the process (and the whole Kenyan development co-operation). The Finnish side is represented by the head of the Africa Unit, Department of International Development Co-operation, the Kenya desk officer, the Ambassador and the Secretary for Development Co-operation of the Finnish Embassy in Nairobi.

Conditionality used in these negotiations has been mainly related to political concepts of human rights and democracy and lately the question of free and fair elections has dominated the scene. In the annual negotiations in 1996 Finland expressed very explicitly its objections to the mismanagement of development aid and to some of the problems in political participation and civil rights. According to estimates by a Finnish official in Nairobi, conditionality has changed Kenya's rhetoric, but very little on the level of real outcomes (Viljanen 1998).¹⁸

Yet it can be seen that the target groups and areas of development co-operation suggested to Finland by the Kenyan government reflect some influence by anticipation. Vulnerable groups in the least developed and sometimes even discriminated areas are suggested as targets of co-operation and ecological sustainability or empowerment of the least influential groups are intended as aims of co-operation (UM 1997). Yet, if the ratio of success in reaching the goals is as poor as the World Bank country director claims and almost 70% of funds disbursed end up in unintended destinations, good project descriptions do not mean much. Yet, of course, success ratios in Finland's development co-operation can never be different than those of the World Bank.

As a result of Finland's dissatisfaction with the problems of democracy human rights and good governance, annual negotiations were cancelled in 1997 as a form of negative sanctioning. From the beginning of year 1997, the Embassy in Nairobi had been sending negative reports on the human rights and democracy situation and the management of co-operation. This has led to a freeze of projects and the cancellation of one forest project. Furthermore, elections were not fair enough to warrant further co-operation, so the Ambassador sent a negative report resulting in a decision by the Ministry in March, to phase out all projects channelled through the Kenyan Government. The Kenyan government was informed of this with no time-tables or concrete conditions for continuation of co-operation being offered. In the decision to phase out co-operation with the Kenyan government questions of economic governance became essential. According to an embassy official, if it had not been for the poor management of co-operation, aid would not have ended.

The obvious reason why conditionality in Finland's bilateral relations with Kenya is less explicit (i.e. no strict conditions for the continuation of government support) is the fact that Finland sees the multilateral, Nairobi-based forums as its main forum of political influence in Kenya. The democracy

Promoting Democracy, Human Rights and Good Governance

conception of DDG-conditionality is based on the core issue of political democracy, while the less essential and more controversial elements of democracy (such as economic democracy, social conditions of democracy etc.) are ignored. This is due to the fact that the group is so large and consists of so many different views.

There is a perception within the group that there is a division between those countries who have the biggest economic stake (in form of investments for example) in the country (the UK for example) and countries who “do not need to care so much about the stability of Kenya” (Wolf 1998). According to the head of USAID, Nairobi, the group differs in opinion between one extreme of countries who are close to being prepared to “let Kenya off the hook” and countries who are close to wanting to destroy the stability of the country. Finland, along with other Nordic Countries, of course, is perceived as belonging to the latter category, which stresses more the issue of human rights and democracy. In reality, it seems, there is a division between countries whose Kenya-officials feel that, the status quo is the pre-requirement for stability and officials who perceive that an undemocratic status quo is the main problem in Kenya’s instability.

The DDG has frequent meetings with the Kenyan government and even though it tries not to insult nationalistic sensitivities by avoiding too explicit political demands, document like the *Principles of Free and Democratic Elections* are considered to have had a strong impact on the Kenyan government. In its areas of focus the opinions of the DDG are taken very seriously by the Kenyan government. This is despite the fact that the direct contribution of the donor governments to Kenya is rather limited. One of the reasons is that in the aid-dependent political culture of Kenya, the popular legitimacy of the government is partly dependent on the public opinions expressed by the major donors. Yet the attitude of the Kenyan officials in charge of the administration of external resources (aid) reveal a weakening of the donor leverage of political influence.¹⁹

According to many observers the core of aid-conditionality in Kenya is in the EGG, which has the muscle for political influence. At the same time as mentioned the EGG does not recognise its political role and it does not focus on the two first components of the democratic political system.

Another forum of dialogue with in the World Bank activity is the institution of meetings of the World Bank Consultative Group, which reviews the progress of the Kenyan Structural Adjustment Program. This forum which convenes at best annually, but has recently been cancelled every time after 1995, reviews not only the state of economy and good governance, but also gives floor to the donor capital view on political developments. The power of this forum is based on the fact that the World Bank tends to operate on the terms of the donor nations, and does not endorse activity unless also the donor countries endorse it. Therefore, consultative group meetings are economically very important for Kenya. Since the meetings allow the more political voice of the donors, and are often followed and influenced to by all actors of human

Promoting Democracy, Human Rights and Good Governance

rights policies, this is a form of dialogue, which very concretely tie human rights to the structural adjustment and aid.

Furthermore, the meetings produce public documents and statements, which are closely followed by all political groups in Kenya. This brings to the dialogue an additional ingredient of political importance, since it links the question of human rights concretely to the legitimacy of the Kenyan government. Naturally, the problem of the Consultative Group meeting is that it cannot follow the developments in Kenya in a flexible manner, since meetings are not held often enough.

The last component of the democratic system is focused on by another strong actor in donor-recipient co-ordination and dialogue, the European Commission and its delegation in Kenya. Even though the Commission in Brussels seeks a more up-front role in democratisation and the promotion of human rights, the commission has a personnel structure, which does not allow it to take a responsible political action in Kenya. The mission has sectoral experts in many important aspects of development co-operation, but lacks one in political affairs. Also the administrative structure of programming implies inflexibility in questions of democracy and human rights. The main decisions on aid are made for five years and, therefore, reacting to changes in the human rights or democracy situation would be difficult. The Commission can use the bluntest instrument of conditionality by withdrawing altogether from Kenya if the human rights situation becomes impossible. However, actions somewhere between not doing anything and leaving the country are difficult because of the long timespan of planning.

Most of the funds allocated in National Indicative Programs for Kenya are for programmable aid, which is channelled through the government. Non-programmable aid is mostly tied to the Stabex (aiming for the stabilisation of commodity prices) and even in the modest aid for projects with NGOs. The Commission did not have a single human rights or democracy-related project.

With no political officer the delegation of the Commission in Kenya does not, have a meaningful role in the DDG, even though it is a member. However, some of the leverage brought by the huge contribution to the Kenyan government (160m ECUs for the next 5 years, European Development Fund 8) of the Commission can probably be used by the individual contributing member-nations within the DDG.

The role of the European Commission in Kenya is more active within the EGG. Obviously, since the Commission is jointly managing huge projects with the Kenyan government, its interests in efficient project management forces it necessarily to be involved in the effort to build good economic governance in Kenya. Also, the lack of political expertise does not hinder the activity of the Commission within the EGG so much, since the economic sectoral specialists are well aware of the components of good economic governance (Delcroix 1998).

What Kind of Human Rights and Democracy Concept the Organization of Dialogue and Coordination Reflects?

The organisation of country co-ordination in the promotion of democracy and human rights in Kenya reflects efficiency and responsibility towards the total effects of the donor community. In Kenya, development co-operation and support for democratisation has avoided the problems caused by insufficient co-ordination of the total impact on the recipient country. Different donors do not balance the effects of each other out, nor do they create imbalances caused by insufficient co-ordination.

The problems of co-ordination and dialogue in Kenya are related to the overall problems of some donor agencies who divide such elements of the democratisation assistance strategy which are not considered inseparable by present democracy thinking. On the one hand development co-operation should acknowledge its political responsibilities (Auvinen & Kivimäki 1997) and thus there should not be a division in the functions of the DDG and the DGD. In the case of Finland it seems that the link is clear and there is not the same thinking as in the case of some other donors (the UK for example) of a more or less complete separation between the two functions. Yet the organisation of donor co-ordination and dialogue makes it difficult for Finland to link aid and human rights or democracy if the dialogues are separated and the DDG just represents countries as political actors, not as donors.

The distinction between the EGG and the DDG, also, reflects a conception of democratisation, which is in accord with the latest research on political economy, which emphasises the indivisibility of public policies' administration and economic management from political administration. Neither does it fit in the ideas of integrated political and economic development. The reason for this division is also related to the donor agencies, especially the World Bank, but also the European Community. If these agencies do not recognise their responsibilities for the political implications of their aid, it is impossible for them to be involved in political conditionality. Yet for the purpose of efficiency of management of their development co-operation they feel the need to be involved in the development of good economic governance in Kenya. Thus there needs to be two dialogue frameworks (DGD and the DGD) for the first two elements of the democratic political system and for the third component (EGG).

Since Finland's money began to flow in development co-operation of the delegation of the European Commission in Kenya (in July 1998), Finland

Promoting Democracy, Human Rights and Good Governance

should develop an interest in ensuring that the Commission's huge resources in persuasion are used for the promotion and support of democracy in a more flexible and balanced manner. One of the pre-requirements would naturally be that the delegation had the necessary human resources for the surveillance of the political impact of their undertakings in Kenya: a post of political adviser is needed to strengthen the political responsibility of the delegation.

Conclusions

While there is no need to pretend that Finland's experience can be generalized to just any nation, the case study perspective clearly gives some indication of the overall difficulties the practical implementation of promotion of democracy faces.

In the institutional realm, the difficulties of harmonizing the political and development cooperation priorities seems to continue to be a central problem. While development cooperation is no longer seen as apolitical activity, its organization often reflects the historical perception of aid as a purely humanitarian and non-partisan element in foreign policies. The de facto separation of donor agencies and foreign policy planning of states and international organizations hampers the policy of the promotion of democracy and leaves the definition of objectives to the political units while the means are in the development cooperation administration. The administrative separation of means and objectives thus remains the main obstacle.

In terms of defining the strategic objectives in the promotion of democracy, it seems that the primary problem is related to the balance between supporting the input and output mechanisms of democratic governance. A democratic polity collects popular preferences, waives them proportionally, forms a public preference as a result of the process and then professionally implements policies that reflect the public preference. Systematic obstruction in any of the phases of the democratic process ruins the totality of the democratic polity. Democratic decision-making and professional implementation do not mean anything if the articulation of popular preferences is not free, as do not free popular articulation and democratic decision-making, if the implementation does not follow the democratic decisions.

Thus the promotion of democracy cannot follow a single formula, but it needs to respond to the particular problems the recipient country has in its democratic process. The choke points of the process need to be addressed instead of addressing only the same issues in every country. In Kenya most of the serious problems of democracy and human rights are in the implementation

Promoting Democracy, Human Rights and Good Governance

of political decisions. Yet most of the bilateral development cooperation projects tend to concentrate on civil society, while the implementation of policies is normally encouraged to follow the norms of economic rationality (defined in neo-liberal terms) and good governance rather than policies that have been formulated in a democratic process.

Finally, the case study clearly shows the problems in the power political setting of the promotion of democracy and human rights. If the political considerations and economic instruments of development cooperation are separated from each other, as is done in the separation of the DDG and DGD, democratisation and human rights promotion can never reflect the indivisible nature of economic and political elements of democracy and human rights. Furthermore, if the instruments of persuasion are with economic organizations, the democracy of the democratisation cannot be guaranteed. While the disparities in power balances of the recipient nations give legitimacy to the external effort to defend the vulnerable within an undemocratic polity of the developing country, the international disparity in the implementation of the intervention weakens the efficiency and legitimacy of the exercise. While political organizations might have a bigger claim in political actions, most of the means in the promotion of democracy in Kenya, for example, are with economic organizations, ruled according to economic principles rather than political principles of democracy. Thus, the vast resources either define explicitly on the basis of one dollar one vote, what kind of democracy is to be promoted in developing countries or as in the case of Kenya, the big players refuse to admit their responsibilities or address the question from an extremely general point of view. In the former case, donors whose own democratic credentials are weak (such as the Commission of the EU) simply look away from political issues and refuse to allocate money to the political considerations of aid. In the latter case the donor agency (such as the World Bank) go for the promotion of good governance, which they can approach from a politically less controversial point of view.

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Notes

¹ Terhi Lehtinen & Timo Kivimäki (1998).

² Yet of course questions of good governance, and human rights are often matters of life and death.

³ The presentation of the co-operation with the UNDP is based on Wasonga 1998 and Hellman 1998.

⁴ In addition to these decisions on the funding are made by the Strategic Public Relations' project "Civil Education for Constitutional Reforms".

⁵ The presentation on the Media institute and its projects are based on an analysis of all the existing numbers of the Expression today, and interviews with Hellman (1998) and Makali (1998).

⁶ The quality of research in Kenyan NGOs cannot be judged easily by viewing the affiliation and positions of the people involved. Especially in the field of journalism, but also in political science, positions in the main universities do not mean a lot because of the low levels of incentives and the high level of corruption in academic life.

⁷ The presentation on the CRIC is based on several CRIC publications (1996, 1997, 1998abcd) and interviews with Otieno (1998) and Hellman (1998).

⁸ The presentation on CLARION is based on interviews with Mute (1998) and Hellman (1998) and on CLARION publications (1998ab).

⁹ This is also the position of the Marxist and the Liberalist school of political thought as well as the main idea of the so-called International political economy thinking (see Strange 1988, Gilpin 1987 etc.)

¹⁰ Obviously, an analysis by a political scientist/political economist on the issues of 1997 and 1998 (issues 11-17 1997, 18-20, 1998) cannot be a reliable basis for any final evaluation of the quality of the journal.

¹¹ This presentation on the Agenda 2000 is based on interview and correspondence with Robert Shaw (1998).

¹² This presentation on ordinary development co-operation projects is based on UM (1997ab) and Viljanen (1998)

¹³ According to Robert Dahl (1982, 11) input democracy requires at least control of elected officials over government, frequent and fair elections, general right to vote, and run for elective offices, freedom of expression, information and association.

¹⁴ For a theoretical discussion on output and input democracy, see Diamond 1993, 97-100. In political debate this discussion is reflected in the differences of emphasis in European and Asian democracies.

Promoting Democracy, Human Rights and Good Governance

¹⁵For the basis of an analysis of a political system along these lines refer to the classics of systems analysis, such as Easton 1965.

¹⁶This same problem could be seen in the peace-building effort of the international community in Somalia. In order to facilitate a dialogue, the international community offered its assistance in inviting NGOs and community leaders into several brainstorming conferences. However, some of the invited leaders felt that the invited people represented all interests in Somalia, and thus could claim political power in the determination of the future of Somalia.

¹⁷In May 16, 1998 he complained in an address, published in all major Kenyan newspapers, of the fact that only \$70m out of the \$200m disbursed to Kenya yearly as project aid by the Bank goes to its intended purposes and that \$640m in project aid from the Bank to Kenya has not been disbursed due to the poor and late implementation of the work (Harold Wackman, cited in Daily Nation May 17, 1998).

¹⁸After the phasing out of development co-operation with the Kenyan government, even this rhetorical impact has been lost: today the Kenyan government accepts the ending of the relationship as a fact of life, without much protesting. (Viljanen 1998).

¹⁹In an interview, the head of the external resources section of the Finance Ministry emphasized that political affairs such as democracy and human rights did not belong to his section (Koetch 1998). Yet his section was always in a central role in the DDG dialogue meetings.

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